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Shariah–compliant real estate investments in the past decade have received attention not only in the 
Middle East but globally. Research in Shariah-compliant real-estate investments are sparse and in 
some cases non-existent. In this study, the role that Shariah principles and compliance play in firm 
value and firm performance is investigated. One survey and three empirical studies that examine 
Shariah compliance in real-estate investments are conducted; these comprise (a) Shariah compliance in 
real-estate investments in the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) (b) leverage choice of Islamic and 
Shariah-compliant real-estate firms (c) the idiosyncratic risks of Shariah-compliant real-estate 
investment trusts, and (d) the corporate real-estate ownership of Shariah-compliant firms.  
The findings of this thesis are as follows: The first essay is a survey in which 18 senior executives in 
the Islamic finance and real-estate industry from the Gulf Cooperation Council are interviewed. This 
survey provides the template for the subsequent research questions in the empirical studies. There exist 
comparative differences between general finance and Islamic finance and its application in real-estate 
development financing and investment. Equity Shariah instruments are in high demand from real 
estate investors; however they are rarely offered by Islamic banks. In addition, survey results confirm 
that Islamic financiers tend to partner real-estate companies through land acquisition to post-
construction, contrary to how conventional financiers operate. The survey also points to the 
importance of political environments, legal and institutional frameworks and human capital expertise 
as factors in which Shariah-compliant real estate firms consider when taking real estate investment 
 viii 
 
decisions. Finally, results show that Shariah-compliant investments have systematic differences based 
on how developed the Islamic financial system of that region is. 
The second essay examines the leverage choice of Shariah-compliant and Islamic public-listed real-
estate firms. Past literature assumes that capital availability depends on a firm’s characteristics this 
chapter explores how compliance to Shariah principles or law may also be associated with a firm’s 
choice of capital structure Shariah principles or law may also be associated with a firm’s capital 
structure choice is explored. The study finds that Islamic real-estate firms (with an internal Shariah 
board) are significantly less leveraged than general real-estate firms; however, the results of Shariah-
compliant firms (inclusion in the Dow Jones Islamic Index) are inconclusive. After controlling for firm 
characteristics and fixed effect on each firm, the results of lower leverage remain significant and 
persistent in Islamic firms. On further examination, the earlier differences in lower leverage by Islamic 
real-estate firms can be explained by their poor access to the debt market and the unwillingness of 
Islamic growth firms to explore leverage as a source of capital.  
The third essay investigates the impact of Shariah-compliant investment principles on the idiosyncratic 
risks of a Shariah-compliant and Islamic Real Estate Investment Trust (REIT) investor using US 
REITs. The importance of idiosyncratic risks in explaining cross-sectional returns of a synthetic 
Shariah-compliant REIT investor’s portfolio is examined in this chapter. Results show a positive and 
significant relationship between expected idiosyncratic volatility and expected REIT returns of the 
synthetic Shariah-compliant portfolio (GCC Shariah compliance standards). The relationship between 
expected REIT returns and idiosyncratic volatility on Islamic REITS in Malaysia is tested and the 
results lend robust support to earlier findings on the synthetic Shariah-compliant portfolio of a positive 
and significant relationship; in other words, idiosyncratic risks are an important factor to consider in 
the pricing of Shariah-compliant and Islamic REIT stock returns. On further examination, the 
 ix 
 
significant relationship as seen in the synthetic Shariah-compliant portfolios can be explained from the 
firm-specific risks of the residential REIT sector which is the most dominant sector during the period 
of investigation. More importantly the implications of these results also point to the importance of 
Shariah compliance standards and screening methods, which are significant features associated with 
the understanding of the relationship of idiosyncratic risks on expected REIT returns of Shariah 
portfolios. 
The fourth essay focuses on corporate real-estate ownership of Shariah-compliant firms in the United 
States. A novel dataset which forms the constituents of the Dow Jones Islamic Market Index (DJIM) 
which conform to Shariah principles, particularly non-real-estate firms and their corporate real-estate 
ownership, characteristics is examined. Results show a significant correlation between Shariah-
restricted variables and corporate real-estate ownership of Shariah-compliant firms. Leverage is 
significantly positively correlated with corporate real-estate ownership (CREO) while Cash + 
interesting-bearing securities are negatively correlated with CREO. There is an insignificant 
correlation between accounts receivables and CREO. Furthermore, the role of CREO in firm 
performance, particularly systematic risk and idiosyncratic component of return, is investigated. 
Results find that, in line with previous studies, a negative relationship between systematic risk and 
CREO in Shariah-compliant firms exists; however, this result is inconsistent when results are 
examined based on industry classification. In addition, the CREO of Shariah-compliant firms does not 
explain the idiosyncratic return of Shariah-compliant firms as there exists a flat relationship between 
the idiosyncratic component of return (alpha) and corporate real-estate ownership. Results that CREO 
do not play any role in explaining the firm returns in Shariah-compliant firms are robust even when 
Shariah-restrictive variables are controlled for.  
 x 
 
Overall, this thesis highlights the effects of Shariah compliance to firm value and firm performance 
from a real-estate investment perspective. The first and second essays focus on the role of Shariah 
compliance in the Gulf Cooperation Council including an understanding of Shariah-compliant real 
estate investments and the leverage choice of Shariah-compliant real-estate firms; while the third and 
fourth essays investigate the effect of Shariah compliance on firm performance by examining the 
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In recent years, Shariah investments have gained popularity and are considered as the world’s fastest 
growing financial sector.  It has been estimated that assets under Islamic management grew from 
US$150 billion in the 1990s to around US$700 billion in 20072. Islamic funds in global financial 
institutions are estimated at $1.3 trillion, while the size of the Islamic financial market is put at $230 
billion, growing at an annual rate of 10% to15%3.   
Shariah investments are popular in the Middle East where Islam is widely practiced and such 
investments are gaining grounds in Asia and parts of Europe, with the United Kingdom at the forefront 
of the Islamic finance industry - outside of the Gulf States - as a non-Islamic country with assets under 
Islamic finance estimated at US$18.1 Billion (HM Treasury and The Banker 2008). 
Shariah investments are considered a form of ethical or socially responsible investments, while the 
latter can be traced back to the 1960s (Bauer et al, 2005); however Shariah-compliant investments 
differ from ethical due to the application of Shariah principles in their practices. Such investments tend 
to be classified more under faith-based/morally responsible investments rather than socially 
responsible investments. Forte and Miglietta (2007) argue that Islamic investments as faith-based 
investments should be excluded from the general grouping of socially responsible investment practices 
as investing as they differ both in terms of asset allocation and econometric profile. Shariah 









the form of the oil boom in the Gulf States in the early 1970s (Grais and Pelligrini, 2006). Also, the 
Islamic finance market has become awash with innovative Islamic products; this can be linked to the 
increase in demand for Islamic products by the rapidly expanding Muslim population who require 
finance products that are compatible to their beliefs.4 
The abundance of oil revenue in the Gulf States is often considered as the catalyst of the modern 
revival of Islamic finance and Shariah investments.  In this environment, Gulf States established 
development banks, and the banks processed state subsidies, were the recipients of government 
bailouts and were also patronised through management of real estate and land deals.5Banks acted as 
intermediaries and beneficiaries in the circulation of oil patronage.6  
Shariah-compliant investments represent a type of investment which conforms to Shariah laws.  
Shariah is derived from the Holy Quran (considered by Muslims as the revealed word of God) and the 
Sunnah (the sayings and practices of the Prophet Muhammad). Shariah law prohibits the giving and 
taking of riba (interest); furthermore, the Shariah law prohibits investing in companies that trade in 
non-permissible activities such as pork products, pornography, financial services (conventional), arms 
or munitions, cinema, tobacco and gambling - those investments which are considered Haram 
(unholy), which is considered a qualitative screening method qualitative screen (RICS 2005).7 Other 
concepts prohibited in Shariah investments include Gharar (Uncertainty - this includes speculation, 
short-selling and derivatives and Maysir (Gambling - this include speculation, derivatives and 













the Shariah Board analyses investments and approves them (or not) as in compliance with Shariah 
Laws.  
In recent years, several stock exchanges and financial institutions have established Shariah Indices to 
increase participation in equities by Shariah investors. In April 1999, the Kuala Lumpur stock 
exchange launched a new index called the Syariah (Shariah) index; this index is used by Shariah 
investors in benchmarking to make better informed decisions (Sadeghi 2008). Other Shariah-
compliant indices include the Dow Jones Islamic Index, the Standard and Poor’s Islamic indices, 
Morgan Stanley Capital International Islamic Index and the Financial Times Islamic Index Series. 
Generally, Shariah-compliant investments must comply with two screenings - qualitative and 
quantitative - which is set by the Shariah scholars. Currently, there are different guidelines and 
principles set by Shariah scholars of different finance institutions for defining the level of compliance 
an investment has to Shariah law; however in this thesis the Shariah guidelines of the Dow Jones 
Islamic Index are followed. According to Khaled and Mohammed (2005) as at 2005, there were 95 
Islamic mutual funds which tracked the Dow Jones Islamic Index (DJIM); this reinforces the 
popularity of the DJIM Index.  
Table 1.1 Investments 
Investments Constrained Universe Financing with Conditions 
Conventional Investment      X X 
Ethical Investment    X 
Shariah Investments     
 
 Table 1.1 above shows Shariah investments in comparison with other forms of investments: while 
conventional investments have an unconstrained universe and there are no rules when financing 
investments, ethical investment have a constrained universe and can finance investments based on 




choice. Shariah investments in equities operate within a constrained universe and are subject to 
investment financing rules, as discussed earlier. 
1.2 Shariah	Compliance	in	Real‐estate	Investments	
 
Shariah-compliant real-estate investments incorporate the application of Shariah law. The qualitative 
(halal activities8) and quantitative (restriction in financial ratios9) aspects of Shariah compliance laws 
are applied to real-estate investments before they are considered as permissible for Shariah investors. 
Shariah property funds are well established around the world. In Asia these include the Baitak Asia 
Real Estate Fund (South Asia) by Kuwait Finance house valued at US$600 million, Al-Islamic Far 
Eastern Real Estate Fund by the Dubai Islamic Bank valued at US$450 million, China Realty Fund by 
Shamil Bank valued at US$150 million;  and in Europe, these include the Islamic Real Estate 
European fund by Kuwait Finance House with a value of US$ 486 million and the Guidance Fixed 
Income Fund in the United States valued at US$200 million10 (Ibrahim et al, 2009). 
The first Islamic REIT, the Al Aqar KPJ, was established in Malaysia in August 2006 and. specialises 
in healthcare. As at 2012, the number of REITs in Malaysia had increased steadily over the years to 
three REITs; including the Al-Hadharah Boustead REIT listed in February 2007 which specialises in 
oil-palm plantation, and the Axis REIT listed in August 2005, and converted to the Islamic REIT in 
December 2008 (Ibrahim et al, 2012). The proliferation of Islamic REITs in Malaysia was motivated 
by the establishment of the first Islamic REITs’ guidelines issued by the Malaysian Securities 
Commission (See guidelines in Chapter 2). The rise in Islamic REITs in Malaysia has led to the 











the largest Islamic REITs in the world in terms of asset value which stood at S$1.08 billion11 as at 
December 2011. 
Shariah-compliant investments are similar to socially responsible investments alongside ethical 
investments. Several studies have investigated the role of ethical investments in portfolio selection; the 
results are mixed, while Diltz (1995), Sauer (1997) and Guerard (1997) conclude that there is no 
statistically significant difference between the returns of ethical screened and unscreened universes. 
However, some studies in the UK such as those of Luther et al (1992) and Mallin et al (1995) show 
evidence that ethical funds or indices seem to over-perform non-ethical funds or indices. There has 
also been an increase in empirical investigation of Shariah-compliant stocks: Hakim and Rashidan 
(2002), Hussein (2004) and Girard and Hassan (2008) investigated US stock while Ahmad and 
Ibrahim (2002), Abdullah et al (2007), Albatity and Ahmad (2008), Sadeghi (2008) and Yusof and 
Majid (2008) investigate Malaysian stocks and find no differences in the adjusted returns of Islamic 
stocks when compared to non-Islamic stocks. A few studies, however, also highlight that Islamic 
stocks outperform non-Islamic stocks including those of Hussein and Omran (2005) and Abdullah et al 
(2007). 
There is limited research on Shariah-compliant real-estate investments due to their relative newness in 
the financial capital markets. In terms of Shariah-compliant REITs, however, Osmadi (2006) 
examined the development of Islamic REITs in Malaysia. Subsequent studies involved the comparison 
in returns between Shariah and non-Shariah-compliant REITs including Faishal and Eng’s (2008) 
examination of synthetic Shariah-compliant US REITs, and find that non-compliant portfolios 








(2009) investigate Islamic REITs in Malaysia and find that they provide low risk and portfolio 
diversification benefits in comparison to conventional REITs. 
1.3 Problem	Statement	
 
Shariah compliance in real-estate investments gives rise to two critical problems for investors. The 
first problem is the reduction in size of the investment universe due to limitations in operating in 
certain business activities considered as haram in Shariah law, and the second is  the restriction in 
financial ratios of no more than 33% of leverage, cash + interest-bearing securities and account 
receivables which may have a detrimental effect on firm value and performance. This critical problem 
affects the investment choice of 20% of the world’s population who are Muslims (Girard and Hassan 
2005). The impact of Shariah compliance on investments remains inconclusive, as several factors 
inherent to Shariah-compliant investments may contribute negatively to performance. These factors 
include the restricted investment universe according to religious prescriptions which may lead to lower 
diversification levels specifically with the exclusion of certain industries such as banking and finance 
as well as the alcohol and tobacco industry; this may result in a higher company-specific risk without a 
compensating higher return. In retrospect, several factors may also contribute positively to 
performance, as SC firms employ less debt, and firms with less debt are less risky and may be more 
profitable. Other researchers such as Lee and Faff (2009) consider responsible non-financial 
investment as representative of an advance form of risk management. This argument is supported by 
the cases of firms such as Enron, Tyco and Worldcom which were excluded from the Dow Jones 
Islamic Index before the respective scandals which affected the firms (Ghoul and Karam 2007). This 
thesis employs an empirical approach which is quantitative in nature to examine the effects of Shariah 
compliance on real-estate investments by investigating Islamic and non-Islamic financial markets, 
thereby providing a holistic framework for decision making on portfolio choice. One of the aims of 




this research is to provide evidence of how religious laws affect real-estate investments and results 
would enable investors to make better informed decisions so as to maximise their real-estate 
portfolios. 
Despite the growth of Shariah-compliant real-estate investments, there is little or no research that has 
addressed the effects of the Shariah compliance issues as previously highlighted on firm value, firm 
performance (risks) and CREO. An empirical analysis in this field is thus appropriate. In the last 
decade there have been limited attempts to explore Shariah real-estate investments; however, no such 
work has looked at the case of the GCC, the centre for Islamic finance. Most of the work on Shariah-
compliant real-estate investment trust has been qualitative and there is a lack of empirical work on the 
effects of Shariah compliance. This thesis employs new data from the Dow Jones Islamic Index, and 
explores novel ways of measuring Shariah compliance in firms. 
The topics explored in this thesis have important implications for Shariah-compliant firms. The 
importance of leverage to firms remains a key topic under the capital structure choice of firms as 
benefits and cost arise from the optimal use of capital. This research area, though, is non-existent for 
Shariah-compliant firms. Furthermore in essays three and four, the effects of Shariah compliance to 
firm returns are explored. There is yet to be a study that investigates the idiosyncratic risks of Shariah-




The effects of Shariah compliance on real-estate investments is a very wide research area, hence this 
research only examines a limited area in the field. Therefore, this thesis is restricted to (a) the 
understanding of Shariah-compliant real estate investments in the GCC, (b) the capital structure choice 
of Islamic and Shariah-compliant firms in the GCC, (c) the idiosyncratic risks of Shariah-compliant 




real-estate investment trusts, and (d) the corporate real estate ownership and firm returns of Shariah-
compliant firms.  
This study focuses on Shariah-compliant real estate investments particularly public listed real-estate 
firms, real-estate investment trusts and firms which are constrained in investing in certain business 
activities considered haram and are not able to exceed  33% of certain financial ratios including 
leverage, cash + interest-bearing securities and account receivables. Understanding the effects of these 
Shariah-compliant principles to a firm’s performance and value is critical to the sustenance of these 
hybrid forms of real-estate investment. 
1.5 Research	Objectives		
 
The thesis attempts to answer a main research question: What is the effect of Shariah compliance on 
firm value and firm performance? The first and second essays focus on the effect of Shariah 
compliance on firm value in the Gulf Cooperation Council while the third and fourth essays examine 
the effect of Shariah compliance on firms’ performance in the United States. 
The first essay examines the effect of Shariah compliance on real-estate firms in the Gulf Cooperation 
Council. Previous literature is followed as seen in the Royal Institute of Chartered Surveyors (2006) 
paper titled Current trends in Shariah property investment in surveying senior executives involved in 
Shariah-compliant real-estate investment. As Islamic finance in theory offers an alternative to 
conventional financing and encourages the use of profit- and loss-sharing instruments, the profit and 
loss instruments are examined to understand if in fact they are popular in the GCC. The essay 
examines the role that Islamic banks play pre- and post-construction of real-estate developments. Here, 
the main goal is to understand the key difference between Shariah compliance and conventional real-
estate investments specifically in the GCC, the centre of Islamic finance, which informs the research 
question: 




 What are the key differences between Shariah compliance and conventional real estate investments in 
the GCC?  
The second essay examines the leverage choice of public listed Islamic and Shariah-compliant real-
estate firms. The essay explores differences in leverage between Islamic/Shariah-compliant firms and 
general firms, and the study applies the methodology of Faulkender and Petersen (2005) in 
determining leverage choice in firms. A novel approach in measuring Islamic firms based on firms 
with an internal Shariah board is employed in this essay. The public listed real-estate firms present a 
perfect test bed to examine the differences in leverage choice between Islamic/Shariah-compliant and 
general real-estate firms. A lower leverage in Islamic/Shariah firms is expected; however, identifying 
the reasons behind the use of less leverage in Shariah-compliant firms is paramount. Thus, the main 
research question for the second essay is;  
Does compliance to Shariah principles affect leverage choice?  
The third essay examines the idiosyncratic risks of Shariah-compliant real-estate investment trusts, as 
well as the relationship between idiosyncratic risks and firm performance (returns) of Shariah-
compliant firms. Idiosyncratic risks are an important factor to consider in the returns of these firms due 
to the restrictions imposed on Shariah-compliant firms concerning investment in certain business 
activities. In this essay US REITS are examined and synthetic Shariah portfolios are created for the 
test, as a result of the infancy12 of Shariah-compliant investment trusts. However, the relationship 
between idiosyncratic risks and returns of Islamic REITs in Malaysia is investigated in the robustness 
test. With the limited investment universe which exists for Shariah investors, the prediction is that 
idiosyncratic risks of Shariah-compliant portfolio is significantly related to firm performance 









Do limitations in the investment universe of a portfolio measured as its idiosyncratic risks explain firm 
returns?  
The fourth essay explores the role of corporate real-estate ownership in explaining firm performance 
including risk and return of Shariah-compliant non-real-estate firms. Prior studies have examined the 
role of corporate real ownership in explaining firm performance, and find that firms with high CREO 
are low risk and have low returns. Shariah-compliant restrictions have a correlation with corporate 
real-estate ownership, particularly in terms of leverage. Hence the restrictions in Shariah ratios which 
are highly correlated with CREO and may have an impact on the relationship between CREO and firm 
performance are investigated in this study. In addition, the industry classifications of Shariah-
compliant firms are examined to test if the restrictions contribute to the findings.  The research 
question for the fourth essay is;  
Do the limitations in Shariah financial ratios have linkages to the relationship between CREO and 
firm performance of Shariah-compliant firms? 
1.6 Research	Contributions		
 
The first essay extends the literature on the understanding of Shariah-compliant real-estate 
investments. The essay examines these investments in the Gulf Cooperation Council through a survey 
of Senior Executives. The study presents first-hand knowledge from the Shariah-compliant real-estate 
industry and sheds light on comparative differences between conventional and Shariah real-estate 
investments. Significant differences such as the role of Islamic banks as partners rather than financiers 
in Shariah-compliant real-estate investments and the disparity in instruments demanded and supplied 
are highlighted. The result shows that equity Shariah instruments are in high demand by real-estate 
investors; however cost plus financing are offered in high supply by Islamic banks.  Furthermore, this 
chapter reveals that there exist regional differences which drive the perception of SC investments as a 




result of differing results with earlier work in Asia and Europe on Shariah-compliant real-estate 
investments. The results echo the findings of Hoepner et al (2011); that SC investments have 
systematic differences based on how developed the Islamic financial system of that region is.  To the 
best of the author’s knowledge, this essay represents the first survey on Shariah-compliant. The second 
essay contributes to the capital structure literature by investigating how a firm’s compliance to Shariah 
principles may be associated with their capital structure choice. There is yet to be a study on leverage 
decisions of Shariah-compliant firms - earlier findings in essay one show a mismatch in the 
instruments demanded by real-estate investors and those supplied by Islamic banks. The findings show 
that Islamic firms have lower leverage even after controlling for firm characteristics under the fixed 
effects regression. A novel approach in the measurement of Shariah-compliant firms based on firms 
with an internal Shariah board is taken in this study. The low leverage in Islamic firms is explained by 
two variables: poor access to the debt market and the lack of Islamic firms with growth opportunities 
to employ more leverage. The use of less leverage by Islamic firms has several implications. Baxter 
(1967) argues that excess leverage can reduce the value of the firm as a high degree of leverage 
increases the probability of bankruptcy and therefore increases the riskiness of the earning streams of 
the firm. Leverage is significantly lower in Islamic firms; therefore the risk of ruin is lower in Islamic 
firms as they have a considerable lower debt in their capital structure. Again, to the best of the author’s 
knowledge, the second essay is the first of its kind to examine empirically the leverage choice of 
Shariah-compliant real-estate companies in the Gulf Cooperation Council.  
The third essay extends the literature on idiosyncratic risks of real-estate investment trusts. The essay 
explores the relationship between idiosyncratic risks and returns of a Shariah-compliant real-estate 
investor’s portfolio. Findings show that the relationship between expected idiosyncratic volatility and 
expected returns is more persistent in these firms. The essay also extends the study to the 




understanding of idiosyncratic risks of Islamic REITs in Malaysia for the first time. Furthermore 
Shariah compliance standards may have a role to play in the determination of the significance of 
idiosyncratic risks to a Shariah investor’s portfolio. Shariah REITs which adopt the strict interpretation 
of Shariah may find that this decision would have a significant effect on returns unlike this is contrary 
to Shariah investors who adopt the less strict interpretation of Shariah law. The author understands that 
the third essay of this thesis is the first of its kind to investigate the idiosyncratic risks face by Shariah-
compliant investors.  
The fourth essay contributes to the corporate real-estate ownership literature, particularly the role 
CREO plays in explaining the risk and return of Shariah-compliant firms. In this study a novel data set 
from the Dow Jones Islamic Index is collected; the constituent firms of the index conform to Shariah 
principles, and the essay focuses on Shariah-compliant firms in the United States. The Shariah-
restrictive financial variable with which firms must comply raises concern of CREO of Shariah-
compliant firms since these variables are highly correlated with this form of ownership. Secondly, the 
industries in which Shariah-compliant firms are limited to gives room for further investigation into the 
relationship between firm’s performance and CREO. The CREO of Shariah-compliant firms has no 
role to play in explaining the firms’ returns contrary to earlier results in general firms, and does not 
have a significant effect on returns. These results are contrary to the case of non-Shariah-compliant 
firms. To the best of the author’s understanding, the fourth essay of this thesis is the first study to 
examine the role of CREO in returns of Shariah-compliant firms by exploring the constituents of the 
Dow Jones Islamic Index. 
Overall, this thesis contributes to real-estate literature and knowledge in several ways. Currently from 
an investor’s perspective, Muslims constitute about 20% of the world population (Girard and Hassan 
2005). Investors are able to make better informed decisions on the type of Shariah-compliant 




investments to participate in. Decision making of Shariah investors is further enhanced; for instance in 
the third chapter, investors are aware of less leverage employed by Islamic firms which reduces the 
riskiness of ruin. In Chapter four, the thesis further highlights the need for investors to consider 
Shariah-compliant investments based on the Shariah-compliance screening methods which are 
peculiar to regions. Investors are also made aware through this research study that there exist 
systematic differences in Shariah-compliant real-estate investments across regions.  
From a regulator’s perspective, results show that different Shariah-compliance regulations have 
differing reactions to unique risks associated with the Shariah-compliant investment and therefore 
return. Therefore, stock exchanges can increase the attractiveness of participation in Shariah-compliant 
investments by selecting distinctive Shariah screening methods based on the risk level of potential SC 
investors. 
From a Shariah-compliant fund manager’s perspective, better informed choices are made when 
managing portfolios. Managers may also structure portfolios based on leverage decisions of firms as 
Islamic firms tend to use less leverage than Shariah-compliant firms or general firms, as discussed in 
Chapter three. Fund managers may also structure portfolios based on the type of screening 
methodologies (Malaysian standards or GCC standards). The results of this study show that there 
exists a significant difference between risk and returns of different Shariah screening methods.  
Overall this thesis provides a framework through empirical evidence to enhance and improve decision 




The rest of the thesis is organised as follows: Chapter two examines the real-estate development 
financing and investments in the Gulf Cooperation Council including the comparative differences 




between conventional and Shariah-compliant real estate investments. Chapter three examines the 
capital structure choice of Shariah-compliant real estate companies; the relationship between 
idiosyncratic risks and synthetic-created Shariah-compliant portfolio returns is examined in Chapter 
four and Chapter five examines the role of corporate real-estate ownership in Shariah-compliant 
companies. Chapter six concludes the thesis, highlights the limitations of the research and provides 
recommendations for future work on Shariah-compliant real-estate investments. 
	










In recent times, Islamic banking and finance has witnessed exponential growth, and it is regarded as 
the fastest growing in the global finance industry. As at 2006, Shariah-compliant products (excluding 
Iran) were valued at US$450 billion and were estimated to exceed US$1 trillion in 2010 with 
estimated growth rates of about 17% per annum (McKinsey 2006). It has been estimated that the assets 
under Islamic management grew from US$150 billion in the mid-1990s to US$700 billion in 2007 
(HM Treasury 2008). 
Islamic Finance, for instance, has grown in leaps and bounds outside of the Middle East, from where it 
first originated. Three countries - Iran, Pakistan and Sudan - have completely Islamised their financial 
institutions, while other countries have introduced Islamic regulatory systems for the creation of 
Islamic banks. In Malaysia, as at 2008, Islamic banking assets accounted for 11.8% of the total assets 
in the Malaysian banking sector while in Indonesia, as at 2005, the Islamic banking sector was 1.8% of 
the total Indonesian banking sector (Khan and Bhatti 2008). Singapore is also making inroads in 
Islamic finance, as the first fully fledged Islamic bank (the Islamic Bank of Asia) opened in 2008.  
In Western Europe, the United Kingdom has made significant progress in the development of Islamic 
finance; in 2008, the UK had the highest volume of Islamic assets under management by a non-Islamic 




country, worth US$18.1 billion. Table 2.1 below highlights the top ten ranking countries involved in 
the management of Shariah-compliant assets. 
Table 2.1 Shariah-compliant Assets 
Rank Country Shariah-compliant Assets US$bn 
1 Iran 235.3 
2 Saudi Arabia 92.0 
3 Malaysia 67.1 
4 Kuwait 63.1 
5 United Arab Emirates 49.1 
6 Bahrain 37.4 
7 Qatar 21.0 
8 United Kingdom 18.1 
9 Turkey 15.8 
10 Pakistan 6.3 
 
Source: HM Treasury and the Banker (November 2008); Top 500 Islamic Financial Institutions 
(2008). 
 
The financing of real-estate developments and investment in the Gulf Cooperation Council is unique 
when compared to other regions in the world as a large number of real-estate developers and investors 
adhere to Islamic principles. Unlike conventional finance, Islamic finance and investments is governed 
by Islamic law which prohibits the giving and taking of interest (riba), encourages profit- and loss-
sharing, prohibits activities which are considered to be sinful under Islamic laws such as involvement 
with businesses which engage in alcohol, tobacco, pork products, ammunitions and pornography; and 
prohibits certain activities which include gambling, speculation (maysir), and uncertainty (gharar) 
which includes derivative instruments.  
The principles of Islamic Finance are derived from Shariah Law which includes the Holy Quran, the 
Sunnah (the sayings and actions of Prophet Mohammed) and the Figh which represents interpretation 
of the Shariah law by Islamic scholars.  Islamic Finance encourages an equity-based partnership 
system through risk-sharing, as an alternative to an interest- or a debt-based system. The two systems 




(Shariah and Conventional financing) differ from one another, as in the latter system, interest is earned 
on a loan regardless of the outcome of the project being financed. 
The most important of the principles of Islamic finance is the prohibition of interest (riba). Although 
there are debates as to the true meaning of riba, widespread interpretations suggest that ban on riba 
implies a ban on interest, the Holy Quran states ‘Allah forbids riba and permits trade” (Aggarwal and 
Yousef 2000). In order for an Islamic finance product to be considered as Shariah-compliant, Shariah 
scholars examine the product to determine if it is structured in accordance to Shariah laws and 
principles. An Islamic product which is Shariah-compliant is issued a fatwa (decree) following which 
it could then be marketed to investors. An essential responsibility of the Shariah scholars is to ensure 
that the Islamic product continues to remain Shariah-compliant. 
2.1.1 Motivation	of	study	
 
In this study, real-estate development financing and investment in the Gulf Cooperation Council are 
investigated; Islamic financing has seen particularly rapid growth in the Gulf states (the region 
consists of six countries, the United Arab Emirates, the state of Bahrain, the kingdom of Saudi Arabia, 
the sultanate of Oman, the state of Qatar and the state of Kuwait). As at November 2008, Shariah-
compliant assets in the GCC were valued at $262.2 billion (HM Treasury 2008) and the region 
remains the centre for Islamic Finance worldwide. The birth of Islam can be traced to this region 
particularly in Saudi Arabia where the two holiest shrines are situated. 
This study investigates Shariah financing of property developments as well as real-estate investments 
particularly in the Gulf Cooperation Council. The objective of the essay is to investigate how 
compliance to Islamic principles affects real estate development financing and also understand the 
complex real estate investment environment in the Gulf region. The research motivation is based on 
the emergence of Islamic finance and banking which is a relatively new phenomenon and has grown 




exponentially in global finance in the last few decades. Islamic finance has also increased in popularity 
in Muslim as well as non-Muslim countries. Real-estate investments are considered as Shariah-
compliant friendly and in the past decade have witnessed an increase in the capital financing of real 
estate developments in the Middle East, Asia and across the world with Islamic financing structures 
and products.  
There are a number of activities involving real-estate investments structured with Islamic finance in 
the Gulf States. In 2006, Al Roustamani Enterprise set up a US$2.3 billion Shariah-compliant real-
estate development fund to invest in a global chain of Shariah-compliant hotels. In the same year, the 
Dubai-based Nakheel Group launched a $US 2.5 billion sukuk13 bond for the financing of real-estate 
developments. In August 2006, a Qatar real-estate investment company issued a sukuk worth $US 270 
million. The deal was structured by the Standard Chartered Bank; a diminishing musharakah14 
structure was used to finance the transaction and it was the first corporate sukuk to emerge from Qatar. 
Activities exist outside the GCC in financing real-estate investments with Islamic financing and 
Shariah-compliant real-estate activities. The world’s first listed Islamic REIT and Asia’s first 
healthcare REIT, the Al Aqar KPJ REIT, was listed on the Malaysian stock exchange in August 2006 
with an asset size of $US 260 million. Subsequently, the Al-Hadharah Bousted REIT consisting of oil 
palm plantation as assets was listed in January 2007. The largest Shariah Compliant REIT by asset 
size, Sabana REITs in Singapore, made an initial public offering of US$510 million in 2010, and the 
average property valuation as at September 2010 was $US640 million. 
                                                            
13 The Sukuk in recent years is a very popular Islamic instrument for the financing of real-estate development and investment. Sukuk are 
Islamic bonds which are traded on capital markets. Sukuk are asset-backed and the bonds are backed by a profit-sharing arrangement, a 
loan or sale-leaseback arrangement. Investors own a part of the underlying asset and the asset serves as collateral for debt repayments 
(Jobst 2007). 
14 This is an equity Islamic contract in which the bank and a business partner contribute to finance a project in the form of a partnership. 
Ownership is based on the share contributed towards financing. In a musharakah contract, the profits or losses are distributed to the 
financing partner and the business partner according to a pre-determined ratio. 
 




As the popularity of Shariah-compliant real-estate grows across the Gulf States and worldwide, the 
essay investigates the role that Islamic finance plays in the real-estate industry in the Gulf Cooperation 
Council, and investigates whether the processes of financing Shariah-compliant real-estate investments 
by financiers, real-estate practitioners and professionals are in line with the tenets of Shariah Law as 
prescribed in accordance with the Holy Quran through a qualitative survey. In addition the study 
investigates the real-estate investment environments of the GCC and the factors which these firms 
consider when making investment decisions. 
Section 2.1 is the literature review, section 2.3 reports on the methodology, and the analysis of the 
survey results are reported in section 2.4. Section 2.5 highlights the challenges and issues faced by the 
Shariah-compliant real-estate investment industry and section 2.6 concludes the essay. 
2.2 Literature	Review		
 
Shariah-compliant real-estate is a new area in the related literature; hence there are a limited number 
of research papers on Shariah financing and real estate, although a number of studies on the topic have 
been undertaken in the last decade.  In 2006, the RICS in conjunction with Ali Parsa of London South 
Bank University carried out a survey of key players in Islamic finance in London. Their findings show 
the investment focus of Islamic real-estate investors in Europe particularly in London. Ibrahim et al 
(2009) examined Shariah-compliant property investment in Asia focusing on investors from 
Singapore, Dubai and Bahrain, and their findings reveal that respondents from Dubai and Bahrain 
show more knowledge about Shariah-compliant principles than respondents from Singapore; their 
study also highlights the investment choices of Shariah investors in Asia.  




The aim of undertaking this study is to fill the gap in knowledge about Shariah real-estate investors 
and players in the Gulf Cooperation Council which is regarded as the Islamic finance centre of the 
world. Findings would reveal how Shariah financing of real-estate development and investments is 
carried out in the GCC, as well as the destination choice of investors, and factors considered, when 
making Shariah-compliant investments. 
2.2.1 Basic	principles	of	the	Islamic	financial	system	
 
Islamic financial systems are based on fairness and justice. The conventional system focuses on the 
economic and financial aspects of transactions; however the Islamic financial system places 
importance on religious, social, ethical and moral perspectives to enhance equality and fairness for the 
benefit of society (Iqbal 1997).  The basic framework of an Islamic financial system can be 
summarised as follows according to Iqbal (1997):  
Prohibition of interest: Islamic finance is based on an important underlying principle; Shariah law 
prohibits the giving and taking of riba. Riba means excess or increase, and is interpreted as an 
unjustifiable increase of capital in loans or sales. A guaranteed and fixed pre-determined rate on the 
principal loan amount regardless of the performance of the investment is considered as riba and is 
prohibited under Islamic finance (Iqbal 1997). 
Risk-sharing: Risk-sharing is encouraged in Islamic financing, the financier becomes a partner in the 
venture - hence risk is shared rather than transferred. 
Money as potential capital: Another principle in Islamic finance is that money should be treated as 
potential capital. According to the ideology, when money is utilised, it becomes productive. 




Prohibition of speculative behaviour: Islamic finance discourages risk and uncertainty also known 
as gharar. Excessive gharar (uncertainty and deceit) is forbidden, however some degree of gharar 
uncertainty is allowed in Islamic finance.  
Sanctity of contracts: Islamic finance upholds contracts and information must be disclosed to all 
parties involved in the transaction. This requirement in Islamic finance reduces asymmetric 
information and moral hazard in contractual obligations.  
Shariah-approved activities: In Islamic finance, certain activities are regarded as non-permissible 
and sinful (haram) and investors must desist from transacting in them. The activities which are non-
permissible include alcohol related products, pork products, gambling establishments, tobacco, arms 




Presently, there are no formal guidelines for operating an Islamic real-estate company; however from a 
Shariah law perspective, a company operating under Shariah law is prohibited from investing in 
conventional financial institutions, alcohol, pork products, pornography, gambling, cinema, arms and 
munitions- as they are classified as non-permissible investments. In addition, an Islamic real estate 
company must adhere to certain financial screening conditions. Real-estate development and 
investment must be financed using Islamic financing, if available. 
Table 2.2 provides a comparison between Shariah-compliant real-estate investments and conventional 
real-estate investments. The differences between the two types of investments lie in two forms of 
compliance: the qualitative screening in terms of the property type eligibility for investments; and a 




quantitative screening based on the accounting ratios including leverage and cash ratios expected of a 
Shariah-compliant real-estate company. 
 
Table 2.2 Comparisons between Shariah-compliant and conventional  
real-estate investment types 
 




Property Type  Prohibited from investing in alcohol, 
pork products, casinos and gaming 
establishments, cinema, arms and 
munitions, conventional financial 
institutions and pornography. 
Any Property Type 
Leverage Compliance  Debt to market value of equity must be 
less or equal to 33% 
No leverage compliance 
level 
Cash Compliance  Account receivables to market value of 
equity must be less than 45% 
No cash compliance 
level  
Revenue Generation  In some cases, non-permissible activities 
are permitted, only if it does not exceed 
a 5% and in some instances 20% 
threshold of revenue. 
No Revenue generation 
restrictions. 
Shariah Committee/ Scholars Real-estate investments are certified 
compliant by a Shariah scholar who is 
well versed in Shariah Law. Areas of 
advice include acquisitions and 
financing as well as tenant mix. 
Shariah committee is 
not required.  
	
 
The non-permissible rule applies to real-estate developers and investment companies alike; 
specifically, Islamic real-estate companies apply Shariah laws  when making investment decisions. 
Ratings Intelligence, a consulting company, provides a framework for Shariah compliance in real-
estate companies to the current Shariah-compliant Standard & Poor (S&P) Citigroup Global Property 
Index with the advice of Shariah scholars.  
Retail Spaces: For real-estate companies that lease space out to retailers, Shariah law prohibits the 
lease of space to businesses who deal in non-permissible products. According to the S&P Citigroup 
Property Index, Islamic real-estate companies are prohibited from leasing space to supermarket or 
shops which exceed 5% threshold revenue from non-permissible activities. 




Hotels:  Real-estate companies that invest in hotels are not Shariah-compliant, unless the hotel derives 
its revenue from 5% threshold from non-permissible activities or less. Hotels often sell alcohol 
beverages, while some have casinos; these are non-permissible forms of investment according to 
Shariah law. However, in the Middle East, there has been an increase in Shariah-compliant hotels 
which operate in accordance with Shariah laws - these hotels are alcohol-free and serve halal food. 
Commercial/Office Spaces: Conventional financial services as well as advertising and media are 
classified as non-compliant sectors (Ratings Intelligence 2008). Hence real-estate companies which 
invest in commercial and office space in which more than 5% of their revenue is from conventional 
financial services as well as advertising and media are regarded as non-compliant. The Shariah S&P 
Citigroup global property index specifies a benchmark ratio for Shariah real-estate companies. These 
financial ratios are also used by the Dow Jones Shariah Index to construct a Shariah index. The 
benchmark quantitative ratios comprise: 
i) Leverage Compliance: The debt to market value of equity (36 month average) must be less 
than or equal to 33%. 
ii) Cash Compliance: Account receivables to market value of equity (36 month average) must be 
less than or equal to 45% or (Cash + interest bearing securities) to market value of equity (36 
month average) must be less than or equal to 33%.  
iii) Share of Revenue from Non-Permissible Activities: In some cases, non-permissible 
activities are permitted, only if it does not exceed a 5% threshold. In other words, revenue from 








In November 2005, the Shariah Advisory Council (SAC) of the Securities Commission in Malaysia 
outlined guidelines to facilitate the establishment of an Islamic real-estate investment trust.  The 
guidelines set by the Securities Commission are the first set of guidelines worldwide that provides 
Shariah guidance on the operations and business activities of Islamic REITs. Malaysia has the largest 
number of REITS listed on the Malaysian stock exchange which conforms to Shariah law. 
	
Guidelines	for	Islamic	real‐estate	investment	trusts	
i) Properties to be acquired by an Islamic REIT must undergo a Shariah-compliant assessment, to 
be carried out by an appointed Shariah committee or adviser.  
ii) Total non-permissible activities from rental income to total turnover of the subject property 
must not exceed 20%, for any property purchased by the Islamic REITs. 
iii) The Islamic REIT fund manager should not invest in any property in which non-permissible 
activities exceed 20%. 
iv) An Islamic REIT is not permitted to own property in which all the tenants operate non-
permissible activities; this guideline still holds if the percentage of rental of that building to 
the total turnover of the Islamic REIT is below 20%. 
v) The Shariah Committee must advise the Islamic REITs not to accept a new tenant whose 
activities are fully non-permissible.  
vi) It is possible to calculate the rental of non-permissible activities from a tenant (s) operating 
mixed activities based on the ratio of area occupied by non-permissible activities to total 
area occupied. The percentage would determine the ratio of rental of non-permissible 
activities to total rent paid by the tenant (s) 




vii) For service-based activities or other forms of investment which do not require the use of space, 
the calculation method will be based on the ijtihad15 of the Shariah Committee or Shariah 
adviser of the Islamic REIT. 
viii) An Islamic REIT must ensure that all investment, deposit and financing instruments 
comply with the principles of Shariah. 
ix) Islamic REITs must use the takaful16 schemes to insure its real estate. If the takaful schemes 
are unable to offer insurance coverage, only then are Islamic REITs permitted to use 
conventional insurance.  
Islamic REITs are permitted to participate in forward sales or the purchase of currency, and 
encouraged to transact with Islamic financial institutions. If the Islamic REITs transact with financial 
institutions, then these REITs are bound by the concept of wa’d17; however Islamic REITs are 




The Gulf Cooperation Council in the last decade has seen a sharp increase in real-estate developments 
and investments; however due to the recent global economic crisis which began in 2008, there has been 
a deceleration in investments in the real-estate sector. Prior to the global credit crisis, several factors 
drove the growth of real-estate development and investments in the Gulf States, including 
The oil boom period (2002 to mid-2008) – The Gulf region has witnessed an oil boom in recent years 
where oil revenues have increased exponentially. With the increase in gross domestic product (GDP), 
                                                            
15 Ijtihad is the process of reasoning by Islamic jurists to obtain legal rulings from the source of Shariah Law. 
16 Takaful is a mutual assistance scheme based on cooperation and mutual principles, where all participants agree to assist 
each other financially in the case of predefined events taking place. 
17 Wa’d – Only one party is obligated to fulfill a promise or responsibility. 




investors have more cash to invest in assets, including real estate. During the period 2002 to 2006, the 
GCC states recorded an annual average of $US327 billion from oil revenues; this amount is double the 
oil revenue five years prior to the oil boom years (Saif 2009). This has led to a strong economic 
growth in the region. 
Improved investment environments –In recent years the GCC states have introduced several 
measures and policies to improve as well as make attractive their investment environments. For 
example, 100% foreign ownership of projects in most sectors are allowed in the GCC; and in all 
countries – with the exception of Kuwait - foreign ownership in residential as well as other real-estate 
markets is allowed (NBK 2008). Table 2.3 below highlights changes in policies in the GCC region 
(less strict laws for ownership and reduction in corporate taxes), which has significantly improved the 
investment environment. 
Table 2.3 Improved investment environments in the GCC 
 Sectors Open For  
Full Foreign 
Ownership  
Foreign Real- estate 
Ownerships in the GCC 
Corporate Taxes  
Bahrain Technology, tourism, 
healthcare, education, 
business and industrial 
businesses 
2003: 100% ownership in 
specified residential and 
commercial zones 
No Corporate tax. Except 
for 46% tax imposed on 




insurance, tourism,  it, 
hospitals, freight and 
housing projects  
Not open to foreigners, except 
for some GCC nationals based 
on reciprocal treatment 
In early 2008, Corporate 
tax was reduced from the 
maximum of 55% to a 
single rate of 15%. Under 
FDI rules, a tax holiday 
may be granted to foreign 
investors in targeted 
sectors 
Qatar Agriculture, industry , 
tourism, education, 
health, development 
and exploitation of 
natural resources 
2003: 100% ownership in three 
designated projects and acquire 
rights to own surface for no 
more than 99 years in 
investment areas 
Maximum Corporate tax is 
35% 
Oman Privatisation projects 2006: 100% ownership in 
specified residential and 
commercial zones  
Maximum Corporate tax is 
30% 






Economic cities and 
select sectors outside 
economic cities 
2000: Non-residents allowed to 
own real estate  for their private 
residence, foreign ownership 
may be used to conduct business 
as well as house employees  
(excluding the holy cities of 
Madinah and MakKah)  
Corporate tax imposed on 
foreign investments has 
been reduced to a flat rate 
of 20% from a maximum 




Free Zones  100% ownership of surface 
property (not land) for 99 years. 
No federal level corporate 
tax, however  some 
emirates impose tax on 
foreign investments 
between 20% and 55% 
Source: National Bank of Kuwait (2008) 
 
Post September 11, 2001 Attacks – Several reports have associated an increase in cross-border 
investments in the GCC to the September 11 attacks in the United States (Price Water House Coopers 
2006). Since this period, there has been a diversion of funds from the USA back to the Gulf States and 
other regions in the world including Europe and Asia. 
2.3	Research	Methodology	
 
In this study, in-depth interviews with senior executives of banks, real-estate developers and 
consultants are carried out.  In cases where an interview could not be conducted, questionnaires were 
administered. Respondents who participated in the survey are from the Gulf Cooperation Council. In 
this essay, desk research and a survey are employed to examine issues relating to Shariah-compliant 
real-estate development financing and investment. Of the 100 potential respondents invited to 
participate in the study; only 18 agreed to take part. The objective of the study was to get about 25 
respondents, which is comparable to other studies such as Parsa and Mcintosh (2005) and Ibrahim et al 
(2009) However, 18 was considered close enough to the benchmark set by these studies. Nevertheless, 
the relatively low sample size of 18 is considered a limitation of this study; therefore results should be 
interpreted and generalised with caution.  
The survey examines the real-estate investment environment of the Gulf Cooperation Council as well 
as the financing methods utilised by developers in undertaking real-estate projects through the use of 




open-ended and close-ended questions.  The questionnaires and interviews with respondents were 
designed to gather expert views on issues such as:  
i)   Differences and similarities between Shariah financing and investment of real estate projects  
ii)  Conventional financing and investment of real estate projects  
iii) Criteria for Shariah financing of real estate developments  
iv) Popular instruments used in the Shariah financing of real-estate projects  
v)  Real-estate investment in the Gulf Cooperation Council – type and location  
vi) The motivations for selecting a type of financing for real-estate developments 




From the sample size of respondents as seen in Figure 2.1, 20% are independent real-estate 
consultants; and 20% are property development and investment companies. A further 13.33% are 
commercial banks, 13.33% are property investment companies and 33% are involved in asset 
management. Of the sample, 6.67% are banks or finance houses; a further 6.67% are property 
development companies and 6.67% of the sample size identified with ‘other’ as a classification of the 
option that best describes their organisation. This organisation is an equity research company.  From 
the sample size as seen in Figure 2.2, 69% are involved in Shariah-compliant real-estate development 
financing and investment while 31% are not involved in Shariah compliant real estate development 
financing and investment. Conventional organisations that operate in the Gulf Cooperation Council 
and organisations that provide services to both conventional and Shariah-compliant client are included 
to give a clearer and unbiased picture of financing in the Gulf Cooperation Council. 
 





                                                   Figure 2.1 Classification of organisation 
 
 




Respondents were asked to identify particular areas in which Shariah and conventional real-estate 
development financing and investment may differ. These areas include: finance and investment, 
portfolio selection, portfolio management, payment of dividends, monitoring of compliance, 
regulation and costs. All respondents (100%) felt that Shariah and conventional development financing 
and investment are different in terms of finance and investment as well as portfolio selection. These 
results are in line with the tenets of Shariah financing and investments which prohibit the giving and 
taking of riba (interest) and predetermined rate of return which is guaranteed regardless of the 
performance of the investment (Iqbal and Tsubota 2006). Other restrictions in investments include 
prohibition of gambling and speculation. Also in Shariah financing and investment, certain activities 




are considered sinful (see section 1 of chapter 2) which clearly differentiates the portfolio of a Shariah 
real-estate developer or investment company from its conventional counterparts. 
As seen in Figure 2.3, 81.25% felt that the regulations of Shariah-compliant financing and investments 
of real-estate development and investments were different from conventional regulations. Moreover, 
62.50% felt that the monitoring of compliance, portfolio management and costs was different; Shariah 
compliant investments require more monitoring from Shariah scholars to ensure that the investments 
are in line with Shariah principles. Finally only 37.50% of the respondents felt that there is any 
difference in the payment of dividends. However, the results differ from the findings of Parsa and 
McInctosh (2005); the respondents in their study are of the opinion that costs and monitoring of compliance of 




Figure 2.3 Differences between Shariah and conventional development finance and investment 
 
2.3.2 Main	criteria	for	Shariah	financing	of	real‐estate	investment	and	development	
With the use of open-ended questions, respondents were asked to comment on the main criteria of 
Shariah financing of real-estate developments:  from the responses, five main criteria emerged.  




Structure of Financing: Most respondents identified the structuring of financing as a key criterion in 
Shariah financing of real estate developments. Most respondents highlighted that Shariah financing is 
structured without interest charges.  
Property Development: Some respondents also mentioned that real estate to be developed or invested 
must be compliant with Islamic laws; i.e. the property must not have tenants who engage in non-
permissible activities.  
Shariah Boards:  Another key feature of Shariah financing of real-estate developments identified by 
some respondents is the use of a Shariah board in the organisation. A Shariah board consists of 
religious scholars; their main responsibility is to ensure that the operation of the Islamic company is in 
accordance with Shariah laws. The role of a Shariah board includes supervision, review and direction 
of the activities of the company. Shariah scholars are required to be experts in the area of Islamic 
commercial jurisprudence as stipulated by the Accounting and Auditing Organization for Islamic 
Financial Institutions (AAOIFI). 
Bank Involvement: Some respondents felt that another main criterion is the involvement of finance 
providers in developments. Unlike conventional financiers where a loan is granted, Islamic banks in 
some cases, tend to be partners in projects. Certain equity financing methods are used such as 
mudaraba and musharaka. Islamic banks tend to act more as partners in a venture rather than as 
passive lenders. 
Value to Community: Another criterion highlighted by respondents is that Islamic financing of real-
estate development and investments adds value to the community, as Islamic banks often identify and 
finance projects as well as partner with real-estate investors. They take into consideration the benefits 
of the projects to the society when making financing decisions. 
 






Islamic finance is governed by fundamental principles which includes prohibition from the giving and 
taking of interest, the importance of risk-sharing, prohibition of speculative behaviour or uncertainty, 
the principle of asset backing and the prohibition of certain activities such as gambling, alcohol, arms 
and munitions, and conventional financing, among others (HM Treasury 2008).  In the last decade, 
Islamic financial banks have improved as well as expanded their services to their clients and, apart 
from the provision of loans, they engage in other activities such as wealth management and asset 
management. The services provided by Islamic banks mirror those of conventional banks. The Islamic 
instruments which are discussed below are used in other services such as savings deposit, consumer 
financing and trade financing, however in this survey the researcher illustrates how they are employed 
in real-estate financing.   
In the survey, respondents were asked if they would consider a list of Islamic finance instruments 
(debt and equity Islamic instruments) as shown in figure 2.4 to finance real-estate developments (see 
appendix 2 for explanation of each Islamic instrument). The majority of respondents – 93% -are likely 
to use the Ijara and the Sukuk to finance real-estate developments whilst 86% are likely to use the 
mudaraba Islamic instrument to finance a real-estate project. Further, 81% of respondents would use 
musharaka, an equity Islamic finance instrument to finance real-estate developments, 67% are likely to 
use murabaha while istisna recorded as one of the instruments least likely to be used, with a response 
rate of. 60%. Finally, the lowest proportion of respondents, 42%, is likely to use Qard Hassan, an 
interest-free loan for financing.  
In line with earlier studies such as those of Parsa and Mcintosh (2005) and Ibrahim et al (2009), the 
most highly favoured financing instruments were ijarah, sukuk, mudarabha, musharaka and murabaha, 




while Istisna and qard hassan were least favoured. However, from the results of this survey, there 
seems to be an increase in the likelihood of respondents using the qard hassan at 42%. A similar 
survey by Ibrahim et al (2009) showed that only 13% of the respondents are willing to use this 
instrument. A probable reason for the disparate results may be due to geographical factors; this survey 









Shariah real-estate developers finance their activities with Islamic financing.  Respondents were asked 
to rank on a Likert-type scale the level of involvement by financiers before, during and after real-estate 
developments, in other words the study investigates how engaged financiers are during the stages of 
land acquisition to post-construction. 1 is ‘not involved’ while 5 is ‘very involved’. 
Respondents from Shariah–compliant companies felt that their financiers were involved throughout 
the real-estate development process from land acquisition to post construction.  As seen in Figure 2.5, 
86% felt that financiers were involved in the land acquisition phase, and 88% believed they were 




involved in the construction stage, and whilst 67% felt that financiers were involved in post 
construction. The researcher found that responses from non-Shariah companies varied from Shariah 
companies; when asked the level of involvement of financiers on real estate developments, 100% of 
respondents mentioned that financiers were not involved in land acquisition and post construction 
whilst 75% felt that financiers were not involved in the construction stage. 
The  respondents (Shariah and conventional) show a clear distinction in the differences between the  
involvement of Shariah financiers and conventional financiers in a real-estate project from inception 
(land acqusition) to post construction. This result is not surprising; since Islamic banks do not charge 
riba (interest), the relationship between financier and real estate developer ought to increase to 




Figure 2.5 Shariah Compliant Companies 
 
 











Respondents were asked to comment on the impact of Islamic financing on the performance of their 
organisation. Faishal and Eng (2008) show that Shariah compliance does not mean that Shariah-
compliant real-estate mutual funds would necessarily underperform relevant indices when risk factors 
are considered; they construct synthetic Shariah-compliant REIT portfolios based on historic 
performance of US REITs and compare the portfolios with various benchmarks. Respondents were of 
the view that the impact of Islamic finance on the performance of an organisation may be positive or 
negative whilst some felt the use of Islamic finance would make no difference to the performance of 
an organisation. 
a) Positive impact: Some respondents felt Islamic finance would have a positive impact on the 
performance of an organisation. The profit-making structure of some Islamic finance instruments such 
as the mudaraba and musharaka is seen as an incentive for developers to work harder, saving time and 
delivering quality projects, as profits are linked to performance. 
b) Negative impact: Uncertainty over debt liabilities as well as the inability for developers to retain 
100% of profits may have a negative impact on performance of an organisation according to a 




respondent. An Islamic instrument such as murabaha may increase risk to both developer and financier 
according to another respondent.  
c) No difference: Some respondents were of the opinion that the use of Islamic finance in real-estate 
projects would not have a positive or negative impact on the performance of an organisation; they 
considered that some Islamic financial instruments seem to be geared towards mirroring the 





Respondents were asked the motivations for financing real-estate developments using either Shariah or 
conventional financing. Most respondents used Islamic financing because their organisation is 
licenced as an Islamic organisation, an Islamic bank or an Islamic finance company and the use of 
Islamic financing is one of the key aspects of developing a Shariah-compliant product. Some 
respondents used Shariah financing because of the increase in its popularity in recent years and an 
increase in a new source of liquidity from oil-rich countries, particularly those in the Gulf Cooperation 
Council. The use of Islamic financing or structuring would allow companies to reach out to investors 
who might otherwise be less accessible through conventional financing or structures. 
Some respondents use Islamic financing for their projects because it is a basic criterion in the region in 
which they operate (the Middle East). “Also the concept of financiers and banks operating as partners 
is more appealing and creates a better understanding and expectation rather than a financier acting 
merely as a passive lender” according to a respondent. 




Some respondents used conventional financing as they are of the opinion that Islamic financing is 
associated with high costs as a result of complex structuring and the extra cost of employing Shariah 
scholars, whose main responsibility involves Shariah compliance by firms. 
2.3.7 Shariah	‐friendly	environment	in	the	GCC	
 
Respondents were asked to rank the countries in the Gulf Cooperation Council which promote the 
growth of Islamic finance in terms of political environment, legal framework, institutional framework, 
human capital and expertise in each country. As seen in Figure 2.7, the political environments of the 
United Arab Emirates and Bahrain are perceived conducive for the growth of Islamic financing with 
70% and 75% respectively, out of a possible 100%. Oman and Kuwait scored the lowest in ratings in 
terms of political environment with 30% and 43%. The respondents rank Bahrain highest as most 
conducive for the growth of Islamic finance in institutional framework (86%), legal framework (82%) 
and human capital and expertise (73%), Bahrain is highly recognised for its internationally known 
Islamic regulatory system while Oman scored the lowest in institutional framework (15%), legal 
framework (23%) and human capital expertise (18%). 
 
 





































Respondents were asked to rank the countries and cities in the Gulf Cooperation Council that they 
would invest in, if involved in Shariah-compliant real estate projects. As seen in Figure 2.11, 89% of 
respondents favoured Saudi-Arabia as the destination to invest in real-estate projects, with Jeddah, 
Riyadh and Mecca very popular. Then, 60% of the respondents reported they would invest in the 
United Arab Emirates; they favoured Abu-Dhabi as the city to invest in. Oman was the least favourite 
city to invest in, with 29% of respondents willing to invest in the city. Other Cities favoured by 
respondents include Manamah in Bahrain, Kuwait City, Doha, Madinah, Ras Al Khaimah, Sellalah 








Respondents were asked to choose real-estate sectors to invest in, now  and in the future. The 
residential sector is the most popular amongst respondents as seen in Figure 2.12, 93% of respondents 
would invest in the residential sector at present whilst 64% intend to invest in sector in the future. The 
retail sector was least favoured by respondents; only 14% would invest in the retail sector at present 
and 29% in the future.  




Residential, industrial and logistics and distribution were more favoured by respondents as these 
sectors are permissible and easily implemented under Islamic laws. Commercial office and retail 
sectors are generally percieved as having more non-Shariah-compliant attributes and require more 
expertise such as screening to ensure they are compliant to Islamic laws at all times.  This may infer 




Figure 2.12 Sectors of real-estate market to invest in 
2.3.10	Level	of	development	of	Islamic	financial	markets	in	the	GCC	
 
As seen in figure 2.13, 100% of the respondents felt that the Islamic financial markets in Bahrain and 
the United Arab Emirates are developed. 94% mentioned that the Islamic financial markets of Saudi 
Arabia and Kuwait were developed, whilst 88% were of the opinion that the Islamic financial markets 
in Qatar were developed. Oman is the only country in the GCC where 56% of respondents felt that the 
Islamic financial market was not developed. 
 










As seen in Figure 2.14, 53% of the respondents feel there is a lack of understanding in Shariah 
compliance of real-estate development financing and investment whilst another 47% feel otherwise. A 
respondent was of the opinion that there exists a lack of understanding outside of the GCC, but not 
within the GCC. Another respondent pointed out that there exists a clear understanding in Shariah 
compliance of real-estate development financing and investments and this exists only in the finance 
industry while knowledge is limited outside of it. Another respondent felt that real-estate companies 
do not often employ Islamic financing when considering financing of real-estate projects; however in 
recent times as it became increasingly difficult to obtain finance from the credit markets, real-estate 
developers are exploring Islamic finance options as a viable alternative to financing real-estate 
developments. It was also noted that property developers are new in using Shariah real-estate 
financing instruments. Many of them are using these instruments for the first time and would explore 
more avenues to use them in the future. 
 
 









In the survey, respondents chose which method of financing – Shariah or conventional - they are likely 
to employ when financing real-estate developments. Of the respondents, 62.5% would prefer to use 
Shariah financing and 25% would prefer to use conventional financing while 12.5% would use either 
of the two types of financing. It is important to draw attention to the fact that as 75% of the 
respondents report they are Shariah-compliant, this is reflected in the high number of respondents who 
favour Shariah finance. This could have led to a high percentage of respondents favouring Shariah 
financing.  
Some respondents would prefer to use conventional financing as they felt it was less complex and the 
structure of conventional loans is simple, while some felt that costs involved in Shariah financing tend 
to be higher than those in conventional financing. Others felt that conventional financing was less 
complicated and faster to implement.   
Some respondents would like to use Shariah financing for a number of reasons, the most common 
reason being that the organisation is a Shariah-compliant company and it is in the organisation charter 
of the company that Shariah financing should be used if available. Other reasons include Shariah 
financing encourages entrepreneurship and equity financing such as musharaka and mudaraba. Others 




felt that, although it takes a great deal of effort to implement Shariah financing, the principles 
underpinning it are just and practical. Another reason for opting for Shariah financing is that the 
“structures of Shariah financing are asset-backed and halal in nature” according to a respondent. A few 
respondents would like to use both type of financing in the appropriate context; the decision would 
depend on the type of real-estate project to develop or invest in, and the availability of funding. A 
respondent felt that Shariah financing will be appropriate if the developer for instance was looking to 
syndicate equity to investors whereas the respondent felt that if syndication is not required, 









In this section of the study, respondents were asked to highlight the challenges as well as issues they 
face in the nascent Shariah-compliant real-estate industry in the form of open-ended questions. Their 
responses are summarised below. 
2.5.12 Implicit	interest	in	Islamic	finance	instruments	
“Some Islamic Finance instruments have implicit interest”, a respondent commented. Debates have 
emerged in the Islamic finance literature that Islamic finance is at best a replicate or mimic of 




conventional financing, for which it intends to be a substitute (El-Gamal 2003). There is a belief that 
Islamic instruments are modelled after conventional instruments. 
Aggarwal and Yousef (2000) study financial instruments used by Islamic banks and find that most 
instruments are not based on profit- and loss-sharing but are very debt-like in nature. This lies in the 
control of rights of mark-up contracts which are similar to debt-like contracts: in both contracts, 
financial institutions hold on to the ownership of assets and take possession of the asset in default 
cases. One of the respondents added that “the use of profit and loss sharing (PLS) instruments such as 
the mudaraba and musharaka are used less often by Islamic banks”. 
Islamic finance encourages risk- and reward-sharing; according to a number of respondents, there 
must be an increase in the use of profit- and loss-sharing instruments to reflect the principles of 
Islamic finance. With time, as the Islamic banking sector is able to establish itself in the global finance 
industry, it is expected that the use of profit- and loss-sharing instruments will increase. 
 
2.5.13 Shariah	board/Shariah	committees			
The responsibility of the Shariah scholar is to ensure the operations of the organisation are in 
accordance with Shariah laws; hence Shariah boards and committees are essential requirements for an 
Islamic real-estate company. However, many of the respondents feel there is currently a shortage of 
Shariah scholars. Some of the respondents also felt the use of Shariah scholars increases the time 
involved in decision making, as Shariah scholars are required to review every investment decisions 
taken by management. While the Shariah board is a necessary element in Islamic finance, it is 
important that the available resources are adequately developed over the next decade. 
 





Currently, there is the lack of an appropriate index for pricing of Islamic assets as indicated by most 
respondents.  The Dow Jones Islamic Index which was created in 1999 was the only available 
benchmark index for pricing Islamic assets until the Standard & Poor Islamic Index became available 
in 2008. However, the methodology used by both indices may prove inaccurate as a benchmark against 
fully compliant Islamic real-estate companies. The indices apply a quantitative screen on companies 
such as a debt to equity percentage of less than or equal to 33%, which means companies with debt 
less than or equal to 33% are included in the index; however, the principles of Islam discourage the 
giving and taking of interest, and some real-estate companies in the Middle East are 100% debt-free 
(conventional loans).  Hence it is in these cases that it would be inappropriate to use the Dow Jones 
and Standard and Poor Islamic indices as benchmarks against 100% fully Islamic companies. 
 
2.5.15 Lack	of	standardisation	in	Shariah	compliance	
The interpretation of what constitutes Shariah compliance was a key issue raised by the respondents. 
There seemed to be a general consensus for the introduction of a standardised regulatory framework 
for Shariah investment and financing. Currently, there is an attempt to standardise and address key 
issues relating to Islamic finance by the Accounting and Auditing Organization for Islamic Finance 
Institutions. Even in the Gulf Cooperation Council, interpretations of Shariah compliance practices 
and products differ, as each organisation often has its own Shariah board, and a universal standard of 
Shariah compliance is unclear. According to a respondent, “this makes it difficult when 
communicating with customers from different parts of the GCC, as each customer may have a 
different expectation of what Shariah compliance entails”. 
 





Islamic real-estate companies are prohibited from investing in certain activities as mentioned earlier; 
hence they tend to invest in residential and industrial real-estate sectors and avoid commercial, retail 
and entertainment sectors. There seems to be a notion that a smaller investment universe of Islamic 
real-estate companies may result in poorer average returns. Faishal and Eng (2008) constructed 
synthetic Shariah-compliant REIT portfolios based on the historic performance of US REITs and 
compared the portfolios with various benchmarks in univariate and multi-factor settings. The results 
indicate that Shariah compliance seems to create a return trade-off and less restrictive compliance 
requirements appear to provide better historical returns. The paper reveals that it may be over-
simplistic to assert that Shariah compliance would necessarily result in inferior return-risk profile; 
their results show that Shariah compliance does not mean that Shariah-compliant real-estate mutual 
funds necessarily underperform relevant indices when relevant risk factors are considered, and 
allowing for differing sensitivities to benchmark returns.  
Although there have been issues raised and ongoing debate about the limitation of the investment 
universe of real-estate companies by respondents, there is no evidence to show that this is a 
disadvantage to Islamic real-estate companies when historic stock returns are investigated. 
2.5.17 High	risk	and	agency	problems	associated	with	partnership	financing		
From the perspective of the financiers, partnership or equity financing is considered as more risky than 
mark-up or debt-like financing. Islamic financing encourages partnership financing such as mudaraba 
and musharaka, however these instruments are used sparingly by Islamic banks. Dar and Presley (200) 
mention that equity financing are used less often than debt financing. This is due to a number of 
reasons including: 




I. Equity Financing is not suitable for short-term projects as a result of high risk. Therefore to 
ensure liquidity, Islamic banks tend to engage in debt-like financing (mark-up). 
II. Agency problems arise in partnership financing; this is because entrepreneurs have an 
incentive to report lower profits and a disincentive to being productive in comparison to a 
self-financed entrepreneur. 
III. Islamic banks tend to offer debt-like financing which is less risky than partnership financing, 
so as to remain competitive with conventional banks and other finance institutions.  
IV. Profits are taxed, whilst interest payments are treated as costs; with partnership financing, there 
is an incentive to avoid tax by declaring lower profits to pay less tax, hence this make 
partnership financing less rewarding for Islamic banks.  
All the challenges and issues are identified by the respondents who took part in the survey. In order for 
Shariah financing to progress and compete with conventional financing, there is the need to address 
these issues. Shariah-compliant companies must use Shariah financing if available according to 
Islamic laws; however until this issues are addressed, conventional developers who are interested in 
Shariah financing as an alternative means of financing for real-estate developments and investments 
would remain sceptical and unwilling to utilise Islamic instruments. 
2.6 Conclusions	
 
The use of Islamic finance has expanded in leaps and bounds in the past decades within the GCC and 
worldwide. This phenomenon has led to the increase of Shariah-compliant real-estate developments 
and investments, as real-estate companies tap into the Islamic finance market. In this essay, the author 
set out to understand Shariah–compliant real-estate industry in the GCC, particularly the Islamic 
finance instruments preferred by real-estate companies, Shariah compliance issues, the GCC real-




estate investment environment as well as challenges faced in the Shariah-compliant real-estate 
industry.  
This survey reveals that real estate companies are willing to use equity-based instruments such as 
mudarabha (86%) and musharaka (81%). However this equity financing structure is not being offered 
in the Islamic finance market. Cost-plus financing such as murabaha are more popular; however the 
research finds that only 67% are willing to use this instrument to finance real-estate developments or 
investments. An interesting finding in the survey is that Islamic banks tend to be more involved in the 
processes of real-estate development projects from land acquisition to post construction, and compared 
to conventional banks, Islamic banks tend to be partners rather than financiers. This finding sets the 
difference between the role of Islamic banks and conventional banks in the financing of real-estate 
investment and development. 
Saudi Arabia ranked first in destination for real estate investments, although it ranks fourth in legal, 
institutional framework and human capital and expertise, and third in political environment.  In terms 
of the real-estate investment environment in the GCC, the United Arab Emirates and Bahrain were the 
second- and third-ranked preferred destination for real-estate investors; they were also ranked 
consistently as second and first for stable political environments, good legal and institutional 
framework and a high level of human capital and expertise. Hence, real-estate investors consider these 
factors as important when making real-estate investment decisions. Residential, industrial and the 
logistics sectors were also favoured- these sectors tend to be more Shariah-friendly, in that there are 
fewer screening procedures required for their implementation as Shariah-compliant real-estate 
investments. 




There are, however, several challenges and issues faced by the Shariah-compliant real-estate industry 
such as the implicit interest in Islamic finance instruments in the form of the preference of cost-plus 
financing instruments as a means of financing by Islamic banks, increase in time in the processes of 
decision making due to compliance issues, lack of standardisation in Shariah compliance, the 
limitations of the investment universe and the high risk and agency problems associated with 
partnership financing.  
The growth of the Shariah-compliant real-estate industry is dependent on how Islamic banks can 
create products which real-estate companies’ demand, particularly partnership financing such as 
musharaka and mudaraba  as  highlighted in the survey, also a standardised Shariah compliance 
structure would aid growth in the Shariah real-estate industry. The GCC is considered as the Islamic 
finance centre of the world, and once the challenges and issues are addressed as highlighted in the 
survey, Shariah-compliant real-estate investments will continue to grow in popularity in the GCC and 
worldwide. 
Finally the survey reveals that in comparison to Parsa and Mcintosh (2005) and Ibrahim et al (2009), 
there exist regional differences which drive the perception of Shariah-compliant investments due to 
differing results in similar questions posed to respondents in Europe and Asia. These disparate results 
with earlier work echo the findings of Hoepner et al (2011); that SC investments have systematic 
differences based on how developed the Islamic financial systems of that region is.








Much of the empirical work and tests on capital structure theory has been derived from general firms 
and developed economies mainly examining debt ratios of property firms. The purpose of this study is 
to analyse capital structure choice made by Shariah-compliant and Islamic property firms18 in the Gulf 
Cooperation Council (GCC) which have institutional as well as operational differences from 
conventional property firms. This analysis finds that Islamic firms are less levered than general 
property firms in the same region investigated while the leverage usage of Shariah-compliant firms 
remains inconclusive. 
This study examines Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates (six 
of the seven countries in the Gulf Cooperation Council), as at the time of data collection there were no 
public listed property firms in Oman. This investigation helps determine how debts are being 
employed by Shariah-compliant and Islamic firms. Herein, attempts are made to understand specific 
phenomena in the capital structure choice of Shariah-compliant and Islamic property firms, including 
i) the determinants of leverage decisions of property firms in the GCC, ii) the leverage decisions of 
Shariah-compliant and Islamic property firms in the GCC, and finally iii) why Shariah-compliant 








In the first stage of the study the differences in leverage ratio between Shariah-compliant/Islamic firms 
and general property firms are investigated. In all examinations quarterly data are employed to 
empirically test the hypothesis. In the first univariate regression results, Shariah-compliant firms use 
less leverage than general firms in the same region; this is after nominalising leverage by total assets. 
Next, firm characteristics - which in capital structure theory are determinants of a firm’s capital 
structure choice - are controlled for and the use of leverage in Shariah-compliant firms are inconsistent 
with earlier findings. However, when firm characteristics are controlled for, Islamic real-estate firms 
are less leveraged.  
Finally the third stage of the investigation was to understand why Islamic firms are conservative in 
their use of leverage; here other non-traditional determinants of leverage may account for this.  
Property developers and investment firms in the GCC are investigated for a number of reasons.  
Firstly, property is considered as a Shariah-compliant asset as it can easily satisfy and fulfil the 
requirements of strict compliance with Shariah laws such as the exclusion of non-permissible activities 
Secondly, the Gulf Cooperation council is investigated as it is considered as the Islamic finance capital 
of the world. As at 2008, the GCC Shariah-compliant assets were valued at US$262.2 billion 
surpassing any other region in the world (Ibrahim et al, 2012).  
This study examines Shariah-compliant property firms as listed in the Dow Jones Shariah Index.  The 
lists of property firms follow certain criteria and property firms in the Dow Jones Islamic Market 
(DJIM) index; they include firms which pass the criteria as set by the DJIM. In understanding the 
capital structure of Shariah-compliant property firms, the criteria of categorising Shariah-compliant 
firms as it is applied by the Dow Jones Islamic Index is employed in this study. The Dow Jones 
Islamic Market (DJIM) Index is the first Islamic equity benchmark index which was created for 
investors who wish to invest in accordance with Islamic principles. The selection universe of the DJIM 




covers 95% of the float-adjusted market capitalisation of the six countries in the GCC. All securities 
selected must pass the Islamic compliance screening examination, including a) qualitative screens: 
firms which are involved in the lines of business including alcohol, general services, tobacco, pork-
related products, entertainment and defence/weapons are exempted from the DJIM index, and b) 
quantitative screens: all securities which are included in DJIM index must pass through the financial 
ratio examination: excluded securities are i) total debt divided by trailing 24 month average market 
capitalisation which exceeds 33%, ii) cash + interest-bearing securities divided by trailing 24 month 
average market capitalisation exceeds 33%, and iii) accounts receivables divided by trailing 24 month 
average market capitalisation exceeds 33%. 
Firms that have an internal Shariah board are classified in this study as Islamic firms; the research 
examines property firms that appoint internal Shariah boards whose responsibility includes ensuring 
that the firms operate in accordance to Shariah laws. In both estimations, the results are consistent with 
the findings that Islamic property firms are less levered than their general counterparts; at least during 
the period investigated. There is an expectation that the capital structure choice of Shariah-compliant 
firms (DJIM classification) may vary significantly as the latter has specific guidelines in which firms 
must adhere to before they are deemed Shariah-compliant, such as a significant feature in the use of 
leverage (Leverage < 33% of firm’s market capitalisation). However, for Islamic firms, the use of 
leverage is based on the decisions of the internal Shariah board which vary from that of the Shariah 
guidelines as specified by the Dow Jones Islamic Index.  
Islamic finance is the fastest growing financial system; and it is also estimated that there are one 
billion Muslims worldwide, which supports an exploration of the impact on Islamic fundamentals on 
finance theory. In the study, the linkages between the type of property firms (Shariah-
compliant/Islamic and general) and their capital structure (leverage ratio) are investigated.  




This study tests the hypothesis that the characterisation of firms as Shariah-compliant, as identified by 
an inclusion in the DJIM, or Islamic as identified by the use of Shariah scholars may have an effect on 
the capital structure of these firms. Specifically, the hypothesis that Shariah-compliant and Islamic 
property firms are less levered than general property firms in the Gulf Cooperation Council is tested.  
Capital structure has been extensively researched; however little or no study has been carried out on 
Islamic or Shariah-compliant firms. There is an important gap in current understanding of the capital 
structure choice of Shariah-compliant firms and Islamic property firms. To address this, the study 
undertakes a cross-sectional analysis to determine the factors which influence capital structure choice 
of property firms in the GCC, specifically the capital structure choice of Shariah-compliant and 
Islamic property firms, and examines the determinants for why these two types of firms use less 
leverage in comparison to general property firms. 
The essay is the first to study the capital structure of property firms in the GCC. This area is of interest 
as the Shariah and non-Shariah forms operate side by side. The rest of the essay is organised as 
follows: Section 3.2 discusses the literature review. In Section 3.3, the research design and 
methodology of the empirical work including hypotheses and variables employed in the model are 
elucidated. Section 3.4 discusses the data as well as descriptive analysis of leverage ratios and firm 
characteristics of firms. Section 3.5 explains the empirical findings of the model, while Section 3.6 





In their paper-the Cost of Capital, Corporation Finance and the Theory of Investment, Modigliani and 
Miller (1963) illustrate the capital structure decisions of firms from the tax benefits as well as the cost 
of debts perspectives; this led to a wide-ranging study on unravelling the capital structure puzzle of 




firms. This also generated several theories from the irrelevance theorem as to how firms make capital 
structure decisions, and these theories can be classified into two broad spectrums as highlighted by 
Feng et al (2007): behavioural theories such as the pecking order theory and market-timing theory, and 
optimisation of costs and benefits of debt such as the trade-off theory.  
Myers and Majluf (1984) assert that firms follow certain financing decisions, often in a pecking order 
approach.  The pecking order theory posits that firms would tend to use up retained earnings first 
(internal financing), followed by debt and equity (external financing). The basis of this intuition stems 
from the notion that equity holders suspect that firms’ managers have privileged information which 
they do not have and managers exploit this advantage by selling equity when it is overvalued; hence 
when new equity is issued by the firm it often has to be discounted.  Due to this phenomenon, equity is 
the last resort for firms due to the adverse costs which could be detrimental. Hence the pecking order 
hypothesis predicts that high growth firms which need more external capital will have high leverage 
ratio.  
The market timing theory introduced by Baker and Wurgler (2002) and extended by Baker et al (2003) 
posits that firms’ capital structure is based on historic attempts to time the equity market and that firms 
would tend to finance capital projects based on the cheapest form of capital available at that point. The 
hypothesis suggests that firms issue securities when market conditions are favourable and avoid 
issuing securities when the market conditions are unfavourable. Baker and Wurgler (2002) find that a 
change in leverage is negatively related to the previous period of market-to-book ratio. Their study 
implies that financing decisions are undertaken using equity issuances rather than retained earnings as 
suggested by the pecking order hypothesis.  
Fama and French (2002) proposed the trade-off theory which involves the optimisation of costs and 
benefits of debt, in which it is purported that firms reach their optimum capital structure or a target 




debt ratio is attained by balancing the benefits of debt, including the reduction of agency conflicts 
(shareholders and managers) which arises from reducing free cash flow as firms pay off interest 
payments from their free cash flow.  The trade-off theory here predicts higher leverage for firms with 
greater free cash-flow and tax advantages in the form of interest tax shields and the costs of debt 
including the possibilities of bankruptcy or financial distress experienced by firms not being able to 
pay their contractual agreements. Firms with higher profitability and access to collateralised fixed 
assets are able to mitigate bankruptcy, and the trade-off theory predicts that high (low) growth firms 
choose low (high) leverage - this is as a result of fluctuations in business and possibly income streams 
which makes the firms concerned more susceptible to the costs of financial distress. 
 
Agency costs of debts 
The agency cost model was first initiated by Jensen and Meckling (1976); the authors highlight two 
conflicts in the principal-agent problem i) the conflict between debt holders and equity holders and ii) 
conflict between shareholders and managers. In the instance of a firm taking out a loan, due to limited 
liability of firms, if an investment by the firm fails, the debt holders would suffer. However, equity 
holders are in the position to benefit from the gains if the investment yields a large return due to the 
debt contract. Agency cost explains the effects of financing decisions. A solution to mitigating agency 
problems in the instance of managers wasting excess cash on projects which may not deliver the cost 
of capital in return is for firms to engage in debt financing (Brealey and Myers 2003). Jensen and 
Meckling (1976) propose a link on how agency costs are generated from the likelihood of default 
through the shifting of risks (risk-shifting problem) between debt holders and equity holders by the 
choice of investments made by managers. The agency problem arises through the contracting of debt 
from the principal to the agent. Jensen and Meckling (1976) propose that outcome-based contracts are 
useful in curbing managerial opportunism; they propose that when the contract between the principal 




and agent is outcome-based, then agents would act in the interests of the principal. In this, the study 
would not exactly test the agency argument; however, employs the agency theory to investigate the 
behaviour of Islamic and Shariah-compliant property firms.  
Leverage thus has an important role to play in the value of the firm as agency cost affects the value of 
the firm and leverage serves as a mitigating factor to address some of these problems. Firms hire 
agents or managers to run the operations of the firm.  In the course of the agent/manager performing 
his duties, managers may act in their own interests rather than in the interests of the firm, hence 
maximising their own utility rather than the value of the firm. Hence the theory asserts that capital 
structure choice of firms may help mitigate this agency cost. According to the agency hypothesis, high 
leverage would increase a firm’s value as managers are constrained against acting in their own 
interest; this is possible as the agency cost of equity from external shareholders is reduced.  
Capital structure of public listed property firms are extensively researched in the area of real-estate 
investment trusts (REITs); however only limited study has been undertaken on other property firms 
such as property developers and property investment companies. Feng et al (2007) explore how the 
capital structure of REITs evolve over time from 1991 to 2003 and, surprisingly, find a positive 
relationship between market-to-book ratios (growth) and leverage ratios. The study attributes this 
finding to the unique regulatory environment in which REITs operate: to qualify as REITs, property 
trusts must distribute 90% of profits; hence this means that REITs have low retained earnings thus 
subjecting them to borrow instead.  
Marts and Elayan (1990) examine the capital structure and the cost of capital of REITs; they find in 
their study that leverage may increase the firm’s cost of capital. The authors conclude that the reason 
for the motivation of the use of debt by REITs is as a result of the leverage clientele effect due to the 
bimodal distribution of the capital structure of REIT. Another research study by Howe and Shilling 




(1988) investigates the capital structure of REITs by examining stock price reactions to 
announcements of seasoned equity offerings (SEO). They found that the results on debt offerings are 
contradictory to the results in general firms and concluded that there is a positive significant 
relationship between debt offerings and stock returns of REITs.  
On the capital structure of property firms, Ooi (1999) investigates the factors which determine debt 
decisions of property companies in the United Kingdom between 1989 and 1996. The results suggest 
that the type of activities performed by the property company as well as asset structure/intensity has a 
role to play in the debt decisions of property companies.  The paper also finds that tax burden as well 
as the performance of the firm does not play any significant role in the debt-equity choice of property 
companies. Brounen and Eichholtz (2001) investigate the capital structure of property firms in Europe 
by investigating the stock price reactions to equity offerings of property companies in 13 countries; 
they find a significant negative reaction when equity offerings are offered and a non-negative reaction 
for debt offerings, which is in line with prior studies on capital structure of firms and property 
companies. Giambona et al (2008) test the Shleifer and Vishny (1992) hypothesis and find that asset 
liquidation value influences firm leverage and debt maturity in REITs.  
Rajan, Zingales and Seward (1995) use four independent variables (market-to-book ratio, size, 
profitability and tangible assets) to analyse determinants of capital structure across  the G7 countries. 
Their results are consistent with the findings of other literature on US data which show correlations 
with leverage and determinants of leverage. Booth et al (2002) examine the capital structure of firms 
in 10 developing countries and find that the variables which determine the capital structure of firms in 
developed countries is applicable in developing countries; however, the authors highlight the 
significance of institutional features in capital structure choice. In this area of research, the GCC, 
Sbieti (2010) investigates the determinants of capital structure choice in the GCC in three countries -




Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and Oman; their results are consistent with the determinants of capital structure 
choice in finance theory.  
This current work is different from other studies on capital structure for the following reasons: i) the 
study is the first to understand the determinants of capital structure on property companies which 
operate in a GCC country, and are not obliged to distribute a certain amount of their dividends (90%) 
as in REITs; ii) the study examines the capital structure of Islamic and Shariah-compliant property 
firms relative to general property firms for the first time as these firms have operational differences but 
are domiciled in the same region, and iii) the capital structure of property companies in the Gulf 
Cooperation Council, a developing economy, is examined for the first time.  
3.3	Research	Focus	and	Methodology	
 
The central research question is; what is the effect of Shariah principles on the capital structure of 
Shariah-compliant and Islamic property firms? The research question is addressed by understanding 
the determinants of property firms in the GCC; thereafter a variable is created to understand 
differences in the capital structure between Shariah-compliant firms, Islamic firms and general 
property firms. Furthermore there is an attempt to understand the underlying reasons for differences 
between these two types of property firms. 
Islamic real-estate firms in this chapter are considered as those that have an internal Shariah board.  
Islamic firms are constrained in the use of debt; this is because under Shariah law, debt must be asset-
backed, and Islamic firms are not permitted to have debts higher than their tangible assets (Ahmed 
2007). However conventional firms do not have such restrictions on debt. Therefore it is predicted that 
Islamic firms use less leverage than conventional firms.  




Shariah-compliant firms in this chapter are considered as those that are included in the Dow Jones 
Islamic Index (DJIM). For firms to qualify for such inclusion they must pass quantitative screening 
including that leverage must be less than 33% of market capitalisation. 
In this study, another key research question is addressed; do Islamic and Shariah-compliant property 
firms employ less leverage relative in comparison to general property firms?  The determinants of 
capital structure of property firms in the GCC, an area in which Shariah-compliant property firms and 
general property firms operate side by side, are examined; a dummy Shariah-compliant variable is 
created to answer the research question. Finally, the reasons why Shariah-compliant property firms 
have less leverage than general property firms are examined. This chapter provides a detailed 
empirical approach in understanding this phenomenon using public data of public listed property firms 
in the GCC. 
3.3.1	Determinants	of	capital	structure	
 
The focus of this work is to test the capital structure of property firms in the Gulf Cooperation Council 
- particularly, to understand the differences in capital structure between general and Shariah-compliant 
property firms in the GCC. The relationship between capital structure and the cost of capital is still an 
ongoing investigation in the area of finance today. Property firms in the Gulf Cooperation Council 
provide a unique set of data to empirically test the capital structure of firms in the structure of property 
firms operating under Shariah law. 
The first step in the analysis is to estimate the relationship between two measures of leverage (debt to 
book value and debt to market value) and firm characteristics which have been identified by past 
theoretical and empirical works as determinants of firm leverage Variables which have been 
empirically tested several times in previous studies include size (Rajan, Zingales and Seward 1995, 
Ang, Chua and McConnell 1982 and Warner 1977),  age (Diamond 1991), growth opportunities 




(Myers 1977,  Barclay, Smith and Morellec 2003 and  Titman and Wessels 1988),  profitability (Jensen 
1986 and Rajan and Zingales 1995) and two measures of a Shariah-compliant variable (DJIM index 
and Shariah Scholar criteria) . Different theories of capital structure have suggested that the variables 
as highlighted above may affect a firm’s debt-equity choice.  
The determinants of leverage employed in the model include firm size, growth opportunities, free cash 
flow, cash holdings, profitability, paper-bill spread and stock market return as described below. 
                  
(1) 
Shariah Compliance Variable 
The Shariah variable is a dummy variable to measure the differences in leverage between general and 
Shariah property firms in the GCC. Two measurements for specifying the Shariah variable are: i) 
property firms included in the Dow Jones Islamic index termed as Shariah-compliant firms, and ii) 
property firms that have a Shariah board to ratify that operations of the firms are in accordance with 
Shariah principles, termed as Islamic firms.  For the first empirical identification of the effect of 
Shariah compliance on leverage, there is an expectation that there is a negative relationship between 
leverage and the Shariah variable; in other words that Shariah property firms are less levered then 
general property firms. Amongst several criteria for inclusion in the DJIM index, firms with a debt 
ratio of 33% or more are excluded from the DJIM index. The second empirical identification is 
property firms that have a Shariah board, which are classified in this study as Islamic firms; there is an 
expectation there is a negative relationship between leverage and the Shariah-compliant variable. 
According to Shariah law, Islamic firms should desist from the giving as well as the taking of riba and 
interest rate considered as riba. Islamic banks refrain from charging interest rate (riba) with loans and 
serve as capital providers for Shariah-compliant property firms; however Islamic financing is still 




growing and represents and currently only represents a small percentage of capital flows in the GCC. 
Also Islamic property firms tend to be sceptical of borrowing from Islamic banks, as they believe there 
may be hidden interests embedded in the loans (Ibrahim et al, 2012). This may result in Islamic 
property firms employing less leverage in comparison to general property firms within the GCC.  
Firm Size 
Size is measured as the natural logarithm of total assets. Large firms are considered to be less prone to 
bankruptcy as they tend to be more diversified; hence it is expected that large firms may be considered 
and granted debt in comparison to small firms because they may be less susceptible to the likelihood 
of bankruptcy. Therefore there may be a positive relationship with firm size and leverage as seen in 
Rajan and Zingales (1995); the authors find that firm size is positively correlated with leverage. Ang, 
Chua and McConnell (1982) and Warner (1977) show evidence that bankruptcy costs are higher for 
small firms; hence the leverage ratio of small firms would be lower. 
Firm Age 
Firm’s age is a measure of a firm’s reputation. The older a firm is and the longer it operates as a going 
concern, the more the reputation of the firm increases and, subsequently, the ability of the firm to 
increase debt capacity is plausible. Hence a positive relationship between firm’s age and leverage ratio 
is predicted. A firm’s banking relationship increases the possibility of the firm’s ability to tap into 
credit from banks, and a good proxy to measure relationship is through the age of the firm. Diamond 
(1991) finds that firms with good reputation have several benefits including the ability to mitigate 
conflicts of interest between borrowers and lenders. The authors view reputation as the learning over 
time of observable behaviours from characteristics of agents; a good proxy for reputation is firm age. 
Petersen and Rajan (1994) find a positive relationship between availability of finance and length of 




relationships between borrowers and lenders, where older firms would tend to have longer length of 
relationship with banks.  
Growth Opportunities  
Growth opportunities are measured by the ratio of a firm’s market value to book value; market value 
consists of the value of growth opportunities whilst the book value is a measure of the assets currently 
owned by the firm as suggested by Myers (1977). In previous findings, authors such as Smith and 
Watts (1992) and Barclay, Morellec and Smith (2003) identify a negative relationship between growth 
opportunities and leverage. Firms with higher equity control would tend to invest sub-optimally in 
other to shift wealth away from bondholders. However, Ross (1977) argues that there exists a positive 
relationship between growth opportunities and leverage, through signalling credit lenders would  tend 
to give out loans to firms with high growth opportunities. Hence it is expected that growth 
opportunities could be negatively related to leverage as posited by Titman and Wessels (1988) or 
positively correlated to leverage as argued by Ross (1977).  
Cash Holding  
Cash holding of firms represents liquidity of the firm; it serves as a form of internal fund access for 
firms to explore when financing growth opportunities and expansion, and it benefits firms as external 
financing is costly, coupled with the uncertainty that surrounds debt and equity financing. The trade-
off theory predicts a positive relationship between cash holdings and leverage ratios; the prediction is 
that highly leveraged firms would hold more cash so as to prevent the possibilities of bankruptcy and 
financial distress as a result of default probabilities. However, under the pecking order theory, a 
negative relationship between cash holdings and leverage ratio is expected. 
 
 





There are conflicting predictions and results on the relationship between profitability and leverage. 
According to Myers and Majluf (1984), under pecking order theory a negative relationship exists 
between profitability and leverage because firms would prefer to utilise internal funds from profits 
instead of external financing such as debt. However, Jensen (1986) posits that the effect of profitability 
could be positive or negative depending on corporate control: firms with effective corporate control 
would push for more debt, hence utilising cash for debt payment. With ineffective corporate control, 
however, firms would avoid the constraints that debt imposes on them. Under the trade-off theory a 
positive relationship exists between profitability and leverage; the model predicts that profitable firms 
would have more debt so as to reduce tax burdens and lower bankruptcy risk. Jensen (1986) predicts a 
positive relationship between free cash flow; the intuition here is that since managers may engage in 
less desirable activities which may be detrimental to the firm, firms with high cash flow would 
increase leverage to channel excess cash to debt repayments, hence controlling for agency costs. 
Profitability is measured as earnings before tax by total assets; however Rajan and Zingales (1995) 
find that profitability is negatively correlated with leverage in all countries investigated except 
Germany. 
Macro-Economic Indicators  
In the model used to understand the determinants of capital structure of property companies in the 
GCC, two time-variant variables as examined in Ooi’s (1999) study - paper bill spread and stock 
market return - are included. These variables are included to capture any external variations which 
may have an effect on the use of leverage by property companies during the time investigated. Paper 
bill spread is measured by non-financial 3-month Aaa CP rate minus 3-month Treasury bill (T-bill) 
rate, and captures borrowing cost: when borrowing costs are high, firms would tend to use equity 




financing while high borrowing cost also signifies the possibility that firms may encounter financial 
distress. It is predicted that leverage is negatively correlated to borrowing costs while stock market 
return is price appreciation of the S&P GCC index over the last two prior quarters. This variable is 
included in the model to control for the effect of market sentiments on capital structure choice of 
property companies, and a negative relation between debt ratios and stock market performance is 
predicted. Several studies (e.g. Bayless and Dittz 1991 and Marsh 1982) have shown that firms tend to 
issue equities when the market is buoyant; in other words, firms time the market in favourable 
conditions. 
 
Non-traditional Determinants of Capital Structure   
Founding Family  
Mishra and McConaughy (1999) investigate the role of founding family-controlled firms, and show 
that the founding family control factor is very important in understanding firms’ leverage decisions. 
The study finds a negative relationship between firms which are family founded and leverage. The 
intuition is that these firms would tend to borrow less to prevent a loss of ownership to creditors. This 
variable is a dummy variable; 1 for firms that are family founded and 0 for firms that are not family 
founded.  
Access to Public Debt Market 
Faulkender and Petersen (2005) find that firms that have access to the debt market tend to have more 
leverage than firms that do not. Firms that have a credit rating such as the Standard & Poor’s credit 
rating or the Moody’s credit rating are regarded as having access to the public debt market. This 
variable is a dummy variable; 1 for firms that have a credit rating and 0 for firms that does not.   




In the analysis, panel data are employed which allows us to observe the relationships across firms and 
across periods of time. The effects of the factors which are related to leverage using the cross-sectional 
technique and the fixed effects model are identified; hence the results are more robust and correct for 
any errors by using an OLS regression. 
3.4	DATA	AND	DESCRIPTIVE	ANALYSIS	
 
As at the end of the fourth quarter of 2009, there were 55 public-listed property firms (including 
property developers and property investment firms) which are publicly listed in six stock markets and 
five countries respectively in the Gulf States.19 These firms are listed under the property or property 
development section of public listed firms; hence they are easily identified, and their financial 
disclosure requirements are open to public scrutiny. In this way, a firm’s contractual relationship with 
its creditors is easily identified. 
Data are collected from firm-level balance sheet information from the first quarter of 2004 to the 
fourth quarter of 2009. All information and figures on borrowing are gathered from end-of-year annual 
accounts of each publicly listed property company in the Gulf States. Data as well as firm 
characteristics on listed property firms in the Gulf States are collected from their respective balance 
sheets as well as the Bloomberg database.  
There are more public listed firms in Kuwait than in any other GCC countries; 38 property firms are 
listed in the Kuwaiti stock exchange, whilst six property firms are listed in the UAE (Dubai financial 
market and Abu-Dhabi securities exchange) and six property firm are also listed on  the Tadawul stock 
exchange (Saudi Arabia) respectively. There are three public listed property firms in the Doha 








end of 2009, Oman was the only country in the GCC without a public listed property company on the 
stock market.  
The average market capitalisation for public listed GCC property firms is US$798 million; the highest 
average market capitalisation of public listed property firms in the GCC is in Qatar with an average of 
US$ 3,763 million, followed by public listed property firms in the United Arab Emirates and Saudi 
Arabia, with an average size of US$2,201.37 million and US$1,902.10 million  respectively. The 
average market capitalisation of Bahraini public listed property firms is US$306.63 million and 
Kuwait has the lowest average market capitalisation for public listed property firms in the GCC with 
an average market capitalisation of US$194.12 million. In the essay, leverage of firms is measured by 
total debt to total assets; the average leverage of property firms in the GCC is 24.35%. Qatari property 
firms use more debt than any other GCC property firm at 40% whilst the leverage of Saudi Arabian 
property firms is the lowest in the GCC at 5%. The leverage ratios of property firms in Kuwait are at 
26.01%, while that of Bahraini property firms are much lower at 8.28% and Emirati property firms 
have a leverage ratio of 23.45%.  
Islamic property firms are identified in the sample by considering property firms with a Shariah board. 
There is currently no Islamic governing body where compliance with Islamic principles by Islamic 
corporations is ensured. The criteria of selection, by choosing only firms that have an internal Shariah 
board, should mitigate the idea that Islamic firms would engage in interest-bearing loans and engage in 
haram (sinful) activities (prohibited in Shariah law). In total, 27 public listed property firms in the 
GCC are Islamic firms, as they have an internal Shariah board, whilst 28 property firms are general 
property firms as they do not have an internal Shariah board.  Kuwait has the highest number of 
Islamic firms in the GCC with 18 Shariah-compliant and 20 general property firms, whilst Bahrain had 
the lowest, with one Shariah-compliant firm and one general property firm.  




Another alternative for identifying Shariah-compliant property firms in the sample is by considering 
public listed property firms which are listed on the Dow Jones Islamic Market GCC Index as at 
December 200920. Thirteen of the public listed GCC firms are Shariah-compliant according to the 
DJIM criteria while 42 are non-Shariah-compliant. Kuwait has the highest number of Shariah-
compliant property firms as seven are Shariah-compliant while 31 are non-compliant. The United 
Arab Emirates and Qatar have no Shariah-compliant public listed property firms as at December 2009.  
Firm’s debt includes short-term debt plus long-term debt. The investigation cuts across different 
countries in the Gulf States; hence differences in book-debt ratios across countries are examined as a 
result of account principles which may differ in countries or due to capital structure policies of the 
firm. However, according to this investigation, it is found that Gulf States adopt international 
accounting standards without any modifications (Hussain et al, 2002).21 Hence it would appropriate to 




Table 3.1: Characteristics of Public Listed Property Firms in the Gulf Cooperation Council. 
Table 3.1 shows the firm characteristics of property developers in the GCC based on the aggregate of 
individual property developers categorised by countries as at December 2009. The only publicly traded 
property company in Bahrain is a property investment company while there are no publicly listed property 
firms in Oman as at the compilation of data. The leverage gearing ratio is calculated by total debt-to-book 
value of total assets. Growth is calculated by market-to-book assets ratio. All figures are an average of 
individual property firms incorporated in the domiciled country. 

















Market Cap ($US 
Million) 
194.12 2201.37 1902.10 3763.40 306.63 798.20 
Leverage/Gearing 
Ratio 
0.2601 0.2345 0.0592 0.4003 0.0828 0.2435 
Shariah (Non-Shariah) 
Islamic Shariah Board 
18 (20) 4 (2) 2 (4) 2 (1) 1(1) 27(28) 
Shariah (Non-Shariah) 
Dow Jones Islamic 
Index 
7 (31) 0(6) 5 (1) 0 (3) 1(1) 13(42) 
Growth Ratio 0.9228 0.9784 1.1036 1.0691 0.7793 0.9514 
Total Assets ($US 
Million) 
544.12 7921.87 2135.54 6572.40 739.94 1858.51 






To measure the effects of debt market restriction, the leverage of Shariah-compliant property firms is 
compared to general property firms. Leverage is measured as total debt (short-term and long-term 
debt) to book value of total assets and results show that Shariah-compliant property firms have a lower 
leverage than general property firms (See panel A of Table 3.2). When leverage is measured using 
debt to book ratios, Shariah-compliant DJIM (Islamic scholar) property firms have a debt ratio which 
is about 12% lower (2.7% lower). Shariah-compliant DJIM (Islamic scholar) average 12.9% (19.76%) 
compared to the leverage ratio of general firms which average 24.83% (22.42%). The difference is 
significant at the 1% level (5% level). When leverage is measured using market debt ratios, Shariah-
compliant DJIM (Islamic scholar) property firms are again less levered than general firms; the 
difference is higher (lower) when leverage is measured using debt market ratios at 15.90% (-1.20%), 
significant at the 1% level. 
In the data, there are a few firm quarters in which leverage is not used.  In these cases firms may have 
used alternative forms of financing, and in panel B firm quarters which have zero debt are excluded. 




The ratios are calculated based on the firms with positive debt. Shariah compliant DJIM (Islamic 
Scholar) firms have significantly lower debt of 8.84% (4.39%) significant at the 1% level (10% level) 
compared to general firms. Leverage of positive debt is measured using debt market ratios and find 
that Shariah-compliant (Islamic) firms have significantly lower debt of 13.09% (0.30%) significant at 
the 1% level (not significant). 
The difference in leverage between Shariah-compliant property firms (DJIM) and general property 
firms is very robust. Shariah-compliant property firms (DJIM) have a lower leverage at the 25th, 50th, 
and 75th percentile of the distribution (See panel A of Table 3.1). For the median firm, being a 
Shariah-compliant property firm reduces the BV debt ratio by 11.93% from 24.83% to 12.9%); 
however if measured by the MV debt ratio, the researcher finds that difference in debt ratio is greater 
by 15.90%. 
In this study, a Shariah-compliant property firm is classified as such if it is listed in the DJIM GCC 
index. Such firms have a significantly lower leverage ratio compared to general property firms. The 
leverage decision of Shariah Islamic property firms (Islamic Scholar) is also examined. The 
responsibilities of the Shariah board are to ensure that the operations of the firms are in line with the 
tenets of Shariah law. There exist mixed results in the leverage choice of Islamic firms, unlike 
Shariah-compliant firms in which the leverage decisions are very robust due to the restrictions of debt 
to 33%. Islamic firms are not restricted to such debt restrictions as they do not borrow from general 
banks which have interest embedded in their loans. Hence Islamic firms tend to borrow more from 
banks than Shariah-compliant firms (DJIM) do. In panel A of Islamic firms, leverage choice is 
measured with debt/book value of assets, and Islamic firms tend to be less levered than general firms, 
with a difference of 2.66%, significant at the 5% level. However when debt/market value of assets is 
employed, according to the differences of mean, Islamic firms are more levered than general property 




firms. The same is observed when firm quarters are examined with positive debt. Islamic firms are less 
levered with a difference of 4.39%, significant at the 1% level, whereas when positive debt by market 
value is measured, they are less levered with a difference of 0.30% but insignificant.  
In the preliminary univariate tests, general firms are employed as a basis on which to compare 
Shariah-compliant firms and Islamic firms. There exists a lower and significant difference in the 
leverage of Shariah-compliant property firms than Islamic property firms, which have mixed results. 
In the next stage, determinants of capital structure decisions are controlled for.  
 
 
Table 3.2: Leverage by Shariah-compliant and General Property Firms 
Table 3.2 reports summary statistics on a firm’s total debt ratios based on Shariah-compliant 
firms and general property firms. Categorisation is based on firms included in the DJIM index 
as at the first quarter of 2010, which is subsequently classified as a Shariah-compliant firm. 
Table 3.2 also reports mean, median, 25th percentile and 75th percentile as well as the difference 
between Shariah-compliant and general firm leverage and its significance level (*, **and *** 
indicates significance level at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively). In panel A of Table 3.2 
there are 846 quarter-year observations of which 37.8% are Shariah-compliant.  Panel B of 
Table 3.2 includes only firm quarters whereby the firm had a positive amount of leverage. In 
panel B there are 720 firm quarter observations of which 38.6% are Shariah-compliant.  Market 
value is calculated as total debt divided by book value of assets minus book value of equity 
plus market value of equity. 
 Mean 25% Median 75% 
Shariah-compliant Firms  
Panel A: All Firm Quarters 
Debt/Asset (BV)     
Total Sample  21.5% 2.79% 19.26% 35.68% 
Shariah-compliant 12.9% 0.00% 7.09% 23.02% 
General  24.83% 8.40% 25.22% 38.33% 
Difference 11.93%*    
Debt/Asset (MV)     
Total Sample 21.98% 4.65% 19.59% 35.52% 
Shariah-compliant 10.86% 0.00% 5.49% 15.86% 
General  26.77% 13.00% 26.57% 40.17% 
Difference 15.90%***    
Panel B: All Firm Quarters with Positive Debt 
Positive Debt/Asset (BV)     
Total Sample  25.27% 10.53% 25.21% 38.10% 
Shariah-compliant 18.45% 5.40% 15.55% 32.03% 
General  27.29% 12.45% 27.72% 40.18% 




Difference 8.84%***    
Positive Debt/Asset (MV)     
Total Sample  25.28% 11.37% 23.51% 37.77% 
Shariah-compliant 15.38% 4.81% 12.98% 19.27% 
General  28.47% 16.06% 27.68% 41.00% 
Difference 13.09%***    
Islamic Firms 
Panel A: All Firm Quarters 
Debt/Asset (BV)     
Total Sample  21.50% 2.79% 19.26% 35.68% 
Islamic 19.76% 3.52% 16.20% 33.56% 
General  22.42% 1.92% 20.91% 37.15% 
Difference 2.66%**    
Debt/Asset (MV)     
Total Sample 21.99% 4.65% 19.59% 35.52% 
Islamic 21.58% 6.21% 19.55% 37.18% 
General  22.78% 2.90% 19.62% 35.27% 
Difference -1.20%    
Panel B: All Firm Quarters with Positive Debt
Positive Debt/Asset (BV)     
Total Sample  25.20% 10.50% 25.18% 38.09% 
Islamic 22.37% 9.21% 21.24% 35.32% 
General  26.76% 12.28% 27.62% 39.86% 
Difference 4.39%*    
Positive Debt/Asset (MV)     
Total Sample  25.34% 11.36% 23.48% 37.66% 
Islamic 25.04% 10.97% 21.49% 37.62% 
General  25.23% 11.37% 25.25% 37.71% 




In the results in Table 3.2, Shariah-compliant property firms are less levered than general property 
firms; however the results of Shariah-compliant firms measured by Islamic scholars are mixed. It is 
therefore apt that this is examined. The difference in leverage between Shariah-compliant/Islamic and 
general property firms may be driven by two possible factors - demand or supply. It may be that 
general firms find debt more appealing than Sharia-compliant and Islamic firms; also it may well be 
that Shariah-compliant and Islamic firms are being discouraged from taking out too much debt. From 
initial analysis, it may be perhaps that general property firms find debt more valuable than Shariah-




compliant and Islamic property firms; hence the benefits of debt may be greater or the cost of debt 
may be lower. Empirical work on the capital structure literature has identified several firm 
characteristics which explain the capital structure choice of firms. Table 3.3 below shows the 
difference in firm characteristics between Shariah-compliant (DJIM) and general property firms. By 
examining the results from Table 3.3, Shariah-compliant property firms are different from general 
property firms in that they tend to be 15% larger (difference in natural logs of market value of assets) 
than general firms; however if the natural logs of book value of assets are considered, Shariah-
compliant firms tend to be only 9% larger.  In terms of age, Shariah-compliant property firms tend to 
be older than general firms, and they also tend to be 24% more capitalised. . When the log of sales is 
considered, Shariah-compliant property firms are 12% larger than general property firms, but they 
have lesser tangible assets of 69% compared to general property firms, and have larger mean market-
to-book ratios.  This suggests that Shariah-compliant property firms have larger intangible assets such 
as growth opportunities, 33% larger than general property firms.  
From Table 3.3 below, which depicts the characteristics of Shariah-compliant and general firms in the 
GCC, there is an understanding of why the former have lower leverage in comparison to their general 
counterparts. Shariah-compliant firms exhibit characteristics which suggest the significant difference 
in leverage such as 69% lower tangible assets, and 33% more growth opportunities. The trade-off 
theory hypothesis predicts that firms or industries with high risks, high growth opportunities and 










Table 3.3: Summary statistics of firm characteristics  
(Shariah-compliant and non-Shariah-compliant firms) 
Table 3.3 contains summary statistics for the samples of Shariah-compliant property firms and 
general property firms. Property firms which are included in the DJIM GCC index as the first 
quarter of 2010 are classified as a Shariah-compliant firm. Values are expressed in mean 
(median), whilst the third column represents the mean difference between Shariah-compliant and 
general property firms. Statistical significance of the difference (***, ** and * indicates 
statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels. 




Compliant firms  
Difference 
Log(MV of assets) 8.91 8.76 -0.15*** 
Log(BV of assets) 8.74 8.65 -0.09** 
Log (1+firm age) 1.27 1.18 -0.09*** 
EBITDA/total assets 0.0184 0.0186 0.0002 
Growth 1.68 1.35 -0.33*** 
Log Market Cap 8.79 8.55 -0.24*** 
Cash/Total assets 0.062 0.085 0.022** 
Log Sales 7.16 7.04 -0.12** 
Tangible Assets 8.59 9.28 0.69* 
Property Firms 22 Firms 30 Firms  
 
Table 3.4 shows the differences in firm characteristics between Shariah-compliant property firms 
(Islamic Scholar) and general firms.  There are several differences noticed in comparison to the results 
reported for Shariah-compliant firms (DJIM). General property firms are employed as a basis of 
comparison; they tend to be older than firms with an Islamic scholar. The earnings before tax of firms 
with an Islamic scholar are negative and the difference in earnings in comparison to non-Shariah 
property firms is significant at the 1% level. Unlike Shariah-compliant (DJIM) firms, Shariah-
compliant firms  (Islamic Scholar) have more tangible assets than non-Shariah-compliant firms. 
Tangible assets are positively correlated with the use of debt; however although the tangible assets of 
Islamic firms are larger than those of non-Islamic firms, they still choose to be less levered. 
From the univariate results in Table 3.2 above, it is unable to identify if the difference in the leverage 
of Shariah-compliant/Islamic and general property firms is due to firm characteristics (demand factors) 




or due to Shariah-compliant/Islamic firms being constrained in their borrowing (supply factors). Hence 
it is essential that, in the next step of the analysis, firm characteristics is controlled for, which may 
determine the firm’s demand for debt.  This would also determine whether the difference in leverage is 
a demand or supply effect22. 
 
Table 3.4: Summary statistics of firm characteristics (Islamic and non-Islamic firms) 
The table contains summary statistics for the samples of Shariah-compliant property firms and 
general property firms. Property firms which have an Islamic Shariah board are classified as 
Shariah-compliant firms. Values are expressed in mean (median), while the third column 
represents the mean difference between Shariah-compliant and general property firms. 
Statistical significance of the difference (***, ** and * indicates statistical significance at the 
1%, 5% and 10% levels). 






Log(MV of assets) 6.24 5.76 -0.4837*** 
Log(BV of assets) 6.00 5.40 -0.5949*** 
Log (1+firm age) 2.52   2.89 0.3711*** 
EBITDA/total assets -1.71 0.58 2.29*** 
Growth 1.48 1.43 -0.051 
Log Market Cap 8.74 8.55 -0.1872*** 
Cash/Total assets 0.08 0.08 -0.0064 
Log Sales 0.0513 0.0365 -0.0148*** 
Tangible Assets   9.23 9.05 -0.1806 
Property Firms 27 28  
	
From the results, the variation between Shariah-compliant firms and general firms is wider post-2007 
and lower pre-2007. Attention is drawn to the liquidity and credit crunch which had an effect on the 
world including the Middle East - the area of investigation. The results post-2007 in Figure 3.1 could 
be as a result of drying up of lending channels and liquidity constraints which affected the global 




























Figure 3.1 Effect of being Shariah-compliant on leverage: Time variation 
 
Effect of being Shariah compliant on leverage: Time variation 
Figure 3.1 depicts the estimated coefficients from the regression of leverage on a Shariah-compliant  
property firm; the co-efficient for each year is estimated by using the same model as in Table 3.3  
(Model II).The interaction variables are created for each year by multiplying dummy variable with the  




This part of the study addresses i) the determinants of capital structure of property firms and ii) the 
capital structure choice of Shariah-compliant and Islamic property firms. In this stage of the analysis, a 




firm’s fixed effects are controlled for23; this method of estimation is more accurate than cross-sectional 
OLS regression. In cross-sectional regressions there are certain omitted variables particular to each 
company which are not taken into consideration; however with the fixed effects, dummy variables are 
created for each firm in the analysis to control for variable omission which is constant in each firm 
over time. The fixed effect model is also known as the least squares dummy variable (LSDV).  In this 
estimation model, the intercept varies for each property firm but still assumes that the slope 
coefficients are constant across firms, as seen in the equation 2 below.  
             (2) 
The subscript i on the intercept of equation 2 suggests that the intercepts of the firms may be different 
from each other, and this difference may be a result of distinctive features associated with each firm.  
The first priority in this study is to understand the determinants of capital structure of property firms in 
the GCC. Table 3.5, Models I and II show the determinants of capital structure of property firms in the 
GCC from 2004 to 2009, the data used are panel data, and a fixed effect regression technique was used 
to derive the coefficients for the equation. The dependent variable in Model I is the leverage ratio 
expressed in book value while Model II is the leverage ratio expressed in market value. In Model I, 
five independent variables are significant; these are size, age, growth, change in EBITDA and the 
Shariah-compliant variable. In Model II, five independent variables are significant; these are i size, 
change in EBITDA, stock market return, paper bill spread and the Shariah-compliant variable.  
There is a positive and significant relationship between capital structure and size, and size is a 
significant determinant of capital structure of property firms in the GCC.  Previous studies (including 
Graham et al, 1998 and Hovakimian et al, 2001) show that leverage is positively correlated with size.  








risky; hence the probability that firms would experience financial distress is often low; hence larger 
firms have access to bank loans. The result is contrary to the findings of Marsh (1982), Titman and 
Wessel (1988) and Ooi (1999) who find a negative relationship between firm size and capital 
structure. The proxy for firm size in the model is natural log of total assets.  
In Models I to IV, there is a positive correlation between firm age and leverage ratio. Older firms are 
more levered than younger firms, and these results mirror those of Petersen and Rajan (1994) that find 
a positive relationship between reputation (firm age) and leverage ratios.  
In Models I and III, there is a positive and significant relationship at the 1% level between growth rate 
and leverage ratio of property firms in the GCC. The result is inconsistent with the prediction of a 
negative relationship between growth rate and leverage ratio as asserted by Myers (1977) which 
highlights that firms in which growth opportunities play a significant part in their market value would 
tend to have less leverage. However, these results are in line with Ross (1977) whose study finds that 
there is a positive relationship between growth opportunities and leverage. According to the signalling 
theory, credit lenders would tend to give out loans to firms with growth opportunities.  
In Table 3.5, Models II and IV, stock market return and paper bill spread are significant at the 1% 
level. The two variables are indicative of macro-economic indicators which are possible determinants 
of capital structure of property firms in the GCC; this means that stock market performance and paper 
bill spread are considered by firms when making capital structure choices. There is a negative and 
significant relationship at the 1% level between leverage ratio and stock market return, which is line 
with the predictions of Marsh (1982)  and Jalilvand and Harris (1990), that firms time equity issues so 
as to coincide with favourable market conditions. This is based on the intuition that in a buoyant 
market the likelihood of undervaluation of the firm’s equity is low (Ooi, 1999). In the model, stock 
market condition is proxy by the quarterly return on the S&P GCC index. 




Table 3.5, Models II and IV show a positive and significant relationship between interest rates and 
leverage ratio.  Intuition leans to the premise that when interest rates are high, firms would look for 
alternative forms of financing particularly equity financing; hence an inverse relationship should be 
observed. However, a counter-intuitive reason is that debt is more readily made available to firms 
when interest rates are higher; the higher the spread the more debt is offered to firms, resulting in 
higher leverage ratios. The paper bill spread is measured as a proxy for interest rates which is the 
difference between Aaa commercial notes and the 3-month risk-free treasury bill.  
In all the models estimated by the fixed effect regression in Table 3.5, there are differences in Models 
I to IV based on the proxy of debt (book value or market value). However, consistency was observed 
in the Shariah-compliant variable regardless of debt proxy. The less leverage in Shariah-compliant 
firms (DJIM proxy) observed in Table 3.2 and in the OLS regression (unreported) disappears in the 
fixed effect regression. Models I and II show that Shariah-compliant (DJIM proxy) firms are not less 
levered when a fixed effect regression is employed. 
In Models III and IV, less leverage in Islamic firms (internal Shariah board) observed in Table 3.2 and 
in the OLS regression (unreported) is consistent in Table 3.5 after controlling for firm characteristics. 
This result shows that firms that are included in the Dow Jones Islamic index are not less levered; 
however firms that have an internal Shariah board are less levered. 
The fixed effect regression model controls for unobserved variables and unique characteristics peculiar 
to firms in the sample size, and findings show that Shariah-compliant property firms as measured by 
property firms in the Dow Jones Islamic Index have more leverage than general property firms, and 
the difference in leverage ratios is significant at the 10% and 1% levels as seen in Table 3.5, Model I 
and II. However, Shariah property firms as measured by property firms with an internal Shariah 
scholar board have less leverage than general property firms in the same region, although the 




differences are insignificant as shown in Table 3.5, Models III and IV. The next analysis is to 
understand why Shariah property firms (Islamic Scholar) employ less leverage than general property 
firms. Two plausible hypotheses are tested to understand this phenomenon: the founding family 
hypothesis and the public debt market hypothesis. 
Table 3.5: Determinants of Capital Structure: Fixed Effects 
The dependent variable is the ratio of total debt to the value of assets.  For Models 
I and III, the dependent variable is the ratio of total debt to the book value of 
assets (BV) while for Models II and IV, the dependent variable is the ratio of total 
debt to market value (MV) of firms’ assets. Models I and II measure the Shariah-
compliant variable as measured by an inclusion in the DJIM index while Models 
III and IV measure the Shariah-compliant variable as measured by firms having a 
Shariah board. All models include year dummy variables. *** indicates statistical 
significance at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level and * indicates statistical 
significance at the 10% level. Sample is retrieved from the Bloomberg database 
from the 1st Quarter of 2004 to the 4th Quarter of 2009.  In Models III and IV, the 
Shariah-compliant variable is measured by firms with which are listed in Dow 
Jones Islamic Index while in Models V and VI, the Islamic variable is measured 






























Ln(1+firm age) 0.0892** 
(0.0385) 
   0.0638 
    (0.0476) 
0.0529** 
(0.0385) 
   0.0638 
    (0.0476) 






















































755 615 755 615 
0.7977 0.7840 0.8156 0.7840 










Results in Table 3.5 show that differences exist between Shariah-compliant firms and Islamic firms 
particularly in their use of leverage. To address robustness in the results in Tables 3.5 of Shariah-
compliant and Islamic property firms, non-traditional variables (founding family and access to the 
public debt market) from past studies are controlled for in Table 3.6. In the earlier section of the essay, 
traditional firm characteristics of firms are examined; however this section below examines how non-
traditional determinants of debts can explain leverage in Sharia- compliant and Islamic firms.  
Mishra and McConaughy (1999) investigate the role of founding family-controlled firms, and show 
that the founding family control factor is very important in understanding firms’ leverage decisions. 
The study argues that founding families are averse to factors which may increase loss of control of the 
firm. In cost of debt which involves potential bankruptcy costs, such families may lose their control if 
they are unable to meet contractual obligations; hence the expected cost of debts is higher in such 
firms. In this case, they would borrow less due to the high expected costs. Mishra and McConaughy 
find that founding families control matters in determining the level of debt financing.  
Faulkender and Petersen (2005) find that firms which have access to the public debt market have 
significantly more leverage than firms which do not have access. The paper controls for firm’s 
characteristics as well as the endogeneity issues associated with having a debt rating and still find that 
firms with access to the public market have significantly more leverage. Firms with a Standard and 
Poor rating or Moody’s rating are considered to have access to the public debt market in line with 
Faulkender and Petersen (2005). 




The models in Table 3.6 control for non-traditional determinants of capital structure, particularly the 
founding family hypothesis and the public debt market hypothesis. Results in Models I and II are 
inconsistent with the founding family hypothesis24 which predicts a negative relationship with 
leverage and family-owned firms and access to public debt market which predicts a positive 
relationship with leverage and firms with an access to the public debt market25. Models I and II 
measure Shariah-compliant firms which are included in the DJIM index, and Model I shows under-
leverage when debt is measured in book value and over-leverage when debt is measure in market 
value revealing an inconsistent result.  
For Models III and IV, however there exists a negative and significant relationship between Islamic 
firms and leverage significant at the 1% level. In Models III and IV, the regression results support the 
hypothesis that founding families26 tend to borrow less, as there exists a negative and significant 
relationship between leverage and the founding family variable. The regression results also support the 
hypothesis that firms that have access to the debt market27 tend to use more leverage. In Models II and 
IV, there is a positive and significant relationship between leverage and access to the public debt 
market. 
After controlling for traditional determinants of capital structure, Shariah-compliant firms use more 
leverage than non-Shariah firms; however Islamic firms use less leverage than non-Islamic firms.  
Islamic firms tend to be less levered according to Model III and IV in Table 3.6. There is a negative 














Results in Table 3.6 are robust as they include traditional and non-traditional determinants of capital 
structure choice which are controlled for. However the relationship between leverage and Shariah-
compliant firms is inconsistent; therefore the results are inconclusive for firms which are included in 
the Dow Jones Islamic Index.  
Table 3.6: Determinants of capital structure and market leverage of Islamic firms: Fixed Effects 
The dependent variable is the ratio of total debt to the value of assets.  For Models 
I and III, the dependent variable is the ratio of total debt to the book value of 
assets (BV) while for Models II and IV, the dependent variable is the ratio of total 
debt to market value (MV) of firms’ assets. Models I, II, III and IV measure the 
Shariah-compliant variable as measured by an inclusion in the DJIM. All models 
include year dummy variables. *** indicates statistical significance at the 1% 
level, ** at the 5% level and * indicates statistical significance at the 10% level. 
The sample is retrieved from the Bloomberg database from the 1st Quarter of 2004 
to the 4th Quarter of 2009.  In Models III and IV, the Shariah-compliant variable is 
measured by firms which are listed in Dow Jones Islamic Index while in Models 























































































































755 615 755 615 
0.8156 0.7840 0.8156 0.7840 
Estimation Method LSDV LSDV LSDV LSDV 
 
The assertions that Shariah-compliant firms included in the DJIM index are more levered than firms 
excluded in the DJIM index are shown in as seen in Models I and II in Table 3.5 are inconsistent in 
comparison to the results in Models I and II in Table 3.6, when non-traditional determinants (founding 
family and access to public debt) are controlled for. However Islamic firms are consistent; results in 
Table 3.6, Models III and IV show that Islamic firms are less levered than non-Islamic firms, 
consistent with earlier Models III and IV in Table 3.5. 
Table 3.7 attempts to explain why Islamic firms are less levered that non-Islamic firms. Models I and 
II in Table 3.7 explains the determinants of capital structure of Islamic firms while Models III and IV 
explains the determinants of capital structure of non-Islamic firms. A positive relationship with 
leverage and the explanatory variables explains that the higher the values of the variable the higher 
leverage it may possible to obtain from lenders. However, a negative relationship with leverage and 
the independent variables explains that the higher the value of the variable, the lower the leverage it 
may obtain from lenders. Tables 3.5 and 3.6 show that Islamic firms are less levered; hence in Table 
3.7, variables which are negative and significant in Models I and II and positive in Models III and IV 
may explain why Islamic firms are less levered.  
The access to debt market and growth opportunities have a negative relationship with leverage in 
Models I and II which measure the leverage of Islamic firms, while the variables have a positive 
relationship with leverage in Models III and IV which measure the leverage of non-Islamic firms.  The 
variables have a strong relationship with the effects of less leverage in Islamic firms. Islamic firms 
with access to the debt market tend to have less leverage than non-Islamic firms with access to the 
debt market. Furthermore, Islamic firms with growth opportunities tend to have less leverage than 




non-Islamic firms with growth opportunities.  These variables tend to have a strong relationship to 
why Islamic firms are less levered than non-Islamic firms in comparison to other variables which show 
a weak relationship when leverage is measured in book value and market value.  
Table 3.7: Determinants of capital structure of Islamic and non-Islamic Firms: Fixed Effects 
The dependent variable is the ratio of total debt to the value of assets.  For Models 
I and III, the dependent variable is the ratio of total debt to the book value of 
assets (BV) while for Models II and IV, the dependent variable is the ratio of total 
debt to market value (MV) of firms’ assets. Models I and II measure the Shariah-
compliant firms which have an internal Shariah board while Models III and IV 
measure non-Islamic firms who do not have an internal Shariah board. All models 
include year dummy variables. *** indicates statistical significance at the 1% 
level, ** at the 5% level and * indicates statistical significance at the 10% level. 
Sample is retrieved from the Bloomberg database from the 1st Quarter of 2004 to 








































































































257 212 498 403 
0.6517 0.7401 0.8654 0.8240 
Estimation Method LSDV LSDV LSDV LSDV 
 






In this study the determinants of capital structure choice of property firms in the GCC as well as the 
effects of Shariah compliance on leverage decisions are examined. Property firms’ financing choices 
in the GCC over several years are examined and this study finds that a positive relationship exists 
between growth and leverage; in other words, property firms with high growth ratios and high market 
valuation raise funds through debt issuance. This finding is consistent with the general finding of a 
positive relationship between growth opportunities and leverage ratios of REITs as seen in Feng et al 
(2007). Capital structure of property firms in the GCC may be explained by the pecking order theory 
as posited by Myers (1984), as there exists a negative relationship between leverage ratios and 
profitability. Firm size and firm age are determinants of leverage ratios of property firms in the GCC 
as there is a positive and significant relationship. Finally, reputation is a significant feature which 
determines the capital structure of firms in the GCC. 
In this essay, the effects of Shariah compliance on leverage decision are examined. Multivariate results 
show that Shariah-compliant property (DJIM) firms are more levered than general property firms, as 
there is a positive and significant relationship between Shariah property firms (DJIM) and leverage 
ratio when the results are estimated under the fixed effects regression.  
Islamic firms that have an internal Shariah board use less leverage than general firms: in Tables 3.5 
and 3.6 there is a negative and significant relationship between firms with an internal Shariah board 
and leverage. Furthermore, in the latter section of the essay, non-traditional determinants of capital 
structure are controlled for. In the models in Table 3.6, the founding family control hypothesis (Mishra 
and McConaughy 1999) and public debt access hypothesis (Faulkender and Petersen 2005) are tested. 
According to the results in the fixed effects regression, there is a disparate result between Shariah 
firms and Islamic firms. The results of Shariah-compliant firms are inconsistent while the results of 




Islamic firms are consistent with earlier findings that Islamic property firms are less levered than non-
Islamic property firms.  
Results in Table 3.7 show that Islamic firms tend to be less levered than non-Islamic firms as a result 
of the inability of Islamic firms with access to debt market to secure more leverage in comparison to 
non-Islamic firms. Furthermore, Islamic firms with growth opportunities are unable to secure more 
leverage in comparison to non-Islamic firms with growth opportunities.  
The firms studied in this survey belong to the property sector and are narrowly selected; hence a level 
of caution is required when interpreting the results.  Replication of this study is encouraged on a larger 
population size of Shariah-compliant and Islamic firms. Another limitation of the study is the 
assumption of the homogeneity of debt in the model; debt in itself could be investigated taking into 
consideration the different maturity periods of debts which could lead to different attributes; also, the 
inability to determine the source of bank borrowing is also a limitation. The main contribution of this 
essay is the exploration of how Shariah law influences leverage decisions. 
The results highlight the importance of Shariah compliance to capital structure choice of property 
firms.  This chapter shows that Islamic property firms tend to have lower debt coverage and this is as a 
result of an inability to take advantage of an access to the debt market and growth opportunities to 
















There has been an increase in Shariah-compliant product offerings as well as investment in Shariah-
compliant stocks in the past decade. Assets under Shariah-compliant management grew from US$150 
billion in the mid-1990s to US$700 billion in 2007 (HM Treasury 2008). In 2010, Islamic finance 
assets reached the US$1 trillion mark (Ernst & Young, 2010); Islamic banking and finance has grown 
exponentially in recent decades and is considered the fastest growing area in the finance industry.  
Islamic finance has grown outside of the traditional markets such as the Gulf Cooperation Council 
(GCC) and Islamic states, and has made inroads into Europe with England leading the Islamic finance 
industry with assets estimated at US$18.1 billion as at 2008 (HM Treasury 2008), as well as into Asia 
with large markets in Malaysia and Indonesia. 
In this essay, the idiosyncratic risks of Shariah-compliant REIT investors are considered. The 
emergence of Shariah-compliant REITs can be traced to Malaysia. In August 2006, the first fully 
Shariah-compliant REIT, Al Aqar KPJ REIT, was listed on the Malaysian stock exchange with an 
asset size of US$260 million; the REIT specialises in healthcare.  Subsequently, in 2007, a second 
Shariah-compliant REIT was listed on the Malaysian stock exchange, Al-Hadharah Boustead REIT, 
which specialises in oil palm plantations. In December 2008, Axis REITs was the first REIT to 
convert to an Islamic REIT; this REIT specialises in office and industrial space. In 2010, the largest 
Shariah-compliant REIT, Sabana, was listed on the Singapore stock exchange: as at September 2010, 




the asset size of Sabana REITs was valued at US$640 million and the REIT specialises in industrial 
space (Ibrahim et al, 2012). 
Shariah-compliant REITs are different from conventional REITs for a number of reasons; the 
guidelines for Islamic REITs in Malaysia set by country’s Securities Commission serve as a good 
measure to illustrate the key differences between these two types of REIT. In the case of Shariah-
compliant REITs the total income from non-permissible activities28 to total turnover of the property 
must not exceed 20%, the financing of property in the REIT portfolios must be Shariah-compliant, and 
the REIT must appoint a Shariah advisor, who is responsible for ensuring that all-REIT operations are 
in accordance with Shariah law. In Malaysia, for example, Islamic M-REITs employ the Islamic 
Banking and Finance Institute, Malaysia as their Shariah advisor (Newell and Osmadi 2009) 
The aim of this essay is to examine the role of idiosyncratic volatility in the pricing of Shariah-
compliant REIT stock returns of the portfolio of a Shariah REIT investor. As a result of equity 
screening, Shariah-compliant investors are limited to a subset of the equities universe. Hence it is 
logical to assume that Shariah-compliant equities may be exposed to a form of idiosyncratic risk which 
is specific to Shariah investors as a result of a limited investment universe. While it is true that other 
investors also hold undiversified portfolios due to differing factors such as limitations on short sales, 
taxes, transaction costs, liquidity, and imperfect divisibility of securities (Merton1987), Shariah-
compliant investors are subject to an additional factor in the form of Shariah compliance. 
Studies on Shariah-compliant real estate investments are relatively scant. In two of these, Faishal and 
Eng (2008) and Newell and Osmadi (2009) explore the differences in returns between Shariah-
compliant REITs and general REITs and find that there is no statistical difference in the returns of 









first time the firm-specific risks of Shariah REITs are investigated, particularly the role the risks play 
in explaining firm returns.  
The Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) assumes that the market portfolio is the only one which is 
held in equilibrium; however such intuition would waiver and is violated when a set of investors are 
unable to retain the market portfolio for varying reasons, in particular in this case for compliance in 
Shariah principles. The effects of Shariah compliance in REIT investors who are unable to hold the 
real-estate investment trust market portfolio are investigated. REITs are investigated, firstly due to 
their unique operational structures; REITs are entitled to tax exemption, so far as they distribute 90% 
of their profits. Second, some REITs satisfy the criteria of qualitative screenings of Shariah 
compliance in the form of sector-based screening; hence the unique effects of Shariah-compliant 
portfolios from the perspective of property sector screenings are investigated. Third, the US REITs are 
investigated as this REIT market is the most developed in the World.  
In this study, the following research questions are asked: 
i) What is the historical pattern of the idiosyncratic risks of a Shariah-compliant REIT portfolio 
relative to an all-REIT portfolio, an equity REIT portfolio and a less restrictive Shariah-
compliant REIT portfolio from 1998 to 2009? 29 
ii) Since Shariah-compliant investors are unable to hold the market portfolio, what is the 
relationship between the conditional idiosyncratic risks and Shariah-compliant REIT 
portfolios? In other words, what role do idiosyncratic risks play in the pricing of the 










In this essay, the cross-sectional relationship between idiosyncratic risks and the expected returns of 
Shariah-compliant REIT stocks between 1998 and 2009 are examined. The idiosyncratic volatility- a 
measure of idiosyncratic risk using the Fama and French three-factor model (1993) - is estimated. The 
portfolios created in accordance with Shariah law have different exposures to volatility and hence 
different average returns. This study hypothesises that the ability of the expected idiosyncratic 
volatility to predict expected market returns of the portfolio of the strict Shariah investor from January 
1998 to December 2009 is driven by sector-based screenings.  
The essay differs from other studies on idiosyncratic risks and REIT stock returns in several ways, in 
that it is the first to explore the relationship between conditional idiosyncratic risks (firm-specific 
risks) and the expected returns of synthetic created US Shariah-compliant portfolios, since it has been 
documented in earlier papers (see Faishal and Eng 2008 and Newell and Osmadi 2009) that Shariah-
compliant REIT portfolios and the Islamic REIT portfolio do not underperform the market; and in 
some cases actually outperform the general REIT and REMF markets. The firm-specific risks of 
Shariah and Islamic REIT investors who invest in a limited universe which may have any effect on the 
returns of the Shariah and Islamic REIT portfolio are examined. Secondly, the study is the first to 
explore the relationship between idiosyncratic risks and expected returns on Islamic REITs in 
Malaysia. The data on Islamic Malaysian REIT also test a much longer period (over a five-year 
period) and complements the work of Newell and Osmadi (2009) who investigate preliminary risks 
and returns of Islamic REITs from 2006 to 2008. Finally, the knowledge on the relationship of REIT 
returns and idiosyncratic risks by investigating sector-based effects of idiosyncratic risks of REIT 
returns is extended. Idiosyncratic risks are important to Shariah-compliant investors, as they are only 
able to invest in a constrained universe which satisfies Shariah laws. 
 






Investors for several reasons are unable to retain the market portfolio; however in the most tested 
pricing model, the CAPM model contribute by Sharpe (1964), Lintner (1965a) and Black (1972), two 
key assumptions are that i) investors are able to hold all assets and are subsequently unconstrained 
from holding the market portfolio. Based on this assumption, systematic risk - also known as market 
risk - is the only risk priced in equilibrium whilst the firm-specific risk also known as idiosyncratic 
risks is not, as it is regarded as diversifiable; and ii) investors do not have a preference and hold the 
assets in the market portfolio proportionally. Based on the aforementioned, it is common knowledge 
that the assumption as posited in the CAPM model is violated in practice (Malkiel and Xu 2002), as 
investors are unable to retain the market portfolio for several reasons. 
There are several theories including those set out by Levy (1978), Merton (1987) and Malkiel and Xu 
(2002) which assume that investors are not able to hold the market portfolio, the authors predict cross-
sectional positive relationship between idiosyncratic risks and predicted stock returns. Levy (1978) 
derived a modified version of the CAPM, the General Capital Asset Pricing Model (GCAPM); a key 
assumption which means it differs from the CAPM is that investors hold a number of securities in their 
portfolios and not the market portfolio. In the model the author finds that, contrary to the assertions of 
the CAPM, the residual variance should has no impact on the risk-return equilibrium relationship. The 
modified CAPM model shows that residual variance is greater than zero; revealing a positive 
relationship between idiosyncratic risk and expected returns. Levy relaxes the assumption of a perfect 
market and allows investors in the model to hold a number of stocks in his portfolio, employing an 
equilibrium relationship; he finds that CAPM β has little or nothing to do with price determination of 
stocks in an equilibrium model. 
Malkiel and Xu (2002) investigate the consequences of the investor being unable to hold the market 
portfolio. The Malkiel and Xu model differs from the Merton model due to two assumptions; i) 




idiosyncratic returns are not required to be correlated across individual stocks and ii) it shows that the 
price of idiosyncratic risk for an individual stock is dependent on its correlation with the aggregated 
undiversified idiosyncratic return. Malkiel and Xu test their model on US and Japanese stocks, and the 
empirical results support the predictions of their model - that idiosyncratic risk has an important role in 
asset pricing. Their cross-sectional results reveal that idiosyncratic volatility is more powerful than 
beta or size in explaining the cross section of returns. 
Merton (1987) assumes that investors invest only in securities in which they have information of the 
expected returns, volatilities and beta loadings. A key assumption is that an investor uses security k in 
constructing his optimal portfolio only if security k is known by the investor.  The assumption used by 
Merton is based on the premise that portfolio held by investors contains a fraction of the traded stocks 
in the market. Merton employs an incomplete information theoretical model and finds that incomplete 
diffusion of information amongst investors has an empirically significant impact on equilibrium 
expected returns and particularly for smaller firms with little institutional following.  
4.1.2	Shariah	compliance	and	idiosyncratic	risks	
 
There are several implications for Shariah-compliant investors in determining the relationship between 
idiosyncratic risks and average returns; however this is dependent on the region in which the 
investment takes place as well as the compliance standards investors choose. Two popular standards of 
Shariah compliance in practice are examined in the analysis: i) the GCC Shariah compliance standard 
and ii) the Malaysian Shariah Compliance standard.  
The GCC Shariah compliance standard follows Shariah rules and law which emanate from the Holy 
Quran, the Hadith and the Ijtihad which require firms to desist from outright investment in non-
permissible activities and also give the proceeds of non-permissible activities to charities as a form of 
purification. For instance, in the GCC, Shariah-compliant firms have internal Shariah scholars to 




ensure that the operations of the firm are in line with the Shariah law. Hence GCC Shariah-compliant 
standards follow a more strict compliance rule. The GCC Shariah rules include that financing of any 
activities must be Shariah-compliant which is categorised as the quantitative aspect of Shariah rules. In 
terms of qualitative screenings, there is an outright ban on investments which are considered non-
permissible (Haram).  
The Malaysian Shariah Standards are outlined by the Securities Commission in Malaysia and is the 
first set of guidelines which provides Shariah guidance in terms of business activities and operations of 
Islamic REITs. In terms of qualitative screening which is investigated in this chapter, total non-
permissible activities from rental income to total turnover of the property must not exceed 20% in 
Shariah-compliant REITs in Malaysia. This rule also applies to property investments. 
Shariah standards often differ as there is no centralised screening rule for Shariah compliance, 
moreover besides the Quran and Hadith, there is the Ijtihad which involves interpretations by Shariah 
scholars, and hence screenings may differ in the qualitative screening of Shariah compliance. For 
instance, the qualitative screenings may involve the outright exclusion from participating in renting 
space to certain business activities that participate in alcohol trading or engage in the casino business 
(gambling) by some Shariah scholars; or in some cases a partial inclusion in Haram activities (most 
often a percentage of total business activity) is permitted. 
In this chapter, the differences in Shariah compliance standards in portfolio selection are explored by 
examining the relationship between firm-specific risks and returns of each constructed portfolio. The 
applications of Shariah guidelines on the portfolio of a Shariah-compliant REIT investor would 
involve the exclusion of certain stocks which would reduce the number of assets in the portfolio. 
Investors do not hold perfectly diversified portfolios; the inclusion of Shariah compliance standards in 
portfolio further buttresses this assertion. The central question in this chapter is; what are the costs or 




perhaps benefits of Shariah compliance in REIT portfolios? This question is answered from the theory 
of under-diversification perspective as contributed by Merton (1987) and Malkiel and Xu (2002), 
which predicts a positive relation between firm-specific risks and expected return when investors do 
not diversify their portfolio.  This theory is therefore tested on Shariah-compliant portfolios. 
According to under-diversification theory, under-diversified investors demand a return compensation 
for bearing idiosyncratic risks. This chapter investigates whether Shariah compliant-investors demand 
such premiums due to less diversification benefits in comparison to conventional REIT investors.  
Therefore the effects of a limited universe on the portfolio of a Shariah REIT investor and 
subsequently the effects of a Shariah REIT investor who conforms to the GCC Shariah compliance 
standards relative to the Shariah REIT investor who conforms to the Malaysian Shariah compliance 
standards are examined. Idiosyncratic risks also known as firm-specific risks cannot be diversified; so 
investigations are carried out on how non-diversifiable risks of the portfolios of the Shariah-compliant 
investor who is constrained in her investable universe differs, if at all, from that of a conventional 
investor who is not constrained by examining the relationship between firm-specific risks of each 
portfolio and the expected returns. This chapter examines if the non-diversifiable risks of the portfolio 
of a Shariah-compliant investor which adheres to the GCC Shariah compliance standards is any 
different from that of a Shariah investor which adheres to the Malaysian Shariah compliance 
standards. Idiosyncratic risks are employed to understand the effects of a limited universe to a Shariah 
investor’s portfolio for a particular reason; idiosyncratic risks are non-diversifiable hence investors are 
more concerned with this form of risk. 
In this study, the US REITs is employed for several reasons.  The Islamic REIT industry is a nascent 
but growing industry, and three Islamic REITs currently exist in Malaysia while one Islamic REIT 
exists in Singapore; hence it is counterintuitive to investigate Islamic REITs in Malaysia in detail. 




Secondly, since REITs investments are often based on sectors, it serves  as a perfect test bed to 
investigate the effects of a limited universe on a Shariah-compliant REIT investor as well as how 
different Shariah-compliant standards can have an effect on the relationship of the firm-specific risks 
and portfolio returns of a Shariah REIT investor. Property is also widely known as a popular Shariah-
compliant asset as the property sectors are easily screened by Shariah investors; and finally the US 
REIT market is the most developed REIT market in the world. 
4.2 Literature	Review		
 
The theory on asset pricing has been in place for well over 40 years.  The model first emerged in the 
form of the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) collaboratively developed by Sharpe (1964), Lintner 
(1965) and Black (1972), built on the prescriptions of the Markowitz portfolio theory, that the market 
portfolio of invested wealth is mean-variance efficient. The CAPM asserts that investors hold all assets 
available in the market in their portfolio in equal proportion, resulting in systematic (market) risks 
purported to be the only risks which matter as idiosyncratic risks are diversifiable. The CAPM theory 
predicts that only the market risk should be priced in equilibrium. However, there is a plethora of 
arguments which discredit or contradict the SLB model. The most prominent of these is Fama and 
French (1993), which evaluates the roles of the market, size, earnings/price (E/P) ratio, leverage and 
book to market equity in the cross-section of average returns. The results show that market risk does 
not seem to help explain the cross-section of average returns and the combination of size and book-to-
market equity seems to absorb the roles of leverage and E/P in average stock returns. In other words, 
there results suggest that if assets are priced rationally, then stock risks are multi-dimensional. 
In reality, however, these assertions (CAPM model) are not true as investors do not hold many risky 
assets in their portfolio. Blume et al (1974), Barber and Odean (2000), Campbell et al (2001) and 




Goetzman and Kumar (2004)30 find that investors hold highly undiversified portfolios. Idiosyncratic 
risks are thus relevant contrary to the findings of the CAPM which asserts that only systematic risks 
matters in asset pricing as idiosyncratic risks can be completely diversified away when investors hold 
the market portfolio.  
Certain asset pricing models are based on the intuition that individuals hold relatively undiversified 
portfolios such as Levy (1978).  The author finds that market beta plays no role or only a negligible 
role in price determination and that variance provides a better explanation for price behaviour of stock. 
Fu (2009), Malkiel and Xu (1997, 2006), Goyal and Santa-Clara (2003) find that idiosyncratic risks 
are positively related to expected returns. This is in support of the theoretical work of Levy (1978) 
whilst Merton (1987) shows that undiversified investors are rewarded for not holding the market 
portfolios. Ang, Hodrick, Xing and Zhang (2006) find that there is a negative relation between one-
month lagged idiosyncratic risk and expected return; however Fu (2009) shows that the proxy used by 
AHXZ (2006) is not appropriate for determining the relation between idiosyncratic risks and expected 
return. 
In previous literature, there is a differing view on the role that idiosyncratic risk plays in explaining 
cross-sectional stock returns. Using monthly and quarterly returns, Douglas (1969) shows that there 
seems to be other measure of risks apart from the market β that explain stock returns. Levy (1978) 
derives a new CAPM which finds that systematic risk of his CAPM plays little or no role whilst 
idiosyncratic risks play a role in explaining returns. Merton (1987) develops a capital market 
equilibrium model with incomplete information; the model is based on the intuition that the portfolios 











traded on the market.  According to Merton, investors are unable to hold a market portfolio so, as a 
result, institutional managers may avoid some stocks and limit their investment on others for varying 
reasons including monitoring costs, liquidity, prudence and insider or five-per-cent rules. Malkiel and 
Xu (2002) find that idiosyncratic risks affect asset returns particularly when investors are unable to 
hold the market portfolio. Their findings show that the idiosyncratic risk proxy by idiosyncratic 
volatility explains the cross section of stock returns better than beta or size measures. 
Arbel and Strebel (1983) find that, in general, small firms which are not in line with the investment 
choice of institutions are neglected and may command a premium as a reward due to possible 
information deficiencies regarding the firm. They conclude that expected returns on neglected stocks 
would be higher than those from widely-held firms based on the premise that analysts would tend to 
follow certain stocks due to varying circumstances preventing them from following neglected firms. 
Empirical studies on idiosyncratic risks are inconclusive, Goyal and Santa-Clara (2003) find that there 
is a significant positive relation between average stock variance which is largely idiosyncratic and the 
return of the market. Their study finds that the lagged variance of the market has no forecasting power 
for the market return. Fu (2009) finds a significantly positive relation between the estimated 
conditional idiosyncratic volatilities and expected returns by using a novel approach in the form of the 
Exponential Generalized Autoregressive Conditional Heteroskedasticity (EGARCH) model to 
estimate expected idiosyncratic volatilities. However in their extensive theoretical and empirical work 
using the two parameter models, Fama and Macbeth (1973) find that only the portfolio risk is 
important to an investor when observing average returns as a result, this results dismissed the role of 
idiosyncratic risks. Ang et al (2006) surprisingly find that there is a negative relation between 
idiosyncratic risks and expected return; however Fu (2009) asserts that the use of a lagged 
idiosyncratic volatility is not a good measure to proxy idiosyncratic volatility and hence the findings of 




Ang et al (2006) cannot therefore imply that there exists a negative relation between idiosyncratic risks 
and expected returns. 
Gyourko and Keim (1992) show the difference between REITs and other organisations, highlighting 
that i) agency problems were more severe in REITs, as a result of the high dividend pay-out leading to 
external financing, ii) difference exists in how information is reflected in stock prices, and iii) 
corporate control difference exists in comparison to other industries. REITs are small in size and do 
not have the same level of institutional monitoring and pricing compared to other firms (Chaudry et al, 
2004). Chaudry et al (2004) find that idiosyncratic risks are of the same importance as they are in 
common stocks are equally as important in REITs as can be found in common stock. Capozza and 
Sequin (2004) find that real-estate investment trusts with greater insider ownership tend to pick 
properties with low systematic risks and capital structures with lower debt while Ooi et al (2009) find 
that idiosyncratic risk measured by idiosyncratic volatility explains the cross-sectional returns of REIT 
stocks.  Using the Fama and French 3-factor model (1992), Ooi and colleagues found that the 
inclusion of conditional idiosyncratic risk in the model absorbs the risk factor proxied by size and 
B/M, suggesting the importance of idiosyncratic risks over the other risk factors. 
Only limited research has been carried out on the risks and returns of Shariah-compliant real-estate 
investment due particularly to data limitation in this area of research. However, in the past decade 
there has been a relative successful attempt  to understand the performance of the Shariah real-estate 
investment market relative to the general REIT markets. Faishal and Eng (2008) compare synthetic 
Shariah-compliant REIT portfolios with general US REIT portfolios, indices and mutual funds and 
find that the restriction of a limited universe in the synthetic Shariah-compliant portfolio does not 
transmit to underperformance when compared to other portfolios. They find a higher average 




annualised return for restrictive and less restrictive31 Shariah-compliant REIT portfolios compared to 
the general real-estate mutual fund portfolio. Newell and Osmadi (2009) investigate the returns of 
Islamic REITs in Malaysian in comparison to non-Islamic REITs and the general Malaysian REIT (M-
REIT) markets and find that the Islamic M-REIT and general M-REIT are different types of property 
vehicles.  The Islamic REITs do not show any form of under-performance compared to general M-
REITs and in fact been shown to outperform them in depressed periods, particularly during the 2006-
2008 global financial crisis, according to the paper. 
4.3 Methodology	and	Data	Descriptions	
 
There are differing views on Shariah compliance in REIT stocks. In this chapter, two Shariah 
screenings of equity stock are investigated: i) the first screen is the GCC Shariah-compliant standard32, 
whereby the activities of the firm must be wholly Shariah-compliant (100%), and ii) the second screen 
is the Malaysian Shariah-compliant standard33. Total non-permissible activities from rental income to 
total turnover of the subject property must not exceed 20% for any property purchased by the Islamic 
REIT. In line with the rationale of Faishal and Eng (2008), the qualitative screening of REITs is 
particularly considered.  
In this chapter, qualitative screening is adopted. Companies that are involved in certain lines of 



















entertainment and defence/weapons are exempted. Quantitative screenings are not considered for 
several reasons in this study. This exclusion is well documented by Faishal and Eng (2008). The only 
issue which may arise due to the non-inclusion of quantitative screenings is that the debt to asset ratio 
(leverage screening) must not exceed 33%. However, it is common knowledge that this action could 
be achieved through cleansing excess debt34; hence the violation of the financial screening is not 
viewed as a binding constraint. Secondly, leverage and stock returns are related to one another; hence 
through this methodology the author would be able to identify relationships between expected returns 
and idiosyncratic risks as a result of the sector effects of Shariah compliance. In addition to this, 
REITs are highly geared firms; hence a restriction of the quantitative screening of 33% would result in 
a large number of REITs being screened out of the sample size. In line with the rationale of Faishal 
and Eng (2008), however, in particular the qualitative screening of REITs is considered. 
In capturing qualitative screenings, which is a basis to be considered as Shariah-compliant, two groups 
of Shariah compliance portfolios are created35. The first portfolio is more strict, in that outright REITs 
which are engaged in activities not permitted in Shariah law are excluded, including REITs which are 
in retail REITs, office REITs (Shariah investments would exclude space leased to or occupied by 
conventional financing operations), diversified REITs, mortgage REITs and hotel REITs. This Shariah 
compliance standard mimics the GCC Shariah compliance standard. The REITs which pass this 
screening test include industrial, logistics, residential, healthcare, storage and speciality REITs. Hence 











In the less restrictive group, REITs including those that operate a mixed as well as diversified portfolio 
of activities such as offices, retail and diversified REITs are investigated. REITs in which less than 
20% of their income is derived from non-permissible activities are included; this follows the 
Malaysian Shariah compliance standards36. In some quarters, as stated in the guidelines of Shariah-
compliant REITs issued by the Securities Commission of Malaysia, the interpretation of Shariah-
compliant jurisprudence on Shariah-compliant investments permits a 20% benchmark for non-
permissible investments. REITs that qualify in this category include those which automatically pass 
the GCC Shariah standards as this screening supersedes the Malaysian standards, as well as others 
such as office, retail and diversified REITs as long as they pass the 20% non-permissibility criteria. 
Through this mechanism, a Malaysian Shariah-compliant REIT based on qualitative screenings is 
derived. 
Three other portfolios are created; namely a small cap equity REIT portfolio which is the lower half of 
the median of the market capitalisation of all REITs in the sample based on REITs with smaller market 
capitalisation, a large cap equity REIT portfolio which is the higher half of the median of the market 
capitalisation of all-REITs in the sample based on REIT with larger market capitalisation, and an all-
REIT portfolio which represents all-REITs in the sample size. Three other portfolios have been 
included in the analysis to mimic investors who are able to invest in the entire REIT sample and are 
not restricted in their REIT selection. The small cap and large cap REIT portfolios are also included in 
the analysis to mimic size. Two other portfolios are created so as to match the number of REITs in the 











these portfolios is to undertake a comparative analysis between the portfolios. This methodology 
compares the relationship between returns and idiosyncratic risks of Shariah-compliant portfolios to 
the other four portfolios which are created.  
 
The Shariah-compliant “synthetic” portfolios are computed which invest in REIT and are considered a 
Shariah-compliant real estate mutual fund in the spirit of Geczy, Stambaugh and Levin (2005), and as 
seen in Faishal and Eng (2008). 
4.4 Data	and	Descriptive	Analysis		
 
The sample period is from 1998 to 200937 and comprises publicly traded US REITs.  The sample size 
is 129 REITs and components of the Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) 6798 classification code 
for REITs. The sample size is dynamic; the analysis begins with 60 REITs as at the beginning of the 
sample period and grew to 129 as at the end of the period investigated. 
Table 4.1 examines the characteristics of Shariah-compliant REITs (SC and SC-LR)38, equity REITs 
and the overall REITs sample. The analysis throughout this chapter would follow this pathway, and 
from this perspective, comparisons between different constructed portfolios are made. Shariah-
compliant investors are limited to Shariah-compliant REITs whilst unrestricted investors are able to 
invest in the all-REITs; equity REITs are included to understand the behaviour of an investor who may 
refrain from investing in mortgage and hybrid REITs due to high volatility concerns. The data show 
that as at December 2009, the size of the total REITs portfolio measured by total assets is $529 billion; 













portfolio was $156 billion lower than the SCLR portfolio with a size of $273 billion. The disparity in 
size between the Shariah portfolios is a result of the restriction in the nature of REITs that restrictive 
Shariah-compliant investors are able to invest in, as a result of strict compliance in Shariah laws. The 
book to market ratio of SCLR REITs is at 0.98 whilst that of SC REITs is measured at 0.86. This 
implies that the SC REIT portfolio could be considered more of a growth portfolio in comparison to a 
SCLR portfolio as at December 2009. The debt to equity ratio of all four portfolios range from 2.61 to 
3.28: this is not particularly surprising as REITs tend to have a high debt to equity ratio. One 
explanation for this phenomenon is due to the high dividend payout (90% of profits), as REITs are 
required by law to pay out 90% of their profits as dividend to be considered as a REIT; hence REITs 
tend to be highly indebted.  
Table 4.1: Descriptive Statistics of Constructed REIT Portfolios 
Panel A shows the descriptive statistic of the five constructed REIT portfolios and characteristics including market capitalisation, size 
(total asset), book to market equity and debt to equity ratio, the figures as illustrated in Table 4.1 are as at December 2009. 
Descriptive Statistics of REIT Portfolios 
Characteristics 




Small Cap Equity 
REITs (55) 






Market Cap (US$ 
Billions) 
259 16 145 185 116 
Size (US$ Billions) 529 24 201 273 156 
Average Market Cap 1,564 291 2,732 1,754 1,976 
Average Size 2,785 537 2,743 2,504 2,697 











Idiosyncratic risks are measured as follows: the standard step employed in empirical literature on asset 
pricing such as in Fu (2009) and Ooi (2009) is utilised. The daily excess returns of individual stock 
REITs returns are regressed on the daily three-factor Fama-French model (1993) in every month and 
idiosyncratic volatility is estimated by computing the standard deviation of the regression residuals. 




The daily stock REITs returns are retrieved from the Centre for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) 
while the daily three-factor data are retrieved from the Kenneth R. French website.  These data 
comprise i) the excess return of the market portfolio , ii) difference between the return on a 
small stock portfolio and a large stock portfolio (SMB) and iii) difference between the return on a high 
book to market stock portfolio and a low book to market stock portfolio (HML).  
 
 is the daily return of individual stock, is the daily risk-free rate, the subscripts t and τ represent 
month and day respectively and  and  are factor loadings. 
The historical idiosyncratic risks of individual REITs in the restrictive Shariah-compliant portfolio is 
the less restrictive Shariah portfolio, the equity REIT portfolio and the overall REIT market portfolio 
is investigated; the average idiosyncratic risks of each individual REIT is estimated in each month and 
a value and equal weighted idiosyncratic risk measure is thus constructed. Figures 4.1–4.4 show the 
movement in idiosyncratic volatility of the constructed REIT portfolios from January 1998 to 
December 2009; the volatility of REIT portfolios tend to exhibit variations during the period 
investigated.  However, idiosyncratic volatility seems to be somewhat cyclical in nature - there were 
highs at specific periods particularly in 1998 to 1999, 2003 to 2004 and 2008 to 2009 and then a five-
year downward drift thereafter. This observation is in line with the findings of Campbell et al (2000) 
and Ooi (2009) that the idiosyncratic volatility of average individual REIT stocks fluctuates over time, 
with highs in specific periods, characterised by a cycle with a five-year downward drift. There were a 
few sharp rises during July to September 1998, February to April 2004 and more recently of recent 
from September to November of 2008, characterised by high fluctuations in the average returns of 
REITs measured by the National Association of real Estate Investment Trusts (NAREIT) index. Of the 
four constructed portfolios, the idiosyncratic volatility of the SC REITs portfolio is the least volatile, 




while all the REITs portfolio are the most volatile during the period. However, there are rare 
occurrences where the SCLR portfolio and the SC portfolio witness a higher change in volatility than 
the REIT and EREITs portfolio, since the number of individual REITs in the portfolio are less than all 
REITs and EREITs.  Thus, there is an expectation that high idiosyncratic volatility of an individual 
REIT is more evident in SCLR or SC REIT portfolio. A higher spike in the equal weighted index of 
the SCLR portfolio in October 2003 and in the value-weighted index SC portfolio in October 2001 is 
observed, although this spike was evident in all portfolios.  
Figures 4.3 and 4.4 show the historical idiosyncratic volatility of initial REITs as at January 1998.  An 
equal weighted and value-weighted index of initial REITs is created to determine if observations in 
Figures 4.1 and 4.2 are not driven by REITs that emerge in the index thereafter. The number of initial 
REITs in each portfolio can be seen in Table 4.1, Panel B. As earlier observed, the idiosyncratic 
volatility of all the REITs indices is the most volatile whilst the SC REIT portfolio has the least 
variation and as evident in Figures 4.3 and 4.4, the researcher finds that the results are not driven by 
the emerging REITs after January 1998. 

















Figure 4.2 Value-weighted Idiosyncratic Risks 












              
 


























In theory, there are differing assertions as to the relationship between idiosyncratic risks and expected 
stock returns. Makiel and Xu (2002) and Jones and Rhodes-Kropf (2003) suggests that if investors 
demand compensation for not being able to diversify risk, then agents who hold stocks with high 
idiosyncratic volatility would demand a premium, while Merton (1987) suggests that firms with high 
idiosyncratic risks would require higher average returns, so as to compensate investors with 
undiversified portfolios. However, Ang et al (2006) surprisingly find a negative relationship between 
idiosyncratic risks and average returns which, as highlighted by Fu (2009), is dependent on how 
idiosyncratic risks were incorrectly estimated. 




The E-GARCH model estimates the conditional idiosyncratic volatility of individual REITs in each 
portfolio.  This model has been used by Fu (2009), Ooi (2009), Brockman and Schutte (2007), Eiling 
(2006), and Spiegel and Wang (2006) and originally proposed by Nelson (1991).  Several tests have 
shown that the E-GARCH model is the best in capturing the asymmetry of conditional volatilities 
including those undertaken by Pagan and Schwert (1990) and Engle and Mustafa (1992). 
The E-GARCH model is used to estimate idiosyncratic risks of REIT returns in this essay for several 
reasons.  Fu (2009), for instance, shows evidence from a sample size of about 26,000 firms from July 
1963 to December 2006 that the first difference of idiosyncratic volatility -  -might follow 
a first-order moving process rather than a random walk process. In that case the one-month lag of 
idiosyncratic volatility employed by Ang et al (2006) may be incorrect, as the random walk hypothesis 
not appropriate for a general stock’s idiosyncratic volatility process (Fu 2009).  
Ooi (2009) tests the random walk hypothesis on the idiosyncratic volatility of REITs, and his results 
support the findings of Fu (2009) in general stock returns that the idiosyncratic risks of REIT returns 
do not follow a random walk process; however they have a slow decay rate and are non-stationary. 
Therefore the use of lagged values to estimate expected idiosyncratic volatility could result in 
measurement error. 
The use of the EGARCH model is thus proposed as it captures the time-varying and non-stationary 
nature of idiosyncratic volatility.  The GARCH model has been widely used to estimate conditional 
volatility of returns; however, the EGARCH model estimates the conditional idiosyncratic volatility of 
individual REITs in each portfolio.  This model has been used by Fu (2009), Ooi (2009), Brockman 
and Schutte (2007), Eiling (2006), and Spiegel and Wang (2006) and originally proposed by Nelson 
(1991).  Several tests have shown that the E-GARCH model is the best in capturing the asymmetry of 




conditional volatilities including those undertaken by Pagan and Schwert (1990) and Engle and 
Mustafa (1992). 
The model of Fu (2009) is employed in modelling idiosyncratic volatilities of the individual REITs in 
each portfolio by using the EGARCH model.  The researcher uses the following function:  
  
 + γ [  ]}           (3) 
The EGARCH model estimates the mean and the variance process jointly: in its application in stock 
returns, the EGARCH model assumes that investors would apply the mean and variance of returns in 
the last period to update the estimates of mean and variance of returns in each period (Fu 2009). In 
equation 2, the 3-factor Fama and French model estimates the monthly excess returns of individual 
REITs. The Fama-French model is used as it is the focal point in explaining the cross section of 
average returns of equities. According to Fama and French (1992), stock risks are multi-dimensional; 
their results validate that market risk alone does not seem to explain the cross section of average stock 
returns and the combination of size and book to market equity seems to describe the cross section of 
average stock returns. 
The conditional distribution of the residual (  in equation 2 is assumed to be normal with a mean of 
zero and a variance of . Equation 3 above shows that the conditional variance  is estimated as a 
function of past p-period of residual variance and q-period of stock return shocks. The permutation of 
these orders yields four different E-GARCH models: EGARCH (1, 1), EGARCH (1, 2), EGARCH (2, 
1) and EGARCH (2, 2). The time series conditional idiosyncratic volatility is estimated for each 
individual REITs in each portfolio; at month t+1 four conditional idiosyncratic volatility are estimated. 
The estimate which is generated by the model which converges within 500 iterations and the lowest 
Akaike information criterion (AIC) is chosen.  




Equation 3 above shows that the conditional variance  is estimated as a function of past p-period of 
residual variance and q-period of stock return shocks. 
4.4.3 The	cross‐section	of	Shariah‐	compliant	REIT	portfolios		
 
This section examines the cross-sectional relationship between the average stock returns of the 
constructed portfolio with particular emphasis on the Shariah-compliant REITs and the estimated 
idiosyncratic volatilities. The sample includes REITs stocks from January 1998 to December 2009, a 
total of 144 monthly observations. The period of analysis post-1998 witnessed an increase in the 
sample size of REITs. The monthly data of stock returns are retrieved from CRSP, whilst information 
from REITs company accounts is retrieved from Compustat. Table 4.2 shows the descriptive statistics 
of the Shariah-compliant portfolios (SC and SCLR), the all REIT portfolio and the first and second 




Table 4.2 shows the descriptive statistics for All-REITs, synthetic created Shariah- 
compliant (SC) and synthetic created Shariah-compliant less restrictive (SCLR) 
portfolios trading under the SIC Code 6798 from January 1998 December 2009. RRET 
is the percentage monthly raw return. ExRET is the monthly return minus risk-free rate 
measured by 1 month t-bill rate. Ln(ME) is the natural log of the market value of equity 
which is measured by multiplying outstanding shares by monthly closing price in June. 
Ln (BE/ME) is the natural log of the ratio of the book value of equity and the market 
value of equity as at year end. The variable Ret(-2,-13) is the cumulative return from 
month (-13) to month (-2) which proxies for the measurement of the momentum effect. 
IVOL is idiosyncratic volatility; the researcher measures idiosyncratic volatility by 
regressing individual REITs returns on the Fama and French 3-factor asset pricing 
model (1993), the standard deviation of the residuals of the regression is multiplied with 
the square root of 22 which proxies as the number of trading days in a month. E(IVOL) 
is the one month ahead expected idiosyncratic volatility which is estimated using the 
EGARCH model based on the 3-factor Fama-French model as prescribed by Fu (2009). 
(E) beta is the one-month ahead, 12 month rolling window expected market risk which 
is estimated using the bivariate GARCH (1, 1) model. 
Panel A: All -REITs  
Variables Mean Median Std.Dev Skew Obs. 
RRet (%) 0.96 1.09 11.37 2.97 14934 




ExRet(%) 0.75 0.86 11.34 3.00 14934 
Ln(1+Ret) % 0.1 0.084 11.33 -1.52 14940 
Ln (ME) 13.36 13.57 155.48 -0.70 14406 
Ln(BE/ME) -0.563 -0.519 84.00 -1.62 13174 
Ret(-2,-13) (%) 5.29 0.071 33.21 0.98 13527 
IVOL(%) 7.24 5.29 11.26 5.32 14746 
E(IVOL) (%) 6.74 5.54 5.19 7.43 14936 
E(beta) 0.62 0.49 55.64 2.65 14843 
Panel B: Equity REITs: 1 
RRet (%) 0.76 0.007 0.12 2.345854 7150 
ExRet(%) 0.56 0.005 0.12 2.379277 7149 
Ln(1+Ret) % -0.11 0.005 0.12 -1.512609 7148 
Ln (ME) 12.64 12.93 1.42 -.9784864 6897 
Ln(BE/ME) -0.41 -0.44 0.76 -1.678237 6253 
Ret(-2,-13) (%) 1.817   0.04 0.31 -.1307545 6433 
IVOL(%) 7.74 0.06 0.10 15.4845 7017 
E(IVOL) (%) 6.88 0.06 0.05 4.58 7151 
E(beta) 0.65 0.50 0.52 1.66 7116 
Panel C: Equity REITs: 2 
RRet (%) 1.21 1.52 8.98 1.03 6112 
ExRet(%) 0.96 1.28 9.00 1.06 6112 
Ln(1+Ret) %  0.54 0.0127   9.20 -1.65 6120 
Ln (ME) 14.45   14.47 9.89 -0.27 5894 
Ln(BE/ME) -0.840 -0.6980 8.46 -2.58 5522 
Ret(-2,-13) (%)  9.33 0.1068  29.72 1.16 5568 
IVOL(%)  5.95 4.79 4.26 3.56 6080 
E(IVOL) (%)  5.78 5.06 3.70 10.48 6112 
E(beta) 0.49   0.4700     27.32 0.39 6070 
Panel D: SC REITs 
RRet (%) 0.99 1.26 9.08 -0.20 5061 
ExRet(%) 0.74 0.96 9.09 0.18 5061 
Ln(1+Ret) % 0.30 0.0095 9.58 -2.02 5071 
Ln (ME) 13.82 13.90 129.24 -0.59 4980 
Ln(BE/ME) -0.685 -0.607 80.36 -2.77 4602 
Ret(-2,-13) (%) 6.49 0.072 31.72 1.42 4582 
IVOL (%) 6.28 5.02 5.69 2.34 5043 
E(IVOL) (%) 6.08 5.29 3.83 836 5061 
E(beta) 0.51 0.46 36.00 1.01 5004 
Panel E: SCLR REITs 
RRet (%) 1.02 1.23 9.87 2.27 9525 
ExRet(%) 0.78 0.95 9.87 2.30 9525
Ln(1+Ret) % 0.29 0.94 9.97 -1.63 9531 
Ln (ME) 13.57 13.73 136.35 -0.56 9132 
Ln(BE/ME) -0.67 -0.59 82.31 -2.40 8428 
Ret(-2,-13) (%) 6.31 8.00 29.82 0.69 8645 
IVOL (%) 6.48 5.11 7.48 21.96 9439 
E(IVOL) (%) 6.14 5.25 4.01 7.28 9526 
E(beta) 0.52 0.46 33.21 1.14 9463 
	
 
The mean of the raw monthly return and the excess return (raw monthly return minus risk-free rate) of 
the SC portfolios is 0.99% and 0.74% which is greater than that of the all-REIT portfolio of 0.96% and 




0.75% respectively, and lower than the raw returns and excess return for the SCLR portfolio which are 
0.02% and 0.78% respectively.  The 2nd quartile equity REITs which represent REITs with a higher 
book value have mean raw and excess return of 1.21% and 0.96% respectively, the highest return in all 
constructed portfolios. The market equity (ME) is estimated by multiplying outstanding shares by the 
closing price of the stock as at end of June in every year.  SC portfolios have a higher market equity 
value than the all-REIT portfolio, with a difference of 0.46 for SC portfolios and 0.25 for SCLR 
portfolios, the market equity value of the 2nd  quartile equity REIT portfolio is 14.45, the portfolio is 
the largest in size as measured by ln(ME). BE and ME are estimated based on end-of-year figure as at 
December of every year between the period 1998 to 2009. The variables Ln(ME) and Ln(BE/ME) 
replicating the Fama and French (1992) 3-factor model are estimated, Fama and French (1992) find 
that size and book to market equity are able to capture the cross-sectional variation in average stock 
returns. The variable Ret (-2,-13) is measured based on the cumulative return of individual REITs two 
to 13 months before monthly returns at t-1.  The variable captures the momentum effect as posited by 
Jegadeesh and Titman (1993), who finds that past winners tend to realise consistently higher returns 
around earnings announcements than past losers when the portfolio returns are measured seven months 
prior to formation. The variable IVOL is the idiosyncratic volatility of individual REIT stock returns, 
measured by regressing individual REIT returns with the Fama-French 3-factor model, the standard 
deviation of the residuals are multiplied by the square root of 22 which proxies for the number of 
trading days in a month. The mean of the idiosyncratic volatility of SC REITs is 6.28%, about 0.96% 
less than the mean of the idiosyncratic volatility of all-REITs portfolio, and the idiosyncratic volatility 
of SCLR REITs is 6.48% slightly higher than the restrictive SC portfolio. 
E(IVOL) is the expected conditional  idiosyncratic volatility which is estimated using the EGARCH 
model.  The mean of the expected idiosyncratic volatility of SC REITs is 6.08% and standard 




deviation is 3.83% compared to the mean and standard deviation of expected idiosyncratic volatility of 
the all-REIT portfolio of 6.74% and 5.19% respectively which is the most volatile.  The mean and 
standard deviation of the expected idiosyncratic volatility of SCLR portfolios stood at 6.14% and 
4.01%. respectively E (beta) is estimated using the bivariate GARCH (1, 1) model: the researcher 
employs a rolling window of 12 months to estimate the expected beta; Brooks et al (2002) adopt three 
different techniques for estimating time-variant beta including the bivariate GARCH model, the 
Kalfman filter method and the Schwert and Seguin approach on monthly Morgan Stanley country 
index data from the period 1975 to 1995. Using a comparison approach, the authors find that in 
generating conditional beta using the above-mentioned techniques, the estimates derived from the 
GARCH model generate the lowest forecast error; hence the researcher applies this approach in 
estimating conditional beta. 
The mean expected beta for SC portfolio is 0.51 and the median is 0.46 compared to the mean and 
median expected beta of the all-REIT portfolio of 0.62 and 0.49 respectively, and the mean and 
median expected beta of the SCLR portfolio are 0.52 and 0.46. The results show that the mean and 
median of the expected beta of the first quartile REIT portfolio is the largest in all portfolios at 0.65 
and 0.50 respectively. 
From the evidence from Table 4.2, the Shariah REIT portfolios (restrictive and less restrictive) have 
lower idiosyncratic risks compared to the all-REIT portfolio. This result persists regardless of how 
idiosyncratic risks of the individual REITs are measured.  However, results show that the lowest 
idiosyncratic risks in the constructed portfolios are the second quartile equity REITs. In measuring 
idiosyncratic volatility, the EGARCH model is employed to measure the expected idiosyncratic 
volatility initially employed by Fu (2009) on stock returns and by Ooi (2009) on REITs returns.  




In addition to this, the researcher also measures idiosyncratic volatility based on the one-month lagged 
idiosyncratic risks as estimated by Ang et al (2006).  Using this technique, the Shariah portfolios have 
a lower idiosyncratic risks compared to the all-REIT portfolio. However, Fu (2009) shows that lagged 
idiosyncratic volatilities are not a good measure for expected idiosyncratic risks. 
4.4.4 Correlations	of	variables		
 
In this section the correlations between each variable from January 1998 to December 2009 are 
investigated, and each variable is measured based on monthly time-series. First the correlation 
between estimated idiosyncratic risks and REIT returns is examined; there is a negative significant 
correlation at the 1% level between idiosyncratic volatility (IVOL) and returns of SC and SCLR 
portfolio with a correlation of -0.1395 and -0.0896 respectively. The IVOL measured in Table 4.3 is a 
contemporaneous idiosyncratic volatility as in Fu (2009) and not a one-month lag. There exists a 
negative significant correlation (1% level) between the all-REITs portfolio returns and 
contemporaneous volatility with a correlation of -0.0407. There exists a negative significant 
correlation between one-month lagged idiosyncratic volatility of SC REIT returns, consistent with Ang 
et al (2006); the all-REIT portfolio and the SCLR portfolio have a negative significant correlation 
between one-month lagged idiosyncratic volatility and returns39.   
There exists a positive significant correlation between all portfolios and the expected idiosyncratic risk 
estimated by the EGARCH model except that there is a negative significant relationship in the SC 
portfolio. The correlation between the all-REITs returns and expected idiosyncratic volatility is 0.1267 
significant at the 1% level while that of the SC and SCLR portfolio is -0.021 (10% level) and 0.0572 









across all portfolios a positive relationship exists.  Consistent with the findings of Ooi et al (2009), the 
co-efficient of the relationship between the all-REIT portfolio and idiosyncratic risk is higher than that 
of SC portfolios. 
The correlation between IVOL and E (IVOL) of the SC and SCLR portfolio is 0.2948 and 0.3018 
significant at the 1% level whilst that of the all-REIT portfolio is 0.2585. There exists a negative 
significant correlation at the 1% level with size and the expected idiosyncratic risks in SC and all-
REIT portfolios of -0.1482 and -0.2264. There is also a negative correlation between size and the 
expected idiosyncratic risks of the SCLR portfolio of -0.0942. In all portfolios a positive correlation 
exists between book to market equity ratios and expected idiosyncratic risks. There is a positive 
correlation between expected beta and expected idiosyncratic risks in the SCLR portfolio and all-REIT 
portfolios whilst in contrast a negative correlation between expected beta and expected idiosyncratic 
risks for SC portfolios is observed. 
In the correlation results in Table 4.3, there is a significant negative correlation between size, and 
expected idiosyncratic risks in all constructed portfolios whilst there exists a positive correlation 
between returns and expected idiosyncratic volatility except in the SC portfolio. Consistent with the 
findings of Fama and French (1992), the relationship between return and beta is flat with correlations 
at zero. 
Table	4.3:	Cross‐sectional	correlation	of	variables	
Table 4.3 depicts the correlation matrix of the time series variables from January 1998 to 
December 2009 including the All-REIT, Large and Small Equity REITs, SC and SCLR REIT 
portfolios. The variables used are within the investigative period and are described in Table 
4.2. *** is significant at the 1% level, ** is significant at the 5% level and * is significant at 
the 10% level. 
Panel A: Correlation of All-REITs Portfolio  
 Ln(1+Ret) Ln(ME) Ln(BE/ME) Ret(-2,-13) IVOL E(IVOL) E(beta) 
Ret(%) 0.9639*** -0.0387*** 0.0484*** -0.0246*** -0.0407*** 0.1267*** 0.0160* 
Ln(1+Ret) %  -0.0154* 0.0279*** 0.0368*** -0.1089*** -0.0072 -0.0542*** 
Ln (ME)   -0.4020*** 0.1435*** -0.1818*** -0.2264*** 0.1444*** 
Ln(BE/ME)    -0.1720*** 0.1121*** 0.1879*** -0.0313*** 
Ret(-2,-13) (%)     -0.2116*** -0.3099*** -0.2662*** 




IVOL (%)      0.2585*** 0.1595*** 
E(IVOL) (%)       0.2410*** 
E(beta)        
Panel B: Correlation of Equity REIT: 1 
Ret(%) 0.9629*** -0.0494*** 0.0556*** -0.0385*** -0.0238*** 0.1186*** 0.0240** 
Ln(1+Ret) %  -0.0336** 0.0425*** 0.0292** -0.1038*** 0.0293** -0.0432*** 
Ln (ME)   -0.2872*** 0.1482*** -0.2361*** -0.1649*** 0.1797*** 
Ln(BE/ME)    -0.1869*** 0.1077*** 0.1037*** 0.0038 
Ret(-2,-13) (%)     -0.3526*** -0.3722*** -0.3310*** 
IVOL (%)      0.3546*** 0.1874*** 
E(IVOL) (%)       0.2118*** 
E(beta)        
Panel C: Correlation of Equity REIT: 2 
Ret(%) 0.9801*** -0.0751*** 0.0409*** -0.0437*** -0.1483*** 0.0139 -0.0204 
Ln(1+Ret) %  -0.0687*** 0.0422*** -0.0038 -0.2397*** -0.0757*** -0.0638*** 
Ln (ME)   -0.2709*** 0.0282** -0.0766*** -0.1472***   0.2880*** 
Ln(BE/ME)    -0.0843*** -0.0311** 0.0486*** -0.2019*** 
Ret(-2,-13) (%)     -0.351*** -0.2160*** -0.1772*** 
IVOL (%)      0.3652*** 0.3009*** 
E(IVOL) (%)       0.1490*** 
E(beta)        
Panel B: Correlation of SC Portfolio 
Ret(%)   0.9845*** -0.0410*** 0.0411*** -0.0328** -0.1395*** -0.0211* -0.0294** 
Ln(1+Ret) %  -0.0308** 0.0339** 0.0008 -0.1969*** -0.0939*** -0.0624*** 
Ln (ME)   -0.3344*** 0.1118*** -0.1388*** -0.1482*** 0.1984*** 
Ln(BE/ME)    -0.1220*** 0.0550*** 0.0970*** -0.1395*** 
Ret(-2,-13) (%)     -0.2527*** -0.2253*** -0.1399*** 
IVOL (%)        0.2948***   0.1965*** 
E(IVOL) (%)         0.0865*** 
E(beta)        
Panel C: Correlation of SCLR Portfolio 
Ret(%) 0.9778*** -0.0294** 0.0302*** -0.0339*** -0.0896*** 0.0572*** 0.0029 
Ln(1+Ret) %  -0.0218* 0.0276** 0.0099 -0.1587*** -0.0796*** -0.0528*** 
Ln (ME)   -0.3786*** 0.1303*** -0.1049*** -0.0942*** 0.2136*** 
Ln(BE/ME)    -0.1431*** 0.0490*** 0.0753*** -0.1448*** 
Ret(-2,-13) (%)     -0.3107*** -0.2771*** -0.2215*** 
IVOL (%)      0.3018*** 0.2092*** 
E(IVOL) (%)       0.1856*** 
E(beta)  
 
      
4.5 Results	and	Findings	
Fama and Macbeth Regressions of Shariah REITs 
The importance of idiosyncratic risks to REIT returns is evident in the univariate analysis of expected 
idiosyncratic risks and REIT returns. In this section the cross-sectional relationship between expected 
REIT returns and expected idiosyncratic risks is investigated with the inclusion of variables which 
have been acknowledged in past literature to predict expected returns of firms. Variables such as size 
and book to market ratios are employed. Fama and French (1992) illustrate in their landmark work that 




a relationship exists between size and book to market ratios and the expected returns of stocks. 
Momentum is estimated as posited by Jegadeesh and Titman (1993), momentum is based on past 
returns of REITs from returns of months (-2 to -13). The estimation involves the compound return of 
months (13 months to 2 months prior). Other variables included are the expected beta. Expected beta 
as a proxy is estimated as seen in Ooi (2009) in which a bivariate GARCH model was used to estimate 
expected beta. 
The Fama and Macbeth (1973) regression is employed to estimate the relationship between 
idiosyncratic risks and REITs returns. The Fama and Macbeth regression runs the cross-sectional 
regression as illustrated below:  
 
In the equation above,  is the return on REIT i in month t.   are variables such as size, book-to-
market ratio, beta, expected conditional idiosyncratic volatility, idiosyncratic volatility and momentum 
which are explanatory variables.  is the disturbance term, this captures the deviation of realised 
return from expected value.  is the number of REITs in month t; this may change in  different 
months depending on the period. In the study, the range of all-REITs portfolio is 60 to 137, SCLR 
portfolios is 57 to 109 and SC portfolios 21 to 44 whilst the maximum number of months is 144 
months. 
The mean and the variance of the estimate  is  
 =  (9) 
     (10) 




In the Fama-Macbeth regression, the t-statistics is the average slope ( , divided by its time-series 
standard error, which is the square-root of the variance of divided by  
T (  )  (11) 
In the Fama-Macbeth regression employed, several variables coupled with idiosyncratic volatilities are 
employed to examine the explanatory power of idiosyncratic risks in the REIT portfolios particularly 
the Shariah portfolios (restrictive and less- restrictive). E (beta) is estimated using the bivariate 
GARCH (1, 1) model with a rolling window of 12 months; Ooi et al (2009) use the bivariate GARCH 
model in estimating expected beta. The expected idiosyncratic risk is estimated using the exponential 
autoregressive conditional heteroskedasticity model (EGARCH). Ln(ME) is the natural log of the 
market capitalisation of individual REITs in June of year t which is used to explain the returns of the 
next 12 months, whilst Ln (BE/ME) is measured as in Fama and French (2002). The natural log of 
book equity to market equity (ln BE/ME) is estimated as at December of year t-1 and used to regress 
against the returns of July of year t+1 to June of year t+2. 
In Table 4.4 using the Fama-Macbeth regression, excess return of the constructed REIT portfolios is 
regressed on expected beta and idiosyncratic volatility. There exists a flat relationship between 
expected beta and excess returns in Model 1 as for all portfolios the average slope of expected beta is 
not significantly different from zero. These results show that beta has no explanatory power in 
predicting Shariah-compliant REIT stock returns and is in line with the findings of Fama and French 
(1992).  However, using the Fama and Macbeth regression in explaining the relationship between 
idiosyncratic risks and stock returns, in all constructed portfolios there is a positive relationship 
between expected idiosyncratic volatility and excess returns of REIT portfolios. In all the models of all 
constructed portfolios, the inclusion of the idiosyncratic volatility increases the r-squared of the model 




and this is evident in all the models of Shariah-compliant REIT, the first and second half of equity 
REITs and the all-REIT portfolio.  
Although there is a positive relationship between idiosyncratic volatility and excess returns in all 
constructed portfolios, the positive relationship between idiosyncratic volatility and excess returns is 
insignificant in all the portfolios except from the first quartile equity REITs which represent smaller 
cap REITs. There is a direct positive relationship between returns and idiosyncratic risks at 0.1140 
significant at the 5% level. The relationship between idiosyncratic volatility and REIT returns are 
positive in the SC, SCLR and all-REIT; however this is not statistically significant. The positive 
relationship between returns and idiosyncratic risks is more significant and dominant in the first 
quartile equity REITs which represents smaller cap REITs. 
Table	4.4:	Fama‐Macbeth	Regression	on	conditional	beta	and	idiosyncratic	volatility	
Table 4.4 shows the time series average of the regression slopes of the constructed 
REIT portfolio returns from January 1998 to December 2009. The t-statistic is the 
average slope divided by times series standard error. In the models depicted above the 
dependent variable is the excess return of the constructed REIT portfolios; α is the 
regression intercept of the model. E(beta) is the one-month ahead, 12 month rolling 
window expected market risk which is estimated using the bivariate GARCH model 
whilst the E(IVOL) is the one month ahead idiosyncratic volatility estimated using the 
EGARCH model based on the 3-factor Fama-French model. *** is Significant at the 
1% level, ** is significant at the 5% level and * is significant at the 10% level. 
Fama-Macbeth Regression on SC REITs 
Model Α E(beta) E(IVOL) Obs 
1 0.0089*** 0.0056  13.51% 4577 
2 0.0037  0.0760 14.25% 5029 
3 0.0040 0.0009 0.1064 25.36% 4577 
Fama-Macbeth Regression on SC-LR REITs 
1 0.0076** 0.0036  11.46% 8655 
2 0.0007  0.0422 6.99% 9455 
3   0.0048 0.0007 0.0717 18.44% 8655 
Fama-Macbeth Regression on All-REITs 
1 0.0074** 0.0022  12.03% 13519 
2 0.0051  0.0273 6.69% 14931 
3 0.0064* -0.0004 0.0451 17.37% 13518 
Fama-Macbeth Regression on Equity REITs: 1 
1 0.0070** -0.0013  13.77% 6439 
2 -0.0024   0.1140** 8.24% 7184 
3 -0.0002 -0.0036 0.1326*** 20.43% 6439 
Fama-Macbeth Regression on Equity REITs: 2 




1   0.0090** 0.0046  12.88% 5606 
2 0.0034 0.1000 12.42% 7034
3 0.0040 0.0004 0.1330** 23.19% 5606 
	
Table 4.5 shows the Fama-Macbeth regression of REIT stock returns and variables which asset-pricing 
literature shows has an explanatory role in explaining stock returns. There is an attempt to understand 
the role of expected beta and expected idiosyncratic volatility in explaining the cross-sectional 
relationships of the constructed portfolios, particularly for the first time, synthetic created Shariah-
compliant REIT portfolios. Expected beta, size effect (LnME), value and growth firms effect 
(LnBeMe), momentum effect (ret -2,-13) and expected idiosyncratic volatility are considered in the 
model employed in explaining the cross section. For Shariah portfolios, expected beta is statistically 
insignificant in explaining expected returns of REIT stocks, as there is a flat relationship between 
expected beta and REIT stock returns. In the SC and SCLR portfolios there is a positive relationship 
between expected idiosyncratic volatility and expected stock returns; however during the period 
investigated - 1998 to 2009 - the average slope for idiosyncratic volatility is statistically significant for 
Shariah-compliant constructed portfolio and the first and second quartile equity portfolio.  
There is a statistical insignificance for SCLR portfolios and the all-REIT portfolios. The effect of size, 
value and momentum in explaining the role of idiosyncratic volatility and market beta in explaining 
the stock returns of Shariah-compliant REIT portfolios is examined. The explanatory power of the size 
effect is a negative relationship between size and SC REIT returns as well as the all-REIT portfolio as 
seen in Models 4a, 4b and 4c, although the average slope for size is insignificant, which implies that 
smaller REIT tend to earn higher returns. 
The inclusion of the idiosyncratic risks in explaining stock returns, however, indicates a positive size 
co-efficient for SCLR, equity portfolios and the all-REIT portfolio while the negative co-efficient still 
persists for Shariah-compliant portfolios; however these results are not statistically significant. The 




value effect and its explanatory power in explaining REIT stock returns with market beta and 
idiosyncratic volatility is examined. In all constructed portfolios there is a positive relationship with 
expected stock returns and the value effect variable (LnBEME), consistent with the findings of Ooi et 
al (2009).  This implies that value REITs would tend to earn higher returns; however, with the 
inclusion of the idiosyncratic risks in explaining REITs stock returns and the Shariah-compliant 
portfolios (SC and SCLR), the coefficient of the value effect is a negative relationship with stock 
returns. 
In the SC REITs, when idiosyncratic risks is included in the model specification (model 5c),  there is a 
negative relationship between expected stock returns and the value effects with an average slope of 
0.034; however the value effect coefficient of the SC portfolio is statistically insignificant. The 
momentum effect of the returns of the constructed portfolios is examined, and there is a positive 
relationship between expected stock returns and momentum effect in all portfolios.  The momentum 
effect is the cumulative return from two months to 13 months prior to the REIT returns. The 
momentum coefficient of the SC portfolio is a significant positive relationship with expected returns 
significant at the 5% level.  
In Models 5c and 6c of the Fama-Macbeth regressions of the Shariah-compliant portfolio, there is a 
statistically positive significant relationship between idiosyncratic risks and REIT stock returns at the 
5% level at 0.1297 when market risk is measured, size and value effect, and at the 5% level significant 
level at 0.1305 when the momentum effect is included in explaining expected stock returns. In all 
constructed portfolios, there is a positive relationship between expected stock returns and idiosyncratic 
volatility; however statistical significance was only observed in the restrictive Shariah portfolio and 
the first and second quartile equity portfolios. The test on the relationship of idiosyncratic volatility on 
Shariah-compliant REIT returns shows that there is a positive and significant relationship on the 




restrictive Shariah-compliant portfolio between 1998 and 2009; however there is a positive albeit 




Table 4.5 shows the time series of average slopes of cross section regressions of constructed 
REIT portfolios. The Fama-Macbeth regression technique in which the t-statistics is the average 
slope divided by time series standard error is employed. The regression result is from January 
1998 to December 2009. The dependent variable is ExRet (excess return of REIT returns). 
Ln(ME) is estimated as (stock price times outstanding shares), the market equity of June t+1 is 
matched to the returns of July of year t. LnBM is estimated as the market equity of December t-1 
and the book equity of the end of the fiscal year as at December t-1 and matched with the returns 
as at July of year t; book equity is estimated as shareholders book equity plus deferred taxes and 
investment tax credit minus book value of preference shares. Ret (-2,-13) measures the 
momentum effect and is the cumulative return from the prior month to 12 months prior to initial 
month. E(beta) is the one-month ahead, 12 month rolling window expected market risk which is 
estimated using the bivariate GARCH model while E(IVOL) is the expected idiosyncratic 
volatility estimated using the EGARCH model based on the 3-factor Fama-French model. *** is 
significant at the 1% level, ** is significant at the 5% level and * is significant at the 10% level 
Model  Α E(beta) Ln(ME) LN(BE/ME) Ret(-2,-13) E(IVOL) 
Fama-Macbeth Regression on SC REITs 
Size Effect        
4a 0.0111  -0.0003    5.92% 
4b 0.0111 0.0012 -0.0003    8.88% 
4c  0.0097 0.0017 -0.0004   0.0914 29.64% 
Value Effect 
5a 0.0088   0.0012   6.99% 
5b 0.0091*** -0.0010  0.0013   9.51% 
5c  0.0134   0.0014 -0.0008 -0.0034  0.1297** 33.92% 
Momentum Effect  
6a 0.0069    0.0120  11.15% 
6b 0.0087*** -0.0041   0.0124  13.63% 
6c  0.0148 0.0014 -0.0010 -0.0031 0.0179** 0.1305** 38.60% 
Fama-Macbeth Regression on SCLR REITs 
Size Effect 
4a 0.0079  0.0000    5.17% 
4b 0.0065 0.0039 0.000    16.09% 
4c  0.0007 0.0015 0.0003     0.0624 22.99% 
Value Effect 
5a 0.0084   0.0004   4.11% 
5b  0.0072** 0.0041  -0.0007   14.99% 
5c  0.0030 0.0025 0.0000 -0.0018    0.0658 25.39% 
Momentum Effect 
6a 0.0065      0.0034  7.02% 
6b    
0.0077** 
0.0038   0.0221***  17.19% 




6c  0.0041   0.0034 -0.0001 -0.0014 0.0207***   0.0755 28.96% 
Fama-Macbeth Regression on all-REITs 
Size Effect 
4a 0.0127  -0.0004    5.24% 
4b 0.0117 -0.0016 -0.0003    7.91% 
4c  -0.0034 -0.0006   0.0008   0.0361 21.74% 
Value Effect 
5a 0.0075   0.0040   3.44% 
5b 0.0067* 0.0027  -0.0003   14.53% 
5c -0.0032 -0.0005 0.0007 -0.0008  0.0275 23.49% 
Momentum Effect 
6a 0.0058    0.0078  5.49% 
6b 0.0078***    0.0026   0.0239***  16.34% 
6c 0.0004   0.0003 0.0004 -0.0002 0.0253*** 0.0478 26.72% 
Fama-Macbeth Regression on Equity REITs: 1  
Size Effect 
4a 0.0152  -0.0007    7.95% 
4b 0.0104 -0.0014 -0.0003    20.07% 
4c  -0.0113 -0.0039 0.0010   0.1236** 25.98% 
Value Effect  
5a 0.0072    0.0023   4.10% 
5b .0075** -.0010  .0013   17.05% 
5c  -.0112 -.0026   .0010 .0008    0.1167** 28.76% 
Momentum Effect 
6a  0.0048    0.0062  6.23% 
6b 0.0074** 0.0004   0.0188**  18.51% 
6c  -0.0084   0.0006  .0017 0.0021    0.0276*** 0.1507*** 32.26% 
Fama-Macbeth Regression on Equity REITs: 2
Size Effect 
4a   0.068***  -0.0041***    5.21% 
4b 0.0717*** .0029 -0.0043***    18.00% 
4c  0.0496*** 0.0002 -0.0031***      0.1178* 27.32% 
Value Effect 
5a 0.0102*     0.0010   4.73% 
5b   0.0095** 0.0043    0.0007    17.44% 
5c  0.0459*** -0.0003 -0.0029***   -0.0002  0.1213** 30.71% 
Momentum Effect  
6a 0.0058    0.0042  9.83% 
6b 0.0690***     0.0081   -0.0043***  15.97% 





The aim is to examine the roles idiosyncratic volatility and market beta play in explaining the cross-
sectional returns of Shariah-compliant REIT returns. In earlier results in Table 4.5, there is a positive 
and significant relationship between idiosyncratic volatility and SC REIT stock returns.  This sub-
period analysis would examine two sub-periods from the period 1998 to 2009.  The first period is from 




January 1998 to December 2006 while the second period is from January 2001 to December 2009.  
The second period captures the financial crisis which particularly affected US REITs. Models 7 and 8 
include several variables including beta, size (LnME), value effect (LnB/M), momentum (ret -2,-13), 
and idiosyncratic volatility. The results of the model are presented in Table 4.6, and consistent with 
results using the full period data, there exists a positive relationship with the idiosyncratic volatility 
and the returns of the constructed SC REIT portfolio between the period January 1998 to December 
2006, significant at the 5% level.  
In the second sub-period analysis between January 2001 and December 2009, the explanatory power 
of idiosyncratic risks and REIT returns is less strong in the SC portfolios compared to the first period 
(January 1998 to December 2009). However, for the first time in the analysis of this study’s findings, 
there is a significant relationship between idiosyncratic risks and all-REIT returns and SCLR REIT 
returns at the 5% level. This is consistent with the models in Tables 4.5 and 4.6. In addition, the results 
in Table 4.5 are consistent under the robustness tests with the first half equity portfolio, and the 
relationship between returns and idiosyncratic risks is positive and significant for smaller cap REITs. 
Furthermore the relationship between idiosyncratic risks and all other portfolio REIT returns except 
the SC REIT portfolio and the Equity REIT 1 portfolio is more explanatory and significant during the 




Table 4.6 shows the time series of average slopes of cross section regressions of constructed 
REIT portfolios The Fama-Macbeth regression technique in which the t-statistics is the average 
slope divided by time series standard error is employed. The regression result is from January 
2001 to December 2009. The variables used are within the investigative period and are 
described in Table 4.5. *** is significant at the 1% level, ** is significant at the 5% level and * 
is significant at the 10% level. 
Monthly Time series of average slopes (Fama-Macbeth Regression) Jan 1998 to Dec.2006 




Model Α E(beta) Ln(ME) LN(BE/ME) Ret(-2,-13) E(IVOL)  
Fama-Macbeth Regression on SC REITs 
7a 0.0138 -0.0093 -0.0009 -0.0002 0.0051 0.2188** 40.35% 
Fama-Macbeth Regression on SCLR REITs 
7b   0.0044 0.0150 -0.0005 -0.0019 -0.0025 0.0673 25.69% 
Fama-Macbeth Regression on All-REITs 
7c 0.0033 0.0052 -.0001 -.0034 0.0218 0.0179 38.74% 
Fama-Macbeth Regression on Equity REITs: 1 
7d -0.0034 -0.0005 0.0006  0.0007 0.0228*** 0.1228** 32.08% 
Fama-Macbeth Regression on Equity REITs: 2 
7e 0.0367** -0.0002 -0.0020* 0.0001   0.0125 0.0811 37.43% 
Monthly Time series of average slopes (Fama-Macbeth Regression) Jan. 2001 to Dec.2009 
Model Α E(beta) Ln(ME) LN(BE/ME) Ret(-2,-13) E(IVOL)  
Fama-Macbeth Regression on SC REITs 
8a 0.0214 0.0044 -0.0018* -0.0014 0.0152*   0.1701** 36.15% 
Fama-Macbeth Regression on SCLR REITs 
8b 0.0029  0.0051 -0.0002 0.0002 0.0178 0.1225** 27.83% 
Fama-Macbeth Regression on All-REITs 
8c   0.0041 -0.0054** -0.00001 0.0003 0.0063   0.0965**   19.42% 
Fama-Macbeth Regression on Equity REITs: 1 
8d -0.1811   0.0494 0.0148 0.0295  0.0561 0.0151 42.67% 
Fama-Macbeth Regression on Equity REITs: 2 
8e   0.0578*** 0.0005 -0.0038*** -0.0005 0.0171**   0.1521** 34.41% 
	
4.6.2	Alternative	estimation	of	idiosyncratic	risks		
The 4- Factor Cahart Model  
In this section of the analysis, a different approach to estimating idiosyncratic volatility is employed40. 












EGARCH model; however the monthly returns of each constructed REIT portfolios follow the 4- 
factor Cahart model as seen in equation 12.  The EGARCH process is illustrated above in equation 3. 
 
REIT returns is then regressed on the following independent variables including size, value effect, 
momentum, beta and idiosyncratic volatility estimated using the 4-factor Carhart model. Consistent 
with the findings, there is a positive relationship between REIT returns and idiosyncratic volatility: 
idiosyncratic risks continue to be more dominant in SC REIT portfolio returns compared to the SCLR 
portfolio and the all-REIT portfolio. As seen in Table 4.7 there is a positive and significant 
relationship at the 10% level in idiosyncratic risks explaining the returns of SC portfolio returns, 
although there is a positive relationship in SCLR, Equity REITs 1 and Equity REITS 2 portfolio, there 
is statistical insignificance. However, consistent with the findings of Ooi e al (2009), there is a positive 
relationship with momentum effect and REIT returns, significant at the 10% level as well as a positive 
and significant relationship between REIT returns and idiosyncratic volatility in the all-REIT portfolio. 
Table 4.7: 4-Factor Carhart model Estimation of Idiosyncratic Volatility 
Table 4.7 shows the time series of average slopes of cross section regressions of constructed 
REIT portfolios. The Fama-Macbeth regression technique in which the t-statistics is the 
average slope divided by time series standard error is employed. The regression result is from 
January 1998 to December 2009. The variables used are within the investigative period and are 
described in Table 4.5. E (IVOL) is the expected idiosyncratic volatility estimated using the 
EGARCH model based on the 4 factor Carhart model. *** is significant at the 1% level, ** is 
significant at the 5% level and * is significant at the 10% level. 
Model  Α E(beta) Ln(ME) LN(BE/ME) Ret(-2,-13) E(IVOL) 4F  
Fama-Macbeth Regression on SC REITs 
9a   0.0173   0.0002 -0.0010 -0.0022 0.0218** 0.0944* 37.33% 
Fama-Macbeth Regression on SCLR REITs 









Fama-Macbeth Regression on All-REITs 
9c -0.0129 0.0026 0.0015 0.0001 0.0186*** 0.0894** 33.09% 
Fama-Macbeth Regression on Equity REITs: 1 
9d -0.0008 0.0011 0.0004 0.0020   0.0256***  0.0652 31.09% 
Fama-Macbeth Regression on Equity REITs: 2 




In the results as seen in Tables 4.5, 4.6 and 4.7, there is a significant positive relationship between 
returns and idiosyncratic risks of the constructed Shariah-compliant portfolio. Since the Shariah-
compliant portfolio is created using sectors that conform to qualitative screens of Shariah compliance, 
this study examines if the results are driven by sectoral effects. Regressions are run on each sector’s 
returns and other factors that may explain stock returns including size effect, momentum effect, 
growth effect and idiosyncratic risks. In all sectors examined - as seen in Table 4.8 - there is a positive 
significant relationship (5% level) between returns and idiosyncratic risks in the REITs residential 
sectors at 0.2097, in other sectors including office, industrial, mixed and retail there is an insignificant 
positive relationship. In the diversified, lodging and resorts sector, there exists an insignificant 
negative relationship between the sector’s return and its idiosyncratic risks. 
To understand if the residential REIT sectoral screen is driving the significant relationship of the 
Shariah-compliant REIT portfolio, more sectoral portfolios including six constructed portfolios are 
created with a combination of two sectors and four constructed portfolios with a combination of three 
sectors which satisfy the qualitative screening of Shariah compliance. The results show that the 
idiosyncratic risks of all combinations which include the REITs residential sector have a positive and 
significant relationship with REIT returns except in two combinations, as seen in Table 4.9. There is a 
positive albeit insignificant relationship with the portfolios which include a combination of other 




sectors (the residential sector is exempted).  Finally the combination of four sectors which are 
considered Shariah-compliant and which represent a large portion of the Shariah-compliant 
constructed portfolio is examined as seen in Table 4.5; and there is a positive and significant 
relationship with returns and idiosyncratic risks with a coefficient of 0.1538 significant at the 5% 
level.  
Therefore this study concludes that the Shariah-compliant constructed portfolio is driven by the REITs 
residential sector: in other words, the firm-specific risks of residential REITs seem to drive the firm-
specific risks of the constructed Shariah-compliant portfolio. However, when other sectors are 
employed which do not conform to strict Shariah principles - forming the less restrictive Shariah 
portfolio as practiced in countries such as Malaysia - the idiosyncratic risks have less of an impact 
compared to the Shariah-compliant portfolios.  
Table 4.8 Sectoral Idiosyncratic Risks 
Table 4.8 shows the time series of average slopes of cross section regressions of constructed REIT 
portfolios. The Fama-Macbeth regression technique in which the t-statistics is the average slope 
divided by time series standard error is employed. The regression results are from January 1998 to 
December 2009. The dependent variable is ExRet(excess return of REIT returns). Ln(ME) is 
estimated as (stock price times outstanding shares) the market equity of June t+1 is matched to the 
returns of July of year t, LnBM is estimated as the market equity of December t-1 and the book 
equity of the end of the fiscal year as at December t-1 and matched with the returns as at July of 
year. Book to equity is estimated as (shareholders book equity plus deferred taxes and investment 
tax credit minus book value of preference shares. Ret (-2,-13) measures the momentum effect and is 
the cumulative return from the prior month to 12 months prior to initial month. E (IVOL) is the 
expected idiosyncratic volatility estimated using the EGARCH model based on the 3-factor Fama-
French model. *** is significant at the 1% level, ** is significant at the 5% level and * is significant 
at the 10% level.	
Model  Α E(beta) Ln(ME) LN(BE/ME) Ret(-2,-13) E(IVOL)  Observ	
Fama-Macbeth Regression on Sectoral REITs   
         
Office    0.0080 -0.0011 -0.0004 -0.0030   0.0108 0.1327 65.09% 1333 
Industrial  0.1551 -0.0069 -0.0098 -0.0050   0.0297 0.0162 100.00% 576 
Mixed   0.0075   0.0099 0.0017 0.0084 0.0652 0.0746 100.00% 525 
Retail  0.0035 0.0033 0.0001 0.0011 0.0183* 0.0610 41.12% 2868 
Residential  -0.0205 -0.0015 0.0012 0.0012 0.0213 0.2097** 53.70% 1954 
Diversified -0.0225 -0.0115 0.0036 0.0094   0.0681 -0.0483 69.73% 1327 
Lodging/ 
Resorts 
   0.0470 0.0140 -0.0035 -0.0476 0.0256 -0.5844 91.40% 781 
Health Care   0.1315   0.0129 -0.0102 -0.0123 -0.0245   0.0760 68.63% 1315 




Ind+Resi 0.0034 -0.0030 -0.0001 0.0021 0.0196   
0.1573** 
44.94% 2530 
Ind+Stor   0.0269    0.0300   -0.0030 -0.0004 -0.0315   0.5994* 85.86% 937 
Ind+Health    0.1111*   0.0234 -0.0093* -0.0216** -0.0224   0.0674 59.21% 1891 
Resi+Stor -0.0183 -0.0004 0.0007 0.0005 0.0108 0.1750* 45.25% 2315 
Resi+Health  0.0238   0.0042 -0.0017 -0.0054*   0.0167*   0.0989 46.50% 2972 
Stor+Health   0.0253 -0.0075 -0.0009   0.0001 0.0082 0.0346 60.89% 1676 
Ind+Res+Str 0.0071 -0.0015 -0.0003   0.0018 0.0179* 0.1043 40.72% 2891 
Ind+Res+Hea   0.0172   0.0015 -0.0012 -0.0028   0.0184** 0.1515** 41.25% 3845 
Resi+Str+Hea 0.0071 0.0013 -0.0007 -0.0030   0.0150* 0.1447** 40.65% 3630 
Ind+Str+Hea 0.0271   0.0031 -0.0019 -0.0046   0.0273 0.1803 53.43% 2252 
Ind+Res+Str+
Hea 




To further test the robustness of the results in Tables 4.5, 4.6 and 4.7 which show that the idiosyncratic 
risks of Shariah-compliant portfolios (GCC) have a positive and significant relationship in explaining 
REIT stock returns and that the idiosyncratic risks of Shariah-compliant less restrictive portfolio (SC-
LR) have a positive but insignificant relationship with REIT stock returns (except between 2001 to 
2009) (see Table 4.6), the relationship between idiosyncratic risks and returns of Islamic REITs in 
Malaysia between August 2006 to December 2011 is investigated. The first Islamic REIT in the world, 
Al Aqar KPJ REIT, a healthcare REIT was listed on the Malaysian stock exchange in August 2006. 
Subsequently another Islamic REIT (plantation REIT), Al-Hadharah Boustead REIT, was established 
in 2007 and in December 2008, Axis REIT was the first general REIT to convert to an Islamic REIT.  
It was established in August 2005 and the REIT portfolio includes office and industrial properties 
(Newell and Osmadi 2009).  As at December 2011, three Islamic REITs existed in Malaysia. Islamic 
REITs in Malaysia are different from the synthetic less restrictive Shariah-compliant portfolios (which 
mimic Malaysia Shariah compliance standards) in several ways; including that all financing of Islamic 
REITs must be Shariah-compliant and the insurance of the properties must be Shariah-compliant if 
available. Furthermore, another distinctive feature is that Islamic REITs must use a Shariah advisor, 




whose responsibility it is to ensure that all operations of the REIT are in compliance with Shariah 
laws.  
The monthly returns of each listed REIT on the Bursa Malaysian stock exchange are collected, the 
Bursa Malaysia stock market index is also retrieved and employed as the market return and the three-
month Malaysian Treasury bill from August 2006 is retrieved from the Bloomberg Database. The 
conditional idiosyncratic volatility of all-REIT portfolios in Malaysia is estimated by using the CAPM 
model; however the error term of the CAPM model follows the E-GARCH model in estimating 
conditional idiosyncratic volatility and in this model an interest exists in estimating the conditional 
variance of the model which represents idiosyncratic volatility.  
The expected beta is estimated using the bivariate GARCH model.  Thereafter the researcher employs 
a 12 month rolling window to estimate the one month ahead beta.   
  
 + γ [  ]} (15) 
Furthermore, several portfolios are created including the Islamic REIT Malaysian portfolio, the non-
Islamic REIT Malaysian portfolio and the all-REIT Malaysian portfolio to understand the relationship 
between expected returns and expected idiosyncratic volatility. The results confirm earlier results that 
there is a positive and significant relationship between expected returns of Islamic REITs and its 
idiosyncratic risks (Table 4.9, Model 10c); the co-efficient of the conditional idiosyncratic volatility in 
Model 10c is 64.193, positive and significant at the 10% level. However, in other portfolios, a positive 
albeit insignificant relationship with idiosyncratic volatility and expected returns of non-Islamic REITs 
within the period investigated exists. Surprisingly in the Fama-Macbeth regressions of the all-REITs, 
there is a negative and insignificant relationship between returns and idiosyncratic volatility (Table 
4.8, Model 3c): this result shows the consistency of the positive and significant relationship of 




Shariah-compliant and Islamic REIT returns and idiosyncratic risks. In all models, as seen in Table 
4.8, the relationship between expected return and expected beta is flat.  
 
Table 4.9 Idiosyncratic Risks and Islamic REITs in Malaysia 
Table 4. 9 show the time series of average slopes of cross section regressions of constructed 
Malaysian REIT portfolios. The Fama-Macbeth regression technique in which the t-statistics is 
the average slope divided by time series standard error is employed. The regression result is from 
August 2006 to December 2011. E(beta) is the one-month ahead, 12 month rolling window 
expected market risk which is estimated using the bivariate GARCH model whilst the E(IVOL) 
is the one month ahead idiosyncratic volatility estimated using the EGARCH model based on the 
CAPM model. *** *** is significant at the 1% level, ** is significant at the 5% level and * is 
significant at the 10% level. 
Model Α E(beta) E(IVOL) 1F  Observation 
Fama-Macbeth Regression on Islamic REITs  
10a -0.0282**   -0.0247  0.5644 138 
10b -0.0367***  8.2127 0.7369 160 
10c   -0.1420 0.0007 64.193* 1.0000 138 
Fama-Macbeth Regression on Non-Islamic REITs  
10a -0.0195*** -0.0067  0.2654 436 
10b   -0.02***    -0.4521 0.2304 557 
10c -0.0195** -0.0075 0.1504 0.4552 436 
Fama-Macbeth Regression on Malaysian All-REITs  
10a -0.0214***   -0.0033  0.2077 574 
10b -0.0209***  -0.4180 0.2015 717 




It has been purported in finance theory that investors for various reasons are unable to hold a perfectly 
diversified portfolio (in other words, investors are unable to hold a market portfolio). Investors who 
make decisions based on their faith and religion (Muslims) are one such example. In this study, 
synthetic Shariah-compliant portfolios are constructed which comply with the qualitative screening 
according to Shariah law; however it is important to state upfront that the constructed Shariah 
portfolios are not put through the quantitative requirement tests of Shariah compliance - hence results 
should be applied with caution. The study examines the role of idiosyncratic risk (firm-specific risks) 
in explaining the cross-sectional monthly stock returns of synthetic created Shariah REITs. Of all the 




portfolios examined including a Shariah-compliant restrictive portfolio, a Shariah-compliant less 
restrictive portfolio and an all-REIT portfolio, the relationship between idiosyncratic risks and REIT 
returns is more dominant and persistent in Shariah-compliant restrictive portfolios than Shariah-
compliant less restrictive portfolio and the all-REIT portfolio. There is a positive and significant 
relationship between idiosyncratic risks and Shariah REIT portfolio returns of all portfolios 
investigated.  In addition, the explanatory power of idiosyncratic volatility was the greatest in 
explaining the returns of the SC REIT portfolio, and also statistically significant. The findings remain 
robust when idiosyncratic volatility is estimated using alternative methods including the 4-factor 
Carhart (1997) model technique. The results are also robust under sub-period analysis in which the full 
period is divided into two periods; in explaining REIT returns, idiosyncratic risks appears to be most 
significant under the SC portfolio. The empirical test on Shariah-compliant REITs supports the 
theories of under-diversification such as Merton (1987) which predicts a positive relation between 
idiosyncratic risks and expected returns.  In addition, the idiosyncratic risk of Shariah-compliant 
portfolio is driven by the firm-specific risks of the residential REIT returns. The impact of the 
idiosyncratic risk of residential REIT returns disappears under the Shariah-compliant restrictive 
portfolios and the all-REIT portfolio.  The relationship of idiosyncratic risks on the expected returns of 
Islamic REIT portfolios in Malaysia is tested and there exists a positive and significant relationship 
with idiosyncratic risks and expected returns: in other words, firm-specific risks matters in explaining 
the returns of the portfolio of an Islamic REIT investor. 
Surprisingly there is a negative relationship between the expected returns and idiosyncratic risk of the 
all-REIT Malaysian portfolio; however in estimating idiosyncratic risks as well as in explaining the 
returns of the constructed REIT portfolios the 1-factor model is employed as opposed to the Fama-
French 3-factor model and the 4-factor Carhart model due to data limitations on the estimating of other 




factors as estimated by Fama and French (1993), hence this may cause idiosyncratic risks in the 
Malaysian REIT context to be overestimated. 
Prior studies on Shariah-compliant REITs such as those of Faishal and Eng (2008) and Newell and 
Osmadi (2009) explore the differences in returns between Shariah-compliant REITs and general 
REITs and find that there is no statistical difference in the returns of these sets of REIT. This study 
extends the knowledge of Shariah-compliant REITs and explores the relationship between firm-
specific risks and Shariah-compliant REITs. This study reveals that the explanatory power in 
explaining the role of firm-specific risks differs between general REITs and Shariah-compliant REITs. 
Investors who hold Shariah-compliant restrictive portfolios according to the evidence in this essay are 
expected to have high idiosyncratic risks and earn high returns. This result is statistically significant in 
only Shariah-compliant restrictive REIT portfolios. In other words the idiosyncratic risks largely 
explain the returns of Shariah-compliant restrictive portfolios. However there is an insignificant 
positive relationship between idiosyncratic risks and returns for less restrictive Shariah-compliant 
portfolios. This result implies that the type of Shariah principles which investors adhere to may have 
an impact on stock returns. The results also have implications for managers when selecting portfolios 
for Shariah investors; the idiosyncratic risks of SC portfolios have a larger positive co-efficient 
compared to SCLR portfolio and the relationship between idiosyncratic risks and returns of Shariah–
compliant portfolio is significant, persistent and robust in most models. As Islamic REITs begin to 
gain ground and relevance in the REITs industry more work is to come on public listed Islamic REITs, 
currently as at December 2011, Malaysia had the highest number of Islamic REITs which stood at 
three Islamic REITs while Singapore launched its first Shariah-compliant REIT in the fourth quarter of 
2010. From the analysis and evidence from the tests undertaken in this research, the regulatory 




decisions on Shariah compliance41 are a significant feature in explaining the importance of 
















Corporate real-estate ownership in the past decades has received increasing attention in real-
estate research and studies. Non-real-estate firms own large amounts of real estate and several 
studies have looked into how this may affect the firm’s performance since the core business of 
the firm is not in real estate. In the US economy alone, there is an estimated value of $US8.8 
trillion of non-residential structures (this includes value of building excluding the value of land) 
(Miles et al, 1991). The main objective for public listed firms is that they maximise shareholder 
value by effective use of scarce capital (Linneman 1998). Therefore the use of capital to finance 
a factor of production such as real estate may have a considerable effect on the ability of the 
firms to maximise shareholder value. Corporate real estate is used by firms to achieve certain 
objectives such as a source of cash when firms are in distress, a source of capital which may be 
disposed of to fuel growth opportunities and investments, and corporate real estate has the ability 
to improve the firm’s market performance (Machlica and Borunch 1989). 
Shariah-compliant firms have a restriction in the use of debt of 33%. These non-real-estate 
companies use less debt for several reasons including that they may belong industries in which 
less debt is the norm, hence firms tap into other sources of capital such as equity and retained 
earnings; also they may be unattractive to banks and may not be able to secure debt financing.  
The main contribution of this essay is to investigate empirically the implications of Shariah 
compliance conditions on Shariah investors from the perspective of the role that CREO plays on 




Shariah-compliant non-real-estate US firms. Although there are several research studies on the 
effect of corporate real-estate ownership on the returns of firms as well as the general riskiness to 
the level of corporate real-estate ownership, there is little or no knowledge on how Shariah 
conditions may have an effect on the subsequent corporate real-estate ownership of Shariah-
compliant non-real-estate firms and what role this linkage may play in the risks and returns of 
Shariah-compliant firms. It is not known to what extent the direct effect on Shariah financial 
ratio restrictions has on corporate real-estate holding and subsequently the effect on shareholder 
wealth of Shariah investors. In this study US Shariah-compliant firms are investigated for several 
reasons: a) the highest number of Shariah-compliant firms exists in the United States, and b) the 
US financial capital market is one of the most oldest and developed in the world, hence data are 
readily available to help answer the research questions. 
Research Questions:  
i) What is the corporate real-estate ownership of US Shariah-compliant non-real-estate 
companies from 1994 to 2009?  
ii) How does Shariah compliance affect the corporate real-estate ownership of Shariah-
compliant non-real-estate companies? 
iii) How does the level of the corporate real estate ownership due to Shariah compliance 
affect the firm’s financial performance? 
Prior studies have examined the relationship between corporate real-estate ownership and firm 
returns and have highlighted the importance of real-estate ownership in explaining adjusted risk 
returns of firms. Deng and Gyourko (2000) find a negative significant relationship between the 
idiosyncratic component of returns and corporate real-estate ownership for risky firms with high 
beta and high cost of capital firms during the period investigated from 1984 to 1993. In further 




studies, Brounen and Eichholtz (2000) find a negative but non-significant relationship between 
corporate real-estate ownership and risk-adjusted stock performance in aggregate data; however 
they find that certain industries do exhibit a negative and significant relationship, such as the 
communications and business services sector, and some industries have a positive relationship 
between CREO and risk-adjusted returns, such as the transportation sector. 
Further studies also show that a return penalty exists for certain type of firms that hold a high 
concentration of real estate specifically riskier firms. Liow (2004) investigates corporate real 
estate and stock performance in 75 non-real-estate firms listed on the Singapore stock exchange. 
In line with the findings of Deng and Gyourko (2000), the study concludes that ownership of real 
estate by non-real-estate firms can be associated with low returns, higher total and systematic 
risks and poorer abnormal return.  
This study is similar to prior studies on the relationships between risk-adjusted returns and 
corporate real-estate ownership. However, first, the study seeks to further the knowledge on 
corporate real-estate ownership by examining the context of Shariah-compliant firms for the first 
time. Second, the relationships between the restrictive financial Shariah variables and corporate 
real-estate ownership are further examined; to the best of the author’s knowledge, this is the first 
study to examine the financial variables which may drive real-estate ownership the financial 
variables which may drive corporate real-estate ownership have been examined. Third, the 
research also furthers the investigation into differences and effects of corporate real-estate 
ownership and returns between different industries, particularly those that are restricted in 
leverage use.  
In the initial first-stage analysis there is an attempt to understand the degree to which Shariah 
conditions play a role in the ownership of corporate real estate. Hence each Shariah financial 




restriction including specific financial ratios such as total debt divided by trailing 24-month 
average market capitalisation, the sum of a company’s cash- and interest-bearing securities 
divided by a trailing 24-month average market capitalisation and accounts receivables divided by 
trailing 24-month average market capitalisation which must not be more than 33% are examined, 
particularly on their correlations to corporate real-estate ownership. Thereafter, the relationship 
between returns, risks and CREO are examined in Shariah-compliant firms. 
Why would Shariah-compliant firms’ CREO be any different? 
There are several reasons why the ownership of real estate in Shariah-compliant firms may differ 
from non-Shariah firms, particularly in the financial restriction of leverage (<33%). Leverage is 
positively related to real-estate ownership, and real estate is useful to firms as a source of 
collateral to secure leverage.  It is possible that firms that have low leverage have low CREO, 
and thus would resort to other forms of financing rather than leverage. The relationship between 
financial restrictions of Shariah-compliant firms such as cash+ interest-bearing securities, 
accounts receivable and corporate real-estate ownership remains unknown, hence the author can 
only speculate as to their relationships in developing the hypothesis. 
In understanding the effect of Shariah conditions on corporate real-estate ownership, only further 
tests can answer the empirical question. Shariah-compliant firms are financially restricted to be 
considered as Shariah-compliant; one of the restricted financial ratios (leverage) has a strong 
relationship with real-estate ownership. It is likely that differences in CREO are more profound 
in industries with higher use of leverage such as oil and gas extraction, building construction, 
manufacturing firms, transportation services, communication, entertainment services and health 
services (Deng and Gyuorko 2000). If firms in these industries are financially restricted, further 




examination is undertaken of whether this may in any way influence the corporate real-estate 
ownership between Shariah and non-Shariah firms.  
Hypothesis 1: Positive correlation between leverage and corporate real estate ownership. 
The hypothesis tests if there is a positive relationship between corporate real-estate ratios and 
leverage ratios. Hence if Shariah-compliant firms are restricted in debt usage then this may have 
linkages to the level of corporate real-estate ownership in comparison to general firms. Cheong 
and Kim (1997) make mention in their paper that situations exist in which changes in real-estate 
value would greatly affect debt value, specifically where loans are made against real estate as a 
collateral. Brounen and Eichholtz (2005) find a significant positive relationship between leverage 
and corporate real-estate ownership. 
Shariah-compliant firms may be less prone to debt use; this is because Shariah firms are 
restricted in their use of leverage (as stated above). This may transcend to a lack of real-estate 
ownership as real estate is a collateral-holding asset which are often used to secure leverage from 
banks. 
Hypothesis 2: There is a negative correlation between corporate real-estate ratios and cash 
plus interest-bearing ratios.  
Shariah-compliant firms are restricted in the level of cash ratios. It is expected that firms with 
higher cash ratios would have less levels of corporate real-estate ownership. 
In the predictions of results, the conditions which general firms are expected to satisfy to become 
Shariah-compliant could result in a lower level of real-estate ownership by firms. Conditions 
such as restriction in the level of leverage which may stave up much needed capital financing 
which firms may need to finance capital-intensive factors of production such as real estate, or in 




retrospect the restriction in the level of debt may be as a result of firms not owning enough real 
estate, which is a means to securing leverage in the form of collaterals.  
This study predicts further that if a reduction of real-estate ownership by Shariah-compliant non-
real-estate firms is identified, then it is expected that Shariah non-real-estate firms are less risky; 
hence these less risky firms may have lower betas, and hence lower expected returns. This 
intuition is similar to the findings of Tuzel (2010) that a firm which has high real-estate 
ownership as part of its capital is riskier than a firm which has low real-estate ownership as they 
have higher betas. Hence investors demand a premium for firms with high real-estate ownership. 
Hypothesis 3: There is a negative significant correlation between corporate real-estate 
ownership and idiosyncratic component of return in Shariah-compliant firms. 
Previous studies find a negative relationship between corporate real-estate ownership and firm 
performance. This hypothesis is tested on Shariah-compliant firms; although previous results 
such as Brounen and Eichholtz (2000) and Deng and Gyourko (2000) show a significant negative 
relationship, this study predicts that the Shariah restrictions in Shariah-compliant firms may have 
an effect on this relationship.  
If hypothesis 1 holds true, that leverage is an important factor in the ownership of real estate by 
Shariah-compliant firms, then results should find that restrictions in leverage in Shariah-
compliant firms may reduce corporate real-estate ownership since prior studies have shown a 
positive relationship between leverage and CREO (see Deng and Gyourko 2000). However, this 
intuition is dependent on the differences between leverage ratios of Shariah-compliant firms and 
non-Shariah firms. 
 




Hypothesis 4: There is a negative significant correlation between outperformance and high 
risk firms with high real-estate concentration.  
Deng and Gyourko (2000) find that firms with high real-estate concentrations and high betas 
(level of risk) experience lower returns. This study tests this hypothesis on Shariah-compliant 
firms, to establish whether high-risk firms with high real-estate ownership may result in higher 
return penalties.  
5.2	Literature	Review	
A number of studies have examined the role that corporate real-estate ownership plays in firm 
performance. Deng and Gyourko (2000) find that there is a negative relationship between the 
idiosyncratic component of return (alpha) and the ownership of corporate real estate by non-real-
estate firms; in other words, according to the findings of the study, non-real-estate firms which 
own a high concentration of real estate experience lower returns. Brounen and Eichholtz (2005) 
investigate corporate real-estate ownership across industries in an international context (across 
nine countries and five continents). The study focuses on the effect of CREO on stock 
performance of non-real-estate companies and finds that corporate real-estate ownership 
generally decreases the risks and returns of non-real estate firms.  However the authors conclude 
that not all returns of non-real-estate firms based on industry classification are affected by 
corporate real-estate ownership.  
Sieler et al (2001) investigate the impact of real-estate ownership of US firms between 1985 and 
1994 and find an insignificant negative relationship between CREO and systematic risks (beta) 
and risk-adjusted return. 
Tuzel (2010) tests a general equilibrium production model and finds that the returns of firms in 
the same industry with a high real-estate capital ratio exceed those of firms with low real-estate 




capital ratio by 3-6% annually when other factors such as size, momentum and value are 
considered and controlled for. 
Cheong and Kim (1997) examine data from Korea and find that an increase in real-estate prices 
does have an effect on a firm’s value as well as the firm’s investment behaviour. The study 
examines the increase in the value of real estate and finds that expectations for real-estate price 
increase would result in firm value loss; the value loss according to the study is as a result of 
increasing potential investments for future growth opportunities. 
Liow (2004) examines the role that corporate real-estate ownership plays in the performance of 
non-real-estate firms in Singapore and finds that corporate real-estate ownership is associated 
with lower returns, high systematic risk and poorer abnormal returns. 
The impact of corporate real-estate ownership on firm performance remains unclear and 
inconclusive. Prior studies using US data have shown an insignificant/significant negative 
relationship between CREO and firm performance. The more recent study by Brounen and 
Eichholtz (2005) documents a significant negative relationship in an international context. The 
unique characteristics of Shariah-compliant firms have prompted this study to revisit this 
research topic and extend the literature on the role of real-estate ownership in firms’ performance 
from the perspective of Shariah-compliant firms. 
5.3	Data	and	Methodology		
5.3.1	Data	
In this study, the data are collected from the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE), National 
Association of Securities Dealers Automated Quotation (NASDAQ) and American Stock 
Exchange (AMEX) stock exchanges which were downloaded from the Centre for Research in 
Security Prices (CRSP); the CRSP provides a comprehensive database on stock prices). New 




data for Shariah-compliant companies are collected from the Dow Jones Islamic Index: the 
information provided by the Dow Jones Islamic Index includes firms that fully comply with 
qualitative screenings including firms that do not engage in certain type of activities which are 
non-permissible according to Shariah law, as well as quantitative screenings which including the 
restrictions imposed on general firms including leverage (<33%), accounts receivables(<33%) 
and cash including interest-bearing securities (<33%). Account information of each Shariah-
compliant firm is then collected from Compustat.  
The corporate real estate ownership (CRE0) is measured as a ratio of property, plant and 
equipment (PPE) divided by total asset measured in book value.  This type of formula for 
quantifying CREO is previously used in corporate real estate literature42.  
                                            
                                CREO =                                    (1) 
 
Real estate is an illiquid asset as it takes months to years to acquire or dispose of assets due to 
search costs, asymmetric information, and other factors; moreover it can take years to develop a 
property. Therefore it would be somewhat fictitious to answer the research questions by 
measuring real-estate ratio annually; instead, it is measured on intermittent breaks of three years 
as seen in Brounen and Eichholtz (2005), but extended to four years to accommodate for the last 
year in the data sample. In this current study, stock performance and balance sheet information is 
collected in 1996, 1999, 2002, 2005, and 2009 for Shariah-compliant firms which are 











The strategy in this study is to test if restrictions (financial ratios) on Shariah-compliant firms in 
Table 5.1 may have any subsequent relationship or effect on the firm’s corporate real-estate 
ownership. The study aims to test whether Shariah-compliant firms which are restricted in 
financial ratios including leverage do in fact own less corporate real-estate and consequently how 
this may affect performance (returns) in the long-run. The strategy is applied to other Shariah 
restrictions including cash + interest-bearing securities and accounts receivables. Are Shariah 
conditions associated with lower corporate real estate ownership? And subsequently how do 
these linkages affect performance (returns)? This is investigated by examining 1070 Shariah-
compliant non-real-estate companies domiciled in the United States. Data are employed from 
1996 to 2009. The first part of the analysis examines whether Shariah restrictions have an effect 
on corporate real-estate ownership using uni-variate and multivariate regression analysis. 
 
.     (1) 
The equation above seeks to test hypothesis 1 and hypothesis 2.  
The second part of the analysis investigates whether Shariah-compliant firms enjoy return 
premiums with their real-estate concentration; this is a follow-up from the first stage of analysis 
where there is an attempt to link Shariah restrictions to real-estate concentration. 
In the latter part of the analysis a two-stage regression is proposed (as seen in Deng and Gyourko 
2000) to estimate the idiosyncratic component of return and systematic risk as seen in equation 1, 
subsequently in equation 2, the researcher examines whether the idiosyncratic component as 
derived in equation 1 has a relationship with corporate real-estate ownership. 





Where  is monthly excess return of Shariah-compliant firm, it is measured by the 
difference between monthly returns and  one-month T-Bill rate;  is measured as the 
idiosyncratic component of monthly excess return;  is the systematic risk;  is the 
monthly excess market return from the market portfolio; and ϵ is the error term of the equation 
which follows a normal standard distribution. 
 
……… (4) 
……..   (5) 
Equations 4 and 5 above examine the relationship between the systematic risks (  and 
idiosyncratic components of return  which is obtained from estimation of the first stage 
regression in equation 1 and  which is the real estate ownership of firms, other variables in 
the equation include  which is the market capitalisation as at year end. Prior studies have 
shown that returns of firms may vary due to SIZE (Fama and French 1993). Also included is 
industry dummies ( ).   is a dummy variable that represents firm’s beta: 1 
denotes firms with a beta lower than commercial real-estate beta (0.8 to 0.9:  Gyuorko and Keim 
1992). The firm’s beta dummy is incorporated with corporate real-estate ownership to 
understand if corporate real estate differs for low- and high-risk firms. PERFORMANCE   
dummy variable, 1 denotes firms which suffered at a minimum of 10% drop during the sample 
period. 





Table 5.1 reports the mean of the CREO and Shariah restriction variables of Shariah-compliant 
firms from 1996 to 2009. Shariah-compliant firms are categorised into 18 industries according to 
SIC classifications. Table 5.1 shows the average of each variable on a yearly basis, while the 
number of observations for each variable is so specified.  
The number of observations in each industry is disparate in the sample; some industries such as 
electronic/electrical, materials and business services are well represented in the sample with high 
numbers of observations. However, industries such as building and heavy construction, 
electric/gas and textiles/apparels have low numbers of observations, hence a level of caution is 
necessary when analysing these industries.  
The corporate real-estate ratio of the data sample of Shariah-compliant firms from 1996 to 2009 
is an average of 0.31.  Within the period investigated (1996-2009) 1999 recorded the highest 
CREO ratio of 0.34 and the lowest CREO ratio was in 2002 at 0.29. CREO figures fluctuate 
during the years investigated as well as across industries.  Industries such as mining/oil and gas 
extraction, electric/gas and communications have high CREO ratios which exceed 0.50; however 
for others such as building and heavy construction, durable and non-durable goods, and business 
services, the CREO ratio is less than 0.25. These results are not surprising as industries which are 
involved in mining or gas and oil exploration tend to have more real estate than business services 
which may tend to lease rather than own real estate and business space.  
In the investigations, CREO reduced by one percentage point from 1996 to 2009; however the 
highest variation is between 1999 and 2002 at 5% and in most industries there seems to be 
reductions in the levels of CREO ownership. These results are interpreted as firms reducing their 
corporate real estate ratios during the period investigated; however four industries increased their 




CREO including mining and oil gas extraction, rubber and leather products, and 
apparel/accessory and retail stores. 
Shariah-compliant firms are leverage- , cash- and account receivable- constrained43, and 
therefore the Shariah ratios are examined within the sample period. Leverage ratios are measured 
by ratio of total debt (long-term plus debt in current liability) divided by common share 
outstanding multiplied by share price. The average leverage ratio of Shariah-compliant firms is 
0.24; the leverage ratios between the sample periods 1996 to 2009 vary from 0.21 to 0.28. Higher 
leverage ratios exist among industries such as mining and oil gas extraction at 0.46 and health 
services at 0.51, whereas in industries such as retail stores and apparel and accessory stores, 
lower leverage ratios exist at 0.11 and 0.15 respectively. Industries with higher leverage ratios in 
the sample tend to be highly industrialised; these firms tend to rely on multiple financing options 
as they are more likely to own rather than lease real estate, assets and customised valuable 
equipment and machinery. 
Shariah-compliant firms are also restricted by cash + interest bearing securities and account 
receivables which must not exceed 33%. During 1996-2009, in aggregate terms, both Shariah 
ratios peaked at 2002 at 0.14 and 0.12 respectively.  
Table 5.1: Corporate real‐estate ownership and Shariah‐compliant restrictions by industry and year, 
1996‐2009 
Table 5.1 shows the CREO and Shariah financial ratios of Shariah-compliant firms from 
1996 to 2009. Corporate real-estate ownership is measured by the ratio property, plant and 
equipment to total asset. Leverage is measured by the ratio of total debt plus debt in current 
liability) divided by common shares outstanding multiplied by share price. Cash + interest-
bearing securities is measured by the ratio cash + interest bearing securities by market 
















All Sectors       
1996 320 0.32 0.25 0.06 0.10 
1999 458 0.34 0.23 0.04 0.08 
2002 549 0.29 0.28 0.14 0.12 
2005 622 0.30 0.21 0.07 0.09 
2009 550 0.31 0.24 0.11 0.10 
1996-2009 2499 0.31 0.24 0.09 0.10 
Mining/Oil & 
Gas Extraction 
     
1996 18 0.74 0.30 0.03 0.08 
1999 27 0.90 0.59 0.03 0.08 
2002 22 0.68 0.62 0.05 0.12 
2005 51 0.70 0.35 0.05 0.07 
2009 52 0.82 0.50 0.06 0.07 




     
1996 3 0.21 0.62 0.05 0.01 
1999 4 0.25 0.34 0.26 0.05 
2002 5 0.26 0.42 0.12 0.20 
2005 7 0.09 0.22 0.18 0.24 
2009 6 0.22 0.42 0.08 0.22 
1996-2009 25 0.20 0.37 0.14 0.17 
Textiles and 
Apparels  
     
1996 5 0.28 0.43 0.02 0.21 
1999 5 0.27 0.29 0.04 0.23 
2002 5 0.32 0.34 0.08 0.18 
2005 5 0.25 0.39 0.04 0.17 
2009 7 0.20 0.11 0.15 0.09 




     
1996 6 0.50 0.15 0.06 0.12 
1999 8 0.47 0.23 0.03 0.16 
2002 15 0.39 0.39 0.06 0.14 
2005 16 0.44 0.34 0.03 0.12 
2009 10 0.42 037 0.05 0.13 
1996-2009 55 0.44 0.32 0.05 0.13 
Chemical & 
Allied Products 
     




1996 50 0.26 0.38 0.06 0.10 
1999 50 0.29 0.15 0.07 0.04 
2002 72 0.24 0.16 0.09 0.05 
2005 86 0.26 0.21 0.09 0.03 
2009 75 0.25 0.19 0.06 0.10 
1996-2009 343 0.26 0.21 0.07 0.06 
Rubber and 
Leather Products  
     
1996 2 0.18 0.06 0.09 0.13 
1999 6 0.43 0.39 0.11 0.17 
2002 9 0.32 0.30 0.14 0.17 
2005 8 0.27 0.24 0.09 0.07 
2009 11 0.29 0.21 0.13 0.15 
1996-2009 36 0.31 0.26 0.11 0.14 
Materials 
Industry 
     
1996 46 0.28 0.14 0.10 0.14 
1999 58 0.31 0.18 0.09 0.16 
2002 59 0.27 0.32 0.08 0.12 
2005 67 0.26 0.20 0.12 0.13 
2009 70 0.28 0.30 0.15 0.11 




     
1996 50 0.33 0.16 0.06 0.11 
1999 68 0.30 0.12 0.16 0.12 
2002 82 0.27 0.28 0.15 0.12 
2005 77 0.24 0.17 0.08 0.04 
2009 69 0.20 0.18 0.09 0.08 





     
1996 7 0.62 0.26 0.06 0.15 
1999 17 0.61 0.30 0.11 0.09 
2002 29 0.39 0.30 0.07 0.09 
2005 27 0.42 0.21 0.06 0.09 
2009 36 0.38 0.23 0.08 0.16 
1996-2009 122 0.43 0.26 0.07 0.16 
Communications       
1996 5 0.63 0.86 0.01 0.06 
1999 9 0.62 0.39 0.10 0.07 
2002 7 0.55 0.66 0.06 0.08 
2005 5 0.44 0.40 0.10 0.07 




2009 6 0.40 0.50 0.09 0.05 
1996-2009 32 0.54 0.54 0.08 0.07 
Electric, Gas       
1996 2 0.78 0.87 0.03 0.14 
1999 2 0.64 0.39 0.00 0.09 
2002 1 0.26 0.30 0.01 0.05 
2005 5 0.59 0.25 0.01 0.05 
2009 6 0.73 0.50 0.07 0.08 
1996-2009 16 0.68 0.43 0.03 0.08 
Durable & Non-
Durable Goods 
     
1996 8 0.22 0.66 0.06 0.11 
1999 11 0.27 0.49 0.07 0.11 
2002 16 0.23 0.51 0.06 0.26 
2005 15 0.16 0.11 0.08 0.24 
2009 12 0.20 0.24 0.07 0.23 




     
1996 6 0.31 0.19 0.11 0.07 
1999 11 0.38 0.22 0.06 0.09 
2002 15 0.40 0.25 0.07 0.05 
2005 18 0.36 0.08 0.1 0.02 
2009 17 0.35 0.07 0.08 0.08 
1996-2009 67 0.37 0.15 0.08 0.06 
Eating and 
Drinking Retail 
     
1996 3 0.45 0.31 0.02 0.01 
1999 7 0.45 0.29 0.05 0.09 
2002 10 0.41 0.31 0.03 0.08 
2005 15 0.40 0.25 0.07 0.07 
2009 6 0.28 0.14 0.05 0.07 
1996-2009 41 0.40 0.26 0.05 0.07 
Business 
Services  
     
1996 40 0.17 0.12 0.04 0.09 
1999 75 0.15 0.09 0.08 0.09 
2002 79 0.13 0.16 0.13 0.05 
2005 77 0.11 0.09 0.30 0.11 
2009 76 0.12 0.09 0.10 0.12 
1996-2009 347 0.14 0.11 0.14 0.09 
Health Services       
1996 3 0.48 0.13 0.19 0.11 
1999 4 0.54 0.57 0.04 0.13 
2002 13 0.32 0.70 0.02 0.16 




2005 13 0.35 0.52 0.04 0.10 
2009 8 0.11 0.28 0.01 0.09 




     
1996 28 0.26 0.10 0.09 0.08 
1999 37 0.23 0.12 0.11 0.09 
2002 46 0.23 0.19 0.07 0.09 
2005 49 0.18 0.12 0.06 0.09 
2009 35 0.15 0.13 0.06 0.08 
1996-2009 195 0.21 0.14 0.08 0.09 
Retail Stores      
1996 4 0.32 0.03 0.00 0.05 
1999 4 0.32 0.02 0.05 0.01 
2002 7 0.36 0.05 0.04 0.00 
2005 9 0.40 0.08 0.05 0.00 
2009 8 0.43 0.20 0.13 0.02 






To answer the research question as highlighted in section 5.1, excess stock returns data are 
collected (stock returns less 3-month Treasury bill) of each Shariah-compliant firm as well as the 
excess CRSP value-weighted market return. These data are collected so as to run individual 
stock returns alongside the market return to derive the idiosyncratic component (out-
performance) and beta (risk). The relationships between CREO and idiosyncratic risks alongside 
beta are examined in latter parts of the study.  
Table 5.2 shows average returns of Shariah-compliant firms during the years 1996, 1999, 2002, 
2005 and 2009.  The alpha (outperformance) and beta (risk) from the univariate regression (see 
equation 3) is also tabulated.  




Shariah-compliant firms outperform the Centre for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) market 
from 1996 to 2009, 1999 recorded the highest return (idiosyncratic component) of 0.03. The beta 
of Shariah-compliant firms varied from a high of 1.47 in 2002 to a low of 1.10 in 2009 with an 
overall average of 1.35. The systematic risks of Shariah-compliant firms tend to be higher than 
the CRSP market. There is a variation in systematic risk (beta), although the returns of Shariah-
compliant firms tend to be riskier than the market returns. However, industries such as chemical 
and allied products, electric and gas, health services and retail stores have low systematic risks 
compared to movements in the market returns. The product demands for these industries are 
stable as they can be considered as essentials which do not fluctuate sporadically.  
The first column of Table 5.2 shows average returns of Shariah-compliant firms during the 
period investigated. The researcher finds the highest fluctuation of returns between 2005 and 
2009, which also corresponds to the highest beta variation. 
Table 5.2: Industrial beta and return statistics, 1996-2009 
Table 5.2 depicts the average monthly returns of firms. Alpha is the idiosyncratic 
component of return of each firm which is derived from equation 3, beta is the systematic 
risk of each firm derived from equation 3 and size is the average year end market 
capitalisation measured in billions of dollars. 
 N Avg. Ret Alpha  Avg. Beta Size 
All Sectors       
1996 327 2.48% 0.01 1.41 6.68 
1999 466 4.28% 0.03 1.20 14.19 
2002 557 -0.97% 0.02 1.47 7.68 
2005 630 1.00% 0.01 1.53 10.97 
2009 547 4.74% 0.01 1.10 11.41 
1996-2009 2538 2.23% 0.02 1.35 10.38 
Mining/Oil & 
Gas Extraction 
     
1996 18 2.48% 0.02 1.30 9.22 
1999 27 4.30% 0.02 1.45 7.82 
2002 22 -0.97% 0.02 1.33 9.22 
2005 51 1.26% 0.03 1.23 5.97 
2009 52 4.75% 0.02 1.28 9.03 
1996-2009 171 2.24% 0.02 1.30 7.95 







     
1996 3 3.42% 0.04 0.52 0.51 
1999 4 0.06% 0.01 1.69 2.53 
2002 5 -1.69% 0.02 1.07 3.56 
2005 7 2.24% 0.01 1.51 4.16 
2009 6 2.60% -0.03 1.90 0.89 
1996-2009 25 1.37% 0.01 1.43 2.56 
Textiles and 
Apparels  
     
1996 5 3.98% 0.01 0.82 2.32 
1999 5 2.16% -0.02 0.95 1.24 
2002 5 0.54% 0.03 0.57 3.29 
2005 5 3.17% 0.00 0.89 2.17 
2009 7 5.06%  0.01 1.73 4.62 




     
1996 6 1.93% 0.02 1.08 3.49 
1999 8 0.98% -0.01 0.70 2.46 
2002 15 -0.32% 0.02 1.24 2.81 
2005 16 -0.51% -0.01 1.22 10.79 
2009 10 5.96% -0.00 1.21 3.86 
1996-2009 55 1.61% 0.00 1.14 5.46 
Chemical & 
Allied Products 
     
1996 50 2.22% 0.00 1.08 14.77 
1999 50 4.36% 0.02 0.94 26.25 
2002 72 -1.86% 0.00 0.77 24.20 
2005 86 0.62% 0.00 1.16 7.32 
2009 75 3.69% 0.01 0.81 15.73 
1996-2009 343 1.69% 0.01 0.94 17 
Rubber and 
Leather Products  
     
1996 2 2.87% 0.01 0.16 15.34 
1999 6 0.78% 0.02 0.61 6.08 
2002 9 0.98% 0.01 0.95 4.45 
2005 8 0.44% 0.00 1.86 4.30 
2009 11 6.95% 0.01 0.97 0.84 
1996-2009 36 2.02% 0.01 1.05 4.10 
Materials 
Industry 
     
1996 46 2.96% 0.01 2.03 4.75 
1999 58 4.08% 0.02 1.38 4.76 




2002 59 -0.74% 0.02 2.31 6.58 
2005 67 1.23% 0.01 1.38 15.83 
2009 70 5.71% 0.02 1.99 16.32 




     
1996 50 2.40% 0.00 1.33 5.65 
1999 68 9.90% 0.07 2.08 4.98 
2002 82 -2.55% 0.02 2.24 9.44 
2005 77 0.14% 0.05 3.06 8.93 
2009 69 6.11% 0.02 1.24 7.37 





     
1996 7 2.00% 0.00 1.60 2.64 
1999 17 3.53% 0.02 0.94 4.85 
2002 29 -0.70% 0.03 1.03 5.20 
2005 27 0.74% 0.00 1.62 7.47 
2009 36 3.63% 0.01 1.29 8.55 
1996-2009 122 1.79% 0.01 1.29 6.17 
Communications       
1996 5 1.18% -0.01 1.05 10.97 
1999 9 5.03% 0.04 1.53 26.70 
2002 7 0.66% 0.00 2.04 26.46 
2005 5 1.65% 0.00 0.98 26.87 
2009 6 5.42% 0.01 0.86 32.55 
1996-2009 32 2.82% 0.01 1.30 25.28 
Electric, Gas       
1996 2 1.68% -0.01 0.21 1.62 
1999 2 1.99%    
2002 1 2.11% 0.03 1.03 1.22 
2005 5 1.86% 0.04 1.32 6.19 
2009 6 2.30% 0.02 0.65 11.55 
1996-2009 16 1.99% 0.02 0.91 7.23 
Durable & Non-
Durable Goods 
     
1996 8 1.77% -0.01 1.24 3.89 
1999 11 1.59% -0.01 0.69 5.52 
2002 16 -0.56% 0.01 0.92 4.40 
2005 15 1.79% 0.00 1.12 4.76 
2009 12 5.10% 0.01 0.82 3.91 
1996-2009 62 2.04% 0.00 1.00 4.34 
Apparel &      






1996 6 5.20% 0.02 1.28 2.27 
1999 11 3.02% 0.00 0.41 5.10 
2002 15 0.06% 0.03 1.31 2.71 
2005 18 2.08% 0.01 1.52 3.95 
2009 17 7.24% 0.04 1.01 4.03 
1996-2009 67 3.29% 0.02 1.15 3.73 
Eating and 
Drinking Retail 
     
1996 3 2.19% -0.03 3.11 3.05 
1999 7 0.30% -0.02 0.84 10.09 
2002 10 1.31% 0.02 0.93 7.07 
2005 15 0.65% 0.00 1.5 9.98 
2009 6 5.73% 0.02 0.78 18.42 
1996-2009 41 1.90% 0.00 1.21 10.02 
Business 
Services  
     
1996 40 2.11% 0.02 1.6 6.23 
1999 75 8.37% 0.05 2.00 22.33 
2002 79 -1.70% 0.02 2.14 7.18 
2005 77 4.65% 0.00 1.75 12.63 
2009 76 4.35% 0.02 0.87 13.25 
1996-2009 347 2.44% 0.02 1.67 12.87 
Health Services       
1996 3 2.98% 0.02 0.77 1.77 
1999 4 -2.67% -0.04 1.60 1.83 
2002 13 -1.02% 0.00 -0.04 2.64 
2005 13 1.55% 0.01 0.44 4.25 
2009 8 4.21% 0.01 0.82 3.86 
1996-2009 41 0.94% 0.00 0.51  
Lab, Medical 
and Ophthalmic  
Instruments 
     
1996 28 2.17% 0.00 1.78 1.94 
1999 37 5.40% 0.03 0.99 3.89 
2002 46 -1.59% 0.03 1.23 4.24 
2005 49 0.84% 0.00 1.50 6.96 
2009 35 3.90% 0.01 1.02 9.15 
1996-2009 195 2.07% 0.02 1.29 5.42 
Retail Stores      
1996 4 4.21% 0.03 1.61 1.84 
1999 4 1.37% 0.00 0.29 5.91 
2002 7 -1.14% 0.01 0.76 4.97 
2005 9 -1.03% -0.01 1.47 5.55 
2009 8 5.99% 0.03 3.91 2.39 









The interest in this study lies in the correlations between corporate real-estate ownership and 
firm performance (returns and risk) of Shariah-compliant firms. Hence this part of the study 
outlines the correlation analysis between CREO, alpha, beta and Shariah restriction variables.  
Table 5.3, column 1 highlights the correlation coefficients between CREO and the idiosyncratic 
component of return (alpha).  CREO and alpha tend to be generally negatively correlated except 
in five industries44 where a positive correlation is documented.  These industries tend to be more 
low-yield industries. In aggregate terms, there is a negative insignificant correlation with alpha 
and CREO in Shariah-compliant firms from 1996 to 2009. 
Brounen and Eichholtz (2005) find a significant negative correlation between CREO and alpha; 
however from the findings of this study, correlations between CREO and alpha for Shariah-
compliant firms are negative but not significant.  
This insignificance is often the case in most industries. A number of industries, though, show a 
negative significant relationship such as Mining and Oil & Gas, Retail and Health Services 
which tend to be high-yield industries. The results reaffirm the notion that real estate may not 
contribute highly to the returns of a firm in comparison to its core activity. Furthermore the 
correlation between CREO and returns in Shariah-compliant firms is closer to zero at -0.029 
which differs from earlier results in the CREO literature. The correlations between CREO and 








negative correlation exists between CREO and risk. The correlation results are interpreted as that 
firms with higher CREO tend to be less risky, or alternatively that less risky firms tend to own 
high CREO. However the correlation coefficients between CREO and risk vary between 
industries, Shariah-compliant firms based on industry classifications tend to also exhibit a 
positive correlation between CREO and beta in 10 out of 19 industries examined. 
In the initial correlation results this study find similar results in aggregate terms with general 
firms (Brounen and Eichholtz 2005).  However disparate results according to industrial 
classifications are evident in Shariah-compliant firms. The difference in results - particularly the 
insignificant negative correlation between CREO and the idiosyncratic component of return 
(alpha) - may be as a result of the restrictions that Shariah-compliant firms must adhere to. The 
correlation between CREO and Shariah-restrictive variables is examined in the final column of 
Table 5.3.  
For general firms to be considered as Shariah-compliant, they must operate in permissible 
activities as well as fulfil a series of quantitative criteria (see Chapter 2), hence the correlations 
between CREO and Shariah variables are examined; earlier studies as seen in Brounen and 
Eichholtz (2005) have highlighted a significant positive correlation between CREO and leverage 
ratios. 
The correlation results between CREO and leverage is positive and significant at the 1% level.  
In the sample data, firms that have higher leverage would tend to have higher CREO. An 
alternative argument is that firms with higher CREO may have higher leverage since CREO 
serves as good collateral for securing leverage. This result can be seen across all industry 
classifications, since the importance of leverage on CREO cannot be overstated, this study is 
interested in understanding how this Shariah restriction, particularly the quantitative criterion of 




less than 33% leverage to an average market capitalisation of 24 months, may affect CREO and 
subsequently its importance in its relationship with returns in Shariah-compliant firms. The 
correlation tests between CREO and leverage show that there is a positive and significant 
relationship at the 1% level. Results in Table 5.3 show a positive and significant relationship at 
the 1% level between debt levels of Shariah-compliant firms and leverage. This is in line with 
hypothesis 1 that there exists a positive correlation with corporate real-estate ownership and 
leverage, as seen in Brounen and Eichholtz (2005). 
Furthermore the correlation between CREO and other Shariah-restrictive variables is explored.  
Results show that there is a negative correlation significant at the 1% level between CREO and 
cash + interesting bearing securities, whereby firms with high cash ratios would tend to own less 
CREO. An alternative view is that firms with high CREO have lower cash ratios, as excess cash 
may have been used to re-invest in CREO. The negative correlation cuts across most industry 
classes. Table 5.3 shows that there exists a negative correlation between cash-holdings and 
corporate real-estate holdings significant at the 1% level.  This supports hypothesis 2 that there 
exists a negative correlation between corporate real-estate ownership and cash + interest-bearing 
ratios. 
The correlation between accounts receivables and CREO is positive albeit close to zero and 
insignificant. Across industry classifications there is variation in correlation coefficients which 
alternates between positive and negative; hence the relation between accounts receivables and 
CREO cannot be ascertained. 
According to correlation results between Shariah-restrictive variables, there is a strong 
statistically significant positive relationship between leverage and CREO. A high-leveraged firm 
would own more CREO; from which an interesting question thus arises.  If Shariah-compliant 




firms are restricted in leverage (leverage has a positive relationship with CREO), would this 
affect CREO and to what extent would the returns of firms be affected? Past literature shows a 
negative relationship with CREO and returns. 
This question is thus explored in the next sub-section. These results show that the Shariah-
compliant variables have a significant relationship with corporate real-estate ownership.  In some 
instances the relationship is positive in the cash of leverage and negative in the case of cash-
holding.  
Table 5.3: Correlation coefficients of corporate real-estate ownership and Shariah-
compliant restrictive variables 
Table 5.3 depicts correlation coefficients between corporate real-estate ownership and the Jensen 
Alpha (α), Beta (β), Debt Ratio (DR), Cash Ratio (CR) and Accounts Receivables (AR) of 
Shariah-compliant firms. Correlation coefficients marked with ***, **,* are statistically 
significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. 
  Return Risk SC Variables 














Mining/Oil & Gas 
Extraction 
171 -0.22*** 0.06 0.76*** -0.16** -0.11 
Building and Heavy 
Construction 
25 -0.09 -0.18 0.35* -0.08 0.57*** 
Textiles and Apparels 27 0.09 -0.13 0.37* -0.21 -0.20 
Lumber, wood and 
furniture products 
55 -0.14 0.06 0.70*** -0.25* -0.17 
Chemical & Allied 
Products 
75 -0.03 -0.01 0.23*** 0.00 0.34*** 
Rubber and Leather 
Products 
343 -0.20 0.03 0.85*** -0.28* -0.04 
Materials Industry 300 0.02 0.05 0.57*** -0.18*** 0.07 
Electronic and 
Electrical equipment 




122 -0.08 -0.05 0.50*** -0.06 0.18*** 
Communications 122 0.18 -0.16 0.67*** -0.56*** 0.18 
Electric, Gas 16 0.23 0.21 0.51*** 0.02 -0.03 








Table 5.4 shows the multivariate regressions between beta and CREO, in aggregate terms; two 
techniques are developed to measure CREO as seen in Deng and Gyourko (2000). In the first 
method a continuous form in measuring CREO is computed, while the second method involves 
the measurement of CREO with the dichotomous dummy variable in which firms with CREO 
higher than the median CREO takes a value of 1.  
In the multivariate model in Table 5.4, beta is the dependent variable and is run on CREO 
including other variables such as size of the firm, leverage, cash + interesting bearing securities 
and poor-performing firms which is a dummy variable in which firms which experience a 10% 
level drop in market capitalisation within the sample period investigated takes the value of 1. 
In the multivariate regressions there is a control for industry-fixed effects and yearly effects, the 
researcher furthers the analysis to include regressions on each industry, and the regression is run 
on 10 industries for which there are sufficient data to carry out the analysis.  
Before the correlations between CREO and beta (risk) in the multivariate results are addressed, 
the results of other independent control variables in the model are discussed.  
Durable & Non-
Durable Goods 
62 -0.01 0.15 0.81*** -0.12 -0.05 
Apparel & Accessory 
Stores 
67 -0.03 0.08 0.67*** -0.27*** 0.39*** 
Eating and Drinking 
Retail 
41 -0.28* -0.20 0.56*** -0.24 -0.16 
Business Services 347 0.03 -0.04 0.18*** -0.02 0.09 
Health Services 41 -0.44*** -0.08 0.66*** -0.31** 0.46*** 
Lab, Medical and 
Opth Instruments 
195 -0.01 -0.00 0.58*** -0.06 0.24*** 
Retail Stores 31 -0.49*** 0.01 0.74*** -0.13 0.43** 
All Sectors 2538 -0.029 -0.04** 0.48*** -0.06*** 0.02 




Size is measured as the log of market capitalisation of each Shariah-compliant firm: in aggregate 
terms there is a negative significant correlation between beta and size - the larger the firms the 
less risky they are. The result is evident among all industries investigated excluding apparel and 
accessory stores, which show a positive insignificant correlation.  
Leverage is measured by the ratio of total debt to common shares outstanding multiplied by 
share price. The coefficient of leverage in aggregate terms is negative and insignificant for all 
Shariah firms but significant for firms with high real-estate concentration. The results show that 
firms with high leverage tend to be more low-risk. The ratio cash + interesting bearing securities 
to market capitalisation are positive and significantly correlated to beta (risk). There is a 
significant positive correlation with CREO and poor performance; poor performance is measured 
as the dummy variable, firms which experience a 10% level drop in market capitalisation within 
the sample period investigated takes the value of 1. The inclusion of this variable increased the r-
squared; in addition, firms that have lost market capitalisation may be disposing of their CREO 
in bad times, so it is important the researcher controls for this to prevent misspecifications in the 
model.  
The correlation coefficient for CREO in explaining risk of firms is negative but statistically 
insignificant statistically insignificant, however it is generally found that when the correlation 
across industry classifications is examined, quite a number of the industries have a positive and 
insignificant relationship with beta. Therefore, although there is a negative and insignificant 
relationship between beta and CREO, this correlation is inconsistent with Shariah-compliant 
firms.   
 
 





Table 5.4: Second Stage least-squares regression output 
Table 5.4 depicts the model in which beta from the first stage regression is the dependent 
variable, the independent variables include CREO which is the corporate real-estate 
ownership ratio measured by property, plant and equipment to total assets, Size is the log of 
the end of year market capitalisation, Debt is the ratio of total debt to common share 
outstanding multiplied by share price, and Cash is measured by the ratio cash + interest 
bearing securities by market capitalisation. Poor performance is a dummy variable in which 
unit value 1 is given to any firm which drops10% in market capitalisation within the period 
investigated. 




A. Beta Overall -0.13 -0.22*** -0.08 1.25***  0.05 
A. Beta Overall -0.16 -0.15*** 0.00 1.96*** 0.23*** 0.07 
CREO>50% -0.01 -0.22*** -0.12* 1.31***  0.05 
CREO>50% -0.03 -0.15*** -0.04 2.02*** 0.23*** 0.07 
Mining/Oil & Gas 
Extraction 
0.00 0.00 0.09 1.09  -0.01 
Rubber and Leather 
Products 
1.29 -0.05 -0.84 1.17  -0.10 
Materials Industry 0.40 -0.15 0.01 1.77**  0.03 
Electronic and 
Electrical equipment 
0.50 -0.22* 0.22 1.24  0.04 
Transport,  -0.12 -0.26** -0.06 2.45**  0.04 
Communications -0.54 -0.05 0.59 2.49  -0.06 
Durable & Non-
Durable Goods 
0.02 -0.47* 0.17 -0.10  0.02 
Apparel & 
Accessory Stores 
1.63 0.09 -0.71 2.30  0.00 
Business Services -0.58 -0.033** -0.38 -0.86  0.00 
Lab, Medical and 
Opth Instruments 
-0.05 -0.29 -0.15 5.21***  0.07 
 
The model in Table 5.4 is replicated in Table 5.5; however firm outperformance (alpha) is the 
dependent variable. In aggregate terms there is a flat or zero correlation between CREO and the 
idiosyncratic component of Shariah-compliant firms. The empirical result refutes hypothesis 3 
and is contrary to the study of Brounen and Eichholtz (2005) which finds a negative significant 
correlation with corporate real-estate ownership and the idiosyncratic component of return. 




These results may differ for several reasons, one of which is that the authors use an international 
dataset consisting of nine countries. 
 
In the second model the dichotomous variable in which firms with CREO (CREO>50%) higher 
than the median take the unit value 1 is included.  
The results in the US equities context can be compared to the study of Deng and Gyourko 
(2000), on the role corporate real estate plays in the idiosyncratic component of a firm’s return 
with US equities. The results in the study are similar to the observations here that there is an 
insignificant correlation with CREO and idiosyncratic component of return (alpha); however the 
study finds a significant negative correlation with alpha and firms with higher concentration of 
CREO (above sample median). The hypothesis that Shariah firms with higher concentration of 
real estate have a significant negative relationship with alpha is tested; however the test rejects 
the hypothesis - Shariah-compliant firms tend to show have an insignificant correlation between 
firms with a high concentration of real estate and return. 
Table 5.5: Second Stage least-squares regression output 
Table 5.5 depicts the model in which alpha from the first stage regression is the dependent variable.  The 
independent variables include CREO which is the corporate real-estate ownership ratio measured by 
property, plant and equipment to total assets, Size is the log of the end-of-year market capitalisation, Debt 
is the ratio of total debt to common share outstanding multiplied by share price, and Cash is measured by 
the ratio cash + interest bearing securities by market capitalisation. Poor performance is a dummy variable 
in which unit value 1 is given to any firm which drops10% in market capitalisation within the period 
investigated. 
 Variables 
 CREO Size Debt Cash  D.Beta  Poor  
Performance 
 
B. Alpha Overall -0.0044 0.00 -0.01 -0.03 0.00  0.02 
B. Alpha Overall -0.0083 0.00 -.01   -0.03 -0.01 -0.00 0.02 
CREO >50% 0.00 0.00 -0.01** -0.03 -0.004  0.02 
CREO >50% 0.00 0.00 -0.01 -0.03 -0.01 -0.00 0.02 
Mining/Oil & Gas 
Extraction 
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01   0.04 




Rubber and Leather 
Products 
-0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.03   -0.05 
Materials Industry 0.01 0.00 -0.01 -0.06**   0.04 
Electronic and 
Electrical equipment 
-0.05 0.01 0.01 -0.10   0.00 
Transport,  -0.02 0.00 0.00 -0.02   0.00 
Communications 0.03 0.01 -0.02 0.07   -0.05 
Durable & Non-
Durable Goods 
-0.03 0.01 0.01 0.05   -0.04 
Apparel & Accessory 
Stores 
0.01 0.00 -0.01 0.11**   0.00 
Business Services 0.02 0.01*  -0.09**   0.04 
Lab, Medical and 
Ophthalmic 
Instruments 
0.02 -0.01 -0.06 -0.06   -0.01 
 
In Table 5.6, two model specifications are run. Firstly, CREO with high and low beta and 
secondly, firms with a high CREO concentration  are examined. A firm is considered to have a 
high real-estate concentration if the CREO is higher than 0.9: 0.9 represents the commercial real-
estate risk as seen in Deng and Gyourko (2000). There is a negative correlation between 
idiosyncratic return and CREO in all CREO and risk interactions including low-risk firms. 
Similar to previous study the correlation between alpha and high-risk firms with low CREO is 
closer to zero, in contrast a return penalty is more evident in high-risk firms and in high-risk 
firms with high CREO, although there exists an insignificant correlation in Shariah-compliant 
firms unlike previous results in general firms which find a significant correlation between alpha 
and high-risk firms with high CREO (Deng and Gyourko 2000). Results in Table 5.6 show that 
hypothesis 4 is rejected; there is a flat relationship between outperformance and high-risk firms 









Table 5.6 Second stage Least-squares regression output 
The dependent variable is the idiosyncratic component of return. The pooled sample 
contains 1070 Shariah-compliant firms, and industry-specific fixed effects were 
estimated for all models. CREO Ratio * H Beta is the CREO variable interacted by a 
high beta dummy which indicates 1 if beta is higher than 0.9 which is the average 
level in the commercial real-estate industry, CREO Ratio * L Beta is the CREO beta 
interacted by low beta dummy variable which indicates 1 if beta is lower than 0.9. 
RC>50% * H Beta is the CREO dummy variable above median interacted by high 
beta dummy which indicates 1 if beta is higher than 0.9. RC>50% * L Beta is the 
CREO dummy variable below median interacted by low beta dummy variable which 
indicates 1 if beta is lower than 0.9. 
Variable Model 5 Model 6 
CREO Ratio * H Beta -0.0131  
CREO Ratio * L Beta -0.0010  
RC>50% * H Beta   -0.0001 
RC>50% * L Beta     0.0034 
Log Size  -0.0002 -0.0004 
Poor Performance  -0.0027 -0.0025 
Leverage -0.0096 -0.0118** 
Cash  -0.0294 -0.0237 
Constant 0.0247 0.0233 




In this section other techniques are employed to validate the results that, unlike general firms, the 
restrictions in Shariah-compliant firms may in fact have an effect on CREO, which may then 
have an effect on the significance of the return penalty often associated with CREO. In the initial 
analysis, Shariah-restrictive variables, specifically leverage and cash + interest bearing securities, 
are significantly correlated with corporate real estate ownership (CREO). An important question 
to answer is if the restriction of these variables does in fact affect corporate real-estate 
ownership. The importance of CREO in explaining the idiosyncratic component of returns has 
been explored in past literature. 




In the initial methodology, equity betas are employed; however the use of equity betas in the 
analysis could involve misspecifications due to the correlation between leverage and CREO and 
its influence on equity betas. Hence, for the robustness of the results, the use of asset betas as in 
Deng and Gyourko (2000) to proxy for systematic risk is employed. The estimation of asset beta 
carried out by Gyourko and Nelling (1996) is followed 
 
                      (6) 
 
In the formula above  is the asset beta to be estimated, D is total debt (long-term debt + short-
term liabilities), S is common shares outstanding, P is the share price,  is the debt beta of each 
firm (I assume debt beta of 0.20) and  is the equity beta of each firm which is estimated from 
equation 3. The result in Table 5.7 shows the estimation of the models in which asset betas are 
employed for high and low betas: the return penalty to increase slightly. However, findings show 
a statistical insignificance in the role that corporate real-estate ownership plays in explaining the 
idiosyncratic returns of Shariah-compliant firms. 
Table 5.7: Second stage least-squares regression output (Robustness) 
 
The dependent variable is the idiosyncratic component of return. The pooled sample 
contained 1070 Shariah-compliant firms. Industry-specific fixed effects were 
estimated for all models. Beta estimation in this Table 5.7 is the asset beta as seen in 
Gyourko and Nelling (1996). CREO Ratio * H Beta is the CREO variable interacted 
by a high beta dummy which indicates 1 if beta is higher than 0.9 which is the average 
level in commercial real-estate industry, CREO Ratio * L Beta is the CREO beta 
interacted by low beta dummy variable which indicates 1 if beta is lower than 0.9. 
RC>50% * H Beta is the CREO dummy variable above median interacted by high 
beta dummy which indicates 1 if beta is higher than 0.9. RC>50% * L Beta is the 
CREO dummy variable below median interacted by low beta dummy variable which 
indicates 1 if beta is lower than 0.9. 
Variable Model 5 Model 6 




CREO Ratio * H Beta -0.0246  
CREO Ratio * L Beta -0.0044  
RC>50% * H Beta   -0.0043 
RC>50% * L Beta   0.0029 
Log Size  -0.000 -0.0001 
Poor Performance  -0.0027 -0.0028 
Leverage -0.0098* -0.0110 
Cash  -0.0274 -0.0218 
Constant 0.0144 0.0095 
 0.02 0.02 





Prior studies have shown a negative relationship between corporate real-estate holdings and firm 
performance (risk-adjusted returns). These assertions are examined in Shariah-compliant firms 
and this study finds an insignificant negative relationship and a flat relationship (coefficients 
close to zero) between CREO and the idiosyncratic component of returns.  
Shariah-compliant firms differ from general firms in several ways including limitations in 
business activities and. more importantly; they are restricted in financial ratios which must not 
exceed 33%.  These financial ratios include leverage, cash + interesting bearing securities and 
account receivables. Shariah-compliant restrictive variables including leverage and cash are 
significantly correlated with corporate real-estate ownership. Leverage has a positive and 
significant correlation with CREO. These restrictions in leverage may reduce CREO in Shariah-
compliant firms, and significantly reduce the role that CREO has in the returns of Shariah-
compliant firms. 
In 10 major industries investigated there is a positive correlation with CREO and alpha 
(outperformance) and in two industries there is a flat correlation.  The study finds a negative 
correlation in only three industries.  
The results show that corporate real estate holdings of Shariah-compliant firms do not have any 
effect on the outperformance of firms’ returns, although CREO generally decreases the exposure 
Shariah-compliant firms to risk. The explanation for this is that the combination of the activities 
of these firms (industry classification) and the Shariah financial restrictions has an implication in 
the significance of high corporate real-estate ownership relating to lower returns.  
The general rule of thumb is that corporate real-estate ownership decreases return of the firm, 
these assertions may not apply in some cases, specifically in Shariah-compliant firms. The 
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results of Brounen and Eichholtz (2005) are echoed in this study - that the sector in which a firm 
is active can skew the results in the negative relationship between CREO and firms’ returns, as 
this is evident in Shariah-compliant firms.  
Furthermore, an investigation into Shariah-compliant firms in an international context is 
required; this would validate the results that corporate real-estate ownership plays no role in 






























Studies on Shariah compliance in real-estate investments are rare and scant, and prior studies 
have mostly been qualitative in nature due to data limitations. The main argument of this thesis is 
that significant statistical differences exist between Shariah-compliant real-estate firms and 
conventional real-estate firms in the area of capital structure choice, firm risks and firm 
performance (returns), and these differences are as a result of compliance to Shariah law, 
primarily observed investment universe and quantitative screenings that Shariah firms adhere to. 
This research focuses on firms which operate as well as invest in real estate to generate revenue 
and utilise real estate as a factor of production including real-estate developers, real-estate 
investment firms, real-estate investment trusts and general firms. 
In general, this thesis has contributed to the understanding of Shariah-compliant real-estate 
investments particularly in the compliance of Shariah principles from a real-estate investment 
perspective. The main contribution of this thesis is a provision of evidence of these significant 
differences and an attempt to identify the causality of these significant differences. To the best of 
the author’s knowledge, the four essays in this thesis comprise the first comprehensive study of 
the effects of Shariah compliance from a real-estate perspective.  
This thesis finds that there exist significant differences between Shariah-compliant real-estate 
firms and conventional real estate firms. The significant differences are as a result of the inherent 
characteristics (quantitative and qualitative screenings) which are peculiar to Shariah-compliant 
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firms. In other word, this thesis provides strong empirical evidence from the GCC and the United 
States. Findings from the GCC show that differences exist between the characteristics of Shariah 
and conventional real-estate investments. Islamic firms tend to use less leverage; this is attributed 
to poor access to the debt market and Islamic growth firms employing less leverage. Furthermore 
in Chapter 4, there is a consensus regardless of region that the risks inherent in Shariah-
compliant REITs affect returns. Finally the ownership of real estate by Shariah-compliant firms 
does not have an effect on performance; this is contrary to the effect which CREO has on 
conventional firms. In general, this thesis concludes that there are significant differences in 
Shariah-compliant firms in the areas of the use of leverage, risks and performance (returns).  
5.2	Summary	of	Main	Findings		
 
The first essay shows evidence of the differences between Shariah-compliant real-estate 
investments and conventional real-estate investments. Since there are few studies in this area, it 
was necessary to carry out a survey from Shariah-compliant real-estate practitioners in the Gulf 
Cooperation Council, the Islamic finance centre of the world. The survey provides evidence on 
the close relationship between the Islamic bank (lenders) and Shariah-compliant real-estate firms 
(borrowers) from pre-construction to post-construction, as well as the mismatch in the 
instruments demanded and offered by Shariah-compliant real-estate firms and Islamic banks 
respectively. More importantly this survey establishes a framework for the research questions in 
subsequent essays in this thesis.  
The second essay provides for the first time empirical evidence which highlights the role that 
Shariah compliance plays in the leverage decisions of Shariah-compliant firms. The empirical 
work provides evidence that Shariah-compliant real-estate firms are less levered than their 
conventional counterparts. Furthermore, less leverage in Shariah-compliant real-estate firms in 
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comparison to conventional real-estate firms can be explained by two hypotheses; these are the 
family-owned hypothesis and the access to debt market hypothesis. This is the first time a study 
has explored the capital structure choice of Shariah-compliant real-estate firms in the Gulf 
Cooperation Council.  
The third essay undertakes an empirical analysis of the relationships between idiosyncratic risks 
and returns of Shariah-compliant real-estate investment trusts. There exists a positive and 
significant relationship between idiosyncratic risks of Shariah-compliant returns, and the 
differences in statistical significance exist based on the compliance standards of Shariah-
compliant real-estate investment trusts. Furthermore, the persistence in the relationship between 
idiosyncratic risks and firm returns exist due to the limitations in the investable universe of 
Shariah investors. The results are also robust for application to Shariah-compliant real-estate 
investment trusts in Malaysia. First, the contribution in this essay is that idiosyncratic risks are 
important in explaining the portfolio returns of a Shariah real-estate investor and is less 
important to the portfolio of a conventional real-estate investor. Furthermore, the Shariah 
compliance standard which Shariah-compliant real-estate investors adopt may influence the 
statistically significant relationship between the idiosyncratic risks and firms returns of the 
portfolio of a Shariah-compliant investor. 
The fourth essay highlights the role that corporate real estate ownership plays in explaining the 
risk and return of Shariah-compliant firms. Contrary to assertions in previous studies that a 
negative relationship between corporate real-estate ownership and firm returns exists, in Shariah-
compliant firms there exists an insignificant, flat relationship. These results still hold when 
Shariah-compliant variables and industry dummies are controlled for which may influence the 
results. The role of corporate real-estate ownership in explaining outperformance according to 
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industry classification of Shariah-compliant firms is examined, and a positive significant 
relationship is found in most industries with sufficient data. First, in aggregate terms, Shariah-
compliant investors do not need to be concerned about real-estate ownership, as it has no role in 
explaining firm performance (returns). Second, in most industry classifications which are 




The findings of the first essay from the survey of senior executives of the Gulf Cooperation 
Council show that Shariah-compliant real estate investment differs from conventional real-estate 
investment particularly in financing of real-estate investments, portfolio selection and regulatory 
compliance. Another key result from the findings implies that Islamic banks tend to be partners 
rather than financiers during pre-construction to post-construction; this thus reduces moral 
hazard and agency costs as lenders are able to monitor borrowers before, during and after the 
project.  
The results also highlight the mismatch in the demand and supply in financial instruments; 
lenders prefer cost-plus financing such as murabaha while borrowers prefer profit- and loss-
sharing instruments such as musharaka. From a policy and regulatory point of view, more needs 
to be done to encourage the issuance of profit- and loss-sharing instruments by Islamic banks as 
this is more reflective of compliance to Shariah law.  
The findings of the second essay imply that Shariah-compliant real-estate firms are under-
levered in comparison to conventional real-estate firms in the same region and this under-
leverage can be associated to the fact that Shariah-compliant real-estate firms tend to be family-
owned; these firms tend to borrow less to prevent the loss of control, and Shariah-compliant 
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firms tend to have poor access to the debt market perhaps due to their longevity in the market 
since IPO inception, as Shariah-compliant firms tend to be relatively younger. From a practical 
point of view, it is true that Shariah-compliant firms are less levered but this is not as a result of 
compliance to Shariah principles per se but as a result of other factors as highlighted earlier. 
Leverage is a fundamental source of financing, particularly for the growth and increase in value 
of firms, and Shariah-compliant firms can do with more leverage use; however this issue may 
have a deeper underlying factor: as highlighted in essay one, there is a mismatch between 
Shariah-compliant instruments demanded and offered by lenders (Islamic banks) and borrowers 
(real-estate firms). This issue may be resolved if banking regulations review policy and require 
Islamic banks to have a minimum percentage which is dedicated to profit- and loss-sharing 
instruments. This may encourage Shariah-compliant firms to borrow more from Islamic banks.  
The results also show that general investors who wish to have a mixed asset portfolio can resolve 
adverse selection problems if they prefer firms with higher leverage to reduce agency costs as 
they can identify such Shariah-compliant firms through family ownership and through debt 
market access.  
The third essay highlights that idiosyncratic risk increases in the portfolio of Shariah REIT 
investors (GCC standards) and this risk is priced cross-sectionally. This result is persistent and 
consistent in US Shariah-compliant portfolios which are constructed in line with GCC standards 
of Shariah compliance. The results in aggregate terms imply that for Shariah investors the choice 
of Shariah compliance (GCC or Malaysian Standards) does have an impact in pricing the returns 
of stock. The results also find that the portfolio of Shariah-compliant investors who have more 
restrictions in their investable universe were more rewarded in outperformance (alpha) of the 
portfolio in comparison to the less restrictive portfolios. The result is also critical for central 
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banks and monetary associations that implement Shariah-compliant regulations in the 
development of Shariah-compliant real-estate investment trusts in their home country. The 
decisions of central banks and monetary associations could have an effect on the inflow of funds 
into real-estate investment trusts depending on the Shariah standards implemented looking from 
a financial gains point of view.  
Contrary to previous studies which suggest that firms with high corporate real-estate ownership 
tend to have lower returns and are less risky, results in the fourth essay show that while Shariah-
compliant firms with high corporate real-estate ownership tend to be less risky, and that the 
claim to lower returns is insignificant, as there is an insignificant flat relationship between 
outperformance and corporate real-estate ownership in Shariah-compliant firms. The 
implications for this result is that whereas general investors are expected to consider real-estate 
ownership as it decreases the return of firms, Shariah-compliant investors need not worry about 
the impact of real-estate ownership on firms’ return. This result could be mainly due to the 
industry classifications of Shariah-compliant firms rather than the restrictions in financial ratios. 
Hence Shariah-compliant investors can make investment decisions based on industry 
classification, as the study finds that the higher the CREO in some industry classifications the 
higher the firm returns.  
5.4	Limitations	and	Future	Research		
 
Every research has its limitations and research is an ongoing exercise. In this section the 
limitations of this thesis through each essay, and recommendations, are highlighted for future 
research in the area of Shariah-compliant real-estate investments.  
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In the first essay on the survey of practitioners, a limitation is the number of practitioners that 
were interviewed.  Although this essay is not an empirical work, the results would have more 
validity if more practitioners were interviewed.   
The second essay on the leverage choice of Shariah-compliant firms has several limitations. The 
empirical work focuses on total debt of firms; however the study is unable to differentiate the 
types of debts - i.e. long term, short term and lines of credit - due to data limitation which would 
have perhaps improved the research study. Secondly the study is only able to test the empirical 
study on six years which may fall a bit short of the usual 10 years for an empirical study. In 
addition to this the empirical model in essay two only looks from the demand side perspective 
without controlling for the supply side of leverage from the bank’s perspective. The study is 
unable to control for the supply side due to data limitation from collecting bank-related variables. 
For future work, it would be a contribution to examine the relationship between leverage (long 
term, short term, lines of credit) and Shariah compliance if these data are available.  
In the third essay the study employs synthetic-constructed Shariah-compliant real-estate 
investment trusts in the United States due to data limitation in employing authentic Shariah-
compliant firms. For example, Shariah-compliant real-estate investment trusts are scant and rare: 
at completion of this research, only three exist in Malaysia and one in Singapore; hence the use 
of synthetic constructed Shariah portfolios was imperative. Although there was little choice in 
the creation of synthetic portfolios for the empirical test, however the robustness tests included 
authentic Shariah-compliant Malaysian REITs.  
This thesis has narrowly focused on Shariah-compliant real-estate investments from a Shariah 
real-estate investor’s perspective; it would be interesting for future work to look into the 
diversification benefits of Shariah-compliant real-estate investments in a mixed asset portfolio. 
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This would be particularly interesting to conventional investors who may be interested in 







Abdullah, F., Hassan, T., and Mohamad, S. “Investigation of Performance of Malaysian Islamic  
              Unit Trust Funds.” Managerial finance, Vol. 33, No.2 (2007): 142-153. 
Ahmad, Z., and Ibrahim, H. “A Study of the Performance of the KLSE Syariah Index.” 
Malaysian Management Journal, Vol. 6, No. 1 & 2 (2002): 25-34. 
Ahmed, B. “Issues in Islamic Corporate Finance: Capital Structure in Firms.” IRTI Research 
Paper Series, No. 70 (2007): 1-48. 
Aggarwal, R.K., and T. Yousef. "Islamic Banks and Investment Financing." Journal of Money, 
Credit and Banking, Vol. 32, No. 1  (2000): 93-120. 
Albaity, M., and Ahmad. "Performance of Syariah and Composite Indices: Evidence from Bursa 
Malaysia." Asian Academy of Management Journal of Accounting and Finance. Vol.4, 
No.1 (2008): 23-43.  
Ang, A., Hodrick, R. J., Xing, Y., & Zhang, X. "The Cross‐Section of Volatility and Expected  
           Returns." The Journal of Finance, Vol. 61, No.1 (2006), 259-299. 
Ang, A., R.J. Hodrick, Y. Xing, and X. Zhang. "High Idiosyncratic Volatility and Low Returns: 
International and Further US Evidence." Journal of Financial Economics Vol. 91, No. 1 
(2009): 1-23. 
Ang, J.S., J.H. Chua, and J.J. McConnell. "The Administrative Costs of Corporate Bankruptcy: 
A Note." The Journal of Finance Vol. 37, No. 1 (1982): 219-226. 
Arbel, A., S. Carvell, and P. Strebel. "Giraffes, Institutions and Neglected Firms." Financial 





Baker, M., R. Greenwood, and J. Wurgler. "The Maturity of Debt Issues and Predictable 
Variation in Bond Returns." Journal of Financial Economics Vol. 70, No. 2 (2003): 261-
291. 
Baker, M., and J. Wurgler. "Market Timing and Capital Structure." The Journal of Finance, Vol. 
57, No. 1 (2002): 1-32. 
Barber, B.M., and T. Odean. "Trading Is Hazardous to Your Wealth: The Common Stock 
Investment Performance of Individual Investors." The Journal of Finance, Vol.55, No. 2 
(2000): 773-806. 
Barclay, M., C.W. Smith, and E. Morellec. "On the Debt Capacity of Growth Options." Journal 
of Business, Vol.79, No. 1 (2006): 37-59. 
Bauer, R., Koedijk, K., & Otten, R. "International Evidence on Ethical Mutual Fund 
Performance and Investment Style." Journal of Banking & Finance, Vol. 29, No. 7 
(2005), 1751-1767. 
Baxter, Nevins D. "Leverage, Risk of Ruin and the Cost of Capital." The Journal of Finance, 
Vol. 22, No. 3 (1967): 395-403. 
Bayless, M.E., and J.D. Diltz. "Securities Offerings and Capital Structure Theory." Journal of 
Business Finance & Accounting, Vol.21, No. 1 (1994): 77-91. 
Black, F. "Capital Market Equilibrium with Restricted Borrowing." Journal of Business, Vol. 45, 
No. 3  (1972): 444-455. 
Blume, M.E., J. Crockett, and I. Friend. "Stock Ownership: Characteristics and Trends." 
Wharton School Rodney L. White Center for Financial Research, Vol. 54, (1974): 16-40. 
Booth, L., V. Aivazian, A. Demirguc-Kunt, and V. Maksimovic. "Capital Structures in 





Brealey, R.A., and Myers S.C. "Principles of Corporate Finance, international edition". 
McGraw-Hill, Boston, MA (2003). 
Brockman, P., and M. Schutte. "Is Idiosyncratic Volatility Priced? The International Evidence." 
Unpublished working paper. University of Missouri U Columbia  (2009). 
Brounen, D., and P. Eichholtz. "Capital Structure Theory: Evidence from European Property 
Companies' Capital Offerings." Real Estate Economics. Vol. 29, No. 4 (2001): 615-632. 
Brounen, D., and P. M. A. Eichholtz. "Corporate Real Estate Ownership Implications: 
International Performance Evidence." Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics, Vol 
30, No. 4 (2005): 429-45. 
Campbell, J.Y., M. Lettau, B.G. Malkiel, and Y. Xu. "Have Individual Stocks Become More 
Volatile? An Empirical Exploration of Idiosyncratic Risk." The Journal of Finance, Vol. 
56, No. 1 (2001): 1-43. 
Capozza, D.R., and P.J. Seguin. "Inside Ownership, Risk Sharing and Tobin's Q‐Ratios: 
Evidence from Reits." Real Estate Economics, Vol.31, No. 3 (2003): 367-404. 
Carhart, M.M. "On Persistence in Mutual Fund Performance." The Journal of Finance, Vol 52, 
No. 1 (1997): 57-82. 
Chaudhry, M.K., S. Maheshwari, and J.R. Webb. "Reits and Idiosyncratic Risk." Journal of Real 
Estate Research, Vol. 26, No. 2 (2004): 207-22. 
Cheong, K., and C.S. Kim. "Corporate Real Estate Holdings and the Value of the Firm in 
Korea." Journal of Real Estate Research, Vol. 13, No. 3 (1997): 273-95. 
Dar, H.A., and J.R. Presley. "Lack of Profit Loss Sharing in Islamic Banking: Management and 






Deng, Y., and J. Gyourko. "Real Estate Ownership by Non-Real Estate Firms: An Estimate of 
the Impact on Firm Returns." Unpublished Working Paper, Wharton School  (1999). 
Diamond, D.W. "Reputation Acquisition in Debt Markets." The Journal of Political Economy, 
Vol. 99, No. 4 (1989): 828-62. 
Diltz, J. D. "Does Social Screening affect Portfolio Performance?" The Journal of Investing, Vol. 
4, No.1, (1995): 64-69. 
Douglas, G.W. "Risk in the Equity Markets: An Empirical Appraisal of Market Efficiency." Yale 
University, (1967). 
Eiling, E. "Can Non-Tradable Assets Explain the Apparent Premium for Idiosyncratic Risk? The 
Case of Industry Specific Human-capital." Unpublished working paper, Tilburg 
University, Netherlands. 2006. 
El-Gamal, M.A. "Interest and the Paradox of Contemporary Islamic Law and Finance." Fordham 
Intrnational Law Journal. Vol. 27, No. 1 (2003): 108-149. 
Engle, R.F., and C. Mustafa. "Implied Arch Models from Options Prices." Journal of 
Econometrics, Vol. 52, No. 1 (1992): 289-311. 
Faishal, M., and S. Eng. "Shariah Compliance in Real Estate Investment." Journal of Real Estate 
Portfolio Management, Vol. 14, No. 4 (2008): 401-14. 
Fama, E.F., and K.R. French. "Common Risk Factors in the Returns on Stocks and Bonds." 
Journal of Financial Economics, Vol. 33, No. 1 (1993): 3-56. 
———. "The Cross-Section of Expected Stock Returns." The Journal of Finance, Vol. 47, No. 2 
(1992): 427-65. 






———. "Testing Trade‐Off and Pecking Order Predictions About Dividends and Debt." Review 
of Financial Studies, Vol. 15, No. 1 (2002): 1-33. 
Fama, E. F., & MacBeth, J. D. "Risk, Return, and Equilibrium: Empirical tests." The Journal of 
Political Economy, Vol. 81. 607-636. 
Faulkender, M., and M. A. Petersen. "Does the Source of Capital Affect Capital Structure?." 
Review of Financial Studies, Vol. 19, No. 1 (2006): 45-79. 
Feng, Z., C. Ghosh, and CF Sirmans. "On the Capital Structure of Real Estate Investment Trusts 
(Reits)." The Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics, Vol. 34, No. 1 (2007): 81-
105. 
Forte, G., and Miglietta, F. "Islamic Mutual Funds as Faith-based Funds in a Socially 
Responsible Context." (2007): 1-27. 
Fu, F. "Idiosyncratic Risk and the Cross-Section of Expected Stock Returns." Journal of 
Financial Economics, Vol. 91, No. 1 (2009): 24-37. 
Geczy, C. C., Stambaugh, R. F., & Levin, D. "Investing in socially responsible mutual funds." 
Rodney L. White Center for Financial Research, The Wharton School, University of 
Pennsylvania. 2003. 
Ghanem Al-Najjar. "Decision Making Process in Kuwait: The land acquisition policy as a case 
study.” University of Exeter. 1984 
Ghoul, Wafica, and Paul Karam. "MRI and SRI mutual funds: A comparison of Christian, 
Islamic (Morally Responsible Investing), and Socially Responsible Investing (SRI) 





Giambona, E., Harding, J. P., & Sirmans, C. F. "Explaining the variation in REIT Capital 
Structure: the Role of Asset Liquidation Value." Real Estate Economics, Vol. 36, No.1, 
111-137. 
Girard, E., Hassan, M. "Is there a cost to faith-based investing: evidence from FTSE  
Islamic indices." Journal of Investing, Vol. 17, No.4. (2008): 112-121. 
Goetzmann, W.N., and A. Kumar. "Why Do Individual Investors Hold under-Diversified 
Portfolios?." Yale School of Management Working Papers  (2005). 
Goyal, A., and P. Santa‐Clara. "Idiosyncratic Risk Matters!" The Journal of Finance, Vol. 58, 
No. 3 (2003): 975-1008. 
Graham, J. R., M. L. Lemmon, and J. S. Schallheim. "Debt, Leases, Taxes, and the Endogeneity 
of Corporate Tax Status." Journal of Finance, Vol. 53, No. 1 (1998): 131-62. 
Grais, W., and M. Pellegrini. "Corporate Governance in Institutions Offering Islamic Financial 
Services: Issues and Options."  World Bank Publications,Vol. 40, No.52 (2006): 1-46. 
Guerard Jr, John B, "Is There a Cost to Being Socially Responsible in Investing?" The Journal of 
Investing, Vol. 6, No. 2 (1997): 11-18. 
Gyourko, J., and D.B. Keim. "What Does the Stock Market Tell Us About Real Estate Returns?" 
Real Estate Economics, Vol. 20, No. 3 (2003): 457-85. 
Gyourko, J., and E. Nelling. "Systematic Risk and Diversification in the Equity Reit Market." 
Real Estate Economics, Vol. 24, No. 4 (1996): 493-515. 
Hakim, S and Rashidan, M. “Risk and return of Islamic Stock Market. Economic Research 
Forum Annual Meeting, Sharjah, UAE, 2002. 
HM Treasury. "The Development of Islamic Finance in the UK: The Government's Perspective." 





Hoepner, A. G., Rammal, H.G., & Rezec, M. " Islamic Mutual funds' Financial Performance and  
            International Investment Style: Evidence from 20 countries." The European Journal of  
            Finance, Vol. 17 , No. 9-10 (2007), 829-850. 
Hovakimian, A., T. Opler, and S. Titman. "The Debt-Equity Choice." Journal of Financial and 
Quantitative Analysis, Vol. 36, No. 1 (2001): 1-24. 
Howe, J. S., & Shilling, J. D. "Capital structure theory and REIT security offerings." The Journal 
of Finance, Vol. 43, No. 4 (1988): 983-993. 
Hussain, M., Islam, M. M., Gunasekran, A., & Maskooki, K. "Accounting standards and 
practices of financial institutions in GCC countries." Managerial Auditing Journal, Vol. 
17, No. 7 (2002): 350–362. 
Hussein, K "Ethical Investment: Empirical Evidence from FTSE Islamic Index." Islamic 
Economic Studies, Vol. 12 (2004): 21-40. 
Hussein, K., and Omran, M. "Ethical Investment: Empirical Evidence Revisited: Evidence from 
Dow Jones Islamic indices." Journal of Investing, Vol.14, No.3 (2005): 105-124. 
Ibrahim, M.F., O.S. Eng, and A. Parsa. "International Articles: Shariah Property Investment in 
Asia." Journal of Real Estate Literature, Vol. 17, No. 2 (2009): 231-48. 
Ibrahim, M.F., S.E. Ong, and K. Akinsomi. "Shariah Compliant Real Estate Development 
Financing and Investment in the Gulf Cooperation Council." Journal of Property 
Investment & Finance, Vol. 30, No. 2 (2012): 175-197. 
Iqbal, Z. "Islamic Financial Systems." Finance and Development 34 (1997): 42-45. 
Iqbal, Z., and H. Tsubota. "Emerging Islamic Capital Markets." Islamic Finance Review, 






Jalilvand, A., and R.S. Harris. "Corporate Behavior in Adjusting to Capital Structure and 
Dividend Targets: An Econometric Study." Journal of Finance, Vol.39, No.1 (1984): 
127-45. 
Jegadeesh, N., and S. Titman. "Returns to Buying Winners and Selling Losers: Implications for 
Stock Market Efficiency." The Journal of Finance, Vol. 48, No. 1 (1993): 65-91. 
Jensen, M. C. "Agency Costs of Free Cash Flow, Corporate-Finance, and Takeovers." American 
Economic Review, Vol. 76, No. 2 (1986): 323-29. 
Jensen, M.C., and W.H. Meckling. "Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and 
Ownership Structure." Journal of Financial Economics, Vol. 3, No. 4 (1976): 305-60. 
Jobst, A. "The Economics of Islamic Finance and Securitization." IMF Working Papers (2007): 
1-35. 
Jones, C., and M. Rhodes-Kropf. "The Price of Diversifiable Risk in Venture Capital and Private 
Equity." Working Paper, Columbia University. (2003). 
Khaled, H and O. Mohammed, "Ethical Investment Revisited Evidence from Dow Jones Islamic 
Index." The Journal of Investing. Vol. 14, No. 3 (2005): 105 -206. 
Khan, M.M., and M.I. Bhatti. "Development in Islamic Banking: A Financial Risk-Allocation 
Approach." The Journal of Risk Finance, Vol. 9, No. 1 (2008): 40-51. 
Lee, Darren D., and Robert W. Faff. "Corporate sustainability performance and idiosyncratic 
risk: a global perspective." Financial Review, Vol. 44, No. 2 (2009): 213-237. 
Levy, H. "Equilibrium in an Imperfect Market: A Constraint on the Number of Securities in the 
Portfolio." The American economic review, Vol. 68, No. 4 (1978): 643-58. 
Linneman, P. Corporate Real Estate Strategies. Real Estate Center, Wharton School of the 





Lintner, J. "The Valuation of Risk Assets and the Selection of Risky Investments in Stock 
Portfolios and Capital Budgets." The Review of Economics and Statistics, Vol. 47, No. 1 
(1965): 13-37. 
Liow, K.H. "Corporate Real Estate and Stock Market Performance." The Journal of Real Estate 
Finance and Economics, Vol. 29, No. 1 (2004): 119-40. 
Luther, R. G., & J.Matatko. "The Performance of Ethical Unit Trusts: Choosing an Appropriate 
Benchmark." The British Accounting Review, Vol.26, No.1 (1994), 77-89. 
Machlica, D., and NB Borunch. "Managing Corporate Assets from a Long Term Perspective." 
Commercial Investment Real Estate Journal  (1989): 44-46. 
Malkiel, B.G., and Y. Xu. "Idiosyncratic Risk and Security Returns." University of Texas at 
Dallas (2002). 
Marsh, P. "The Choice between Equity and Debt: An Empirical Study." Journal of Finance, Vol. 
37, No. 1  (1982): 121-44. 
Marts, B.A., and F.A. Elayan. "Capital Structure and the Cost of Capital for Untaxed Firms: The 
Case of Reits." Real Estate Economics, Vol. 18, No. 1 (1990): 22-39. 
Mckinsey & Company. "Islamic Finance Interest Group, Islamic bank competitiveness report,  
            Exploring the wholesale banking opportunity", 13th World Islamic Banking Conference.   
            (2006) 
Merton, R.C. "A Simple Model of Capital Market Equilibrium with Incomplete Information." 
Journal of Finance, Vol. 42, No. 3 (1987): 483-510. 
Miles, Mike E., et al. "A Detailed Look at America’s Real Estate Wealth." Journal of Property 





Mishra, C.S., and D.L. McConaughy. "Founding Family Control and Capital Structure: The Risk 
of Loss of Control and the Aversion to Debt." Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice, 
Vol. 23, No.4 (1999): 53-64. 
Modigliani, F., and M.H. Miller. "The Cost of Capital, Corporation Finance and the Theory of 
Investment." The American economic review, Vol. 48, No. 3 (1958): 261-97. 
———. "Capital Structure Puzzle." Journal of Finance, Vol. 39, No. 3, (1984): 575-592. 
———. "Determinants of Corporate Borrowing." Journal of Financial Economics, Vol. 5, No. 2 
(1977): 147-75. 
Myers, S.C., and N.S. Majluf. "Corporate Financing and Investment Decisions When Firms 
Have Information That Investors Do Not Have." Journal of Financial Economics, Vol. 
13, No. 2 (1984): 187-221. 
Neelam Verjee. "UAE group starts Islamic property fund, The Sunday Times, April 12, 2006 
Nelson, D.B. "Conditional Heteroskedasticity in Asset Returns: A New Approach." 
Econometrica: Journal of the Econometric Society, Vol. 59, No.2  (1991): 347-70. 
Newell, G., and A. Osmadi. "The Development and Preliminary Performance Analysis of 
Islamic Reits in Malaysia." Journal of Property Research, Vol. 26, No. 4 (2009): 329-47. 
Ooi, J. "The Determinants of Capital Structure Evidence on Uk Property Companies." Journal of 
Property Investment & Finance, Vol.17, No. 5 (1999): 464-80. 
Ooi, J.T.L., J. Wang, and J.R. Webb. "Idiosyncratic Risk and Reit Returns." The Journal of Real 
Estate Finance and Economics, Vol. 38, No. 4 (2009): 420-42. 
Osmadi, A. "Reits: A New Property Dimension to Islamic Finance." Paper presented at the 14th 





Pagan, A.R., and G.W. Schwert. "Alternative Models for Conditional Stock Volatility." Journal 
of Econometrics, Vol. 45, No. 1 (1990): 267-90. 
Parsa, A., and A. McIntosh. "Shariah Property Investment: Developing an International 
Strategy." (2005). 
Petersen, M.A., and R.G. Rajan. "The Benefits of Lending Relationships: Evidence from Small 
Business Data." Journal of Finance, Vol. 49, No. 1  (1994): 3-37. 
Price Water House Coopers. "Global real estate now." Vol.10, No. 5 (2006) 
Rajan, R.G., L. Zingales, and J. Seward. "What Do We Know About Capital Structure?" Journal 
of Finance, Vol. 50, No. 5, (1995): 1421-1460. 
Ratings Intelligence Partners LLP. "Shariah Compliance for real estate stocks". 2008  
Ross, Stephen A. "The determination of financial structure: the incentive-signalling 
approach." The Bell Journal of Economics (1977): 23-40. 
Sadeghi, M. "Financial Performance of Shariah-Compliant Investment: Evidence from 
Malaysian Stock Market." International Research Journal of Finance and Economics, 
Issue 20 (2008): 15-26. 
Saif, I. The Oil Boom in the GCC Countries, 2002-2008: Old Challenges, Changing Dynamics. 
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2009. 
Sauer, David A. "The impact of Social-responsibility Screens on Investment Performance: 
Evidence from the Domini 400 Social Index and Domini Equity Mutual Fund." Review 
of Financial Economics, Vol. 6, No.2 (1997): 137-149. 
Sbeiti, W. "The Determinants of Capital Structure: Evidence from the GCC Countries." 





Seiler, S. J., A. Chantrath, and J. R. Webb. "Real Estate Ownership and the Risk and Return to 
Stockholders." Journal of Real Estate Research. Vol. 22, No.1 (2001), 199-212. 
Sharpe, W.F. "Capital Asset Prices: A Theory of Market Equilibrium under Conditions of Risk." 
Journal of Finance, Vol.19, No. 3 (1964): 425-42. 
Shleifer, A, and R. W. Vishny. "Liquidation Values and Debt Capacity: A Market Equilibruim 
Approach." Journal of Finance. Volume 47: 1343-1366. 
Smith, C.W., and R.L. Watts. "The Investment Opportunity Set and Corporate Financing, 
Dividend, and Compensation Policies." Journal of Financial Economics, Vol. 32, No. 3 
(1992): 263-92. 
Spiegel, M., Wang, X., 2006. "Cross Sectional Variation in Stock Returns Liquidity and 
Idiosyncratic Risk. Unpublished Working Paper. Yale University (2006). 
Titman, S., & Wessels, R. "The Determinants of Capital Structure Choice." The Journal of 
Finance, Vol. 43 No.1 (1988): 1-19. 
The Royal institution of Chartered Surveyors (RICS). King Sturge and London South Bank          
University. "Current Trends in Shariah Property Investment". RICS Research, London, 
United   Kingdom. (2006) 
Treasury, H.M. "The Development of Islamic Finance in the Uk: The Government's 
Perspective." Bank of England, London  (2008). 
Tuzel, S. "Corporate Real Estate Holdings and the Cross-Section of Stock Returns." Review of 
Financial Studies, Vol. 23, No. 6 (2010): 2268-2302. 
Warner, J.B. "Bankruptcy Costs: Some Evidence." Journal of Finance, Vol. 32, No. 2 (1977): 
337-47. 





































This  questionnaire  is  targeted  at  senior  representatives  of  major  international  firms  in  the  Gulf 
Cooperation Council  involved  in Real‐ estate Development,  Investment, and Real‐ estate Development 
Financing. 
 


















































































































































The customer and  the bank share  the  risk of any  investment on agreed  terms, and divide any profits 
between them. 
 
















out an  interest‐bearing  loan. The bank buys an  item and then sells  it on to the customer on a 
deferred basis 
 Istisna  is  contract  of  sale  of  specified  goods  to  be manufactured, with  an  obligation  on  the 
manufacturer to deliver them upon completion (i.e. commissioned manufacture) 
 












































































































































































Ijara/Ijara-wa-Iqtina: an Ijara is a leasing contract whereby the finance house leases an asset 
for a fee and for a specified period of time to its client. The bank (the owner of the asset) bears 
all the risk associated with ownership. The ijara can be structured as a lease-purchase contract in 
which case the lease payment may include part payment for the asset until the lease period ends; 
ownership then reverts from the bank to the customer. 
Sukuk: The Sukuk in recent years is a very popular Islamic instrument for the financing of real-
estate development and investment. Sukuk are Islamic bonds which are traded on capital 
markets. Sukuk are asset-backed and the bonds are backed by a profit-sharing arrangement, a 
loan or sale-leaseback arrangement. Investors own a part of the underlying asset and the asset 
serves as collateral for debt repayments (Jobst 2007).  
Murabaha: Is a contract in which the bank purchases a tangible asset on behalf of its customer 
from the supplier, the bank and its customer agree a pre-determined resale price based on cost 
plus mark-up price. The contract specifies if the bank collects payment by instalments or a lump 
sum upon maturity.  
Istisna: The Istisna is often used to finance long-term projects, and it is a popular form of 
financing in real-estate construction and development. The instrument is a pre-delivery financing 
and leasing instrument. In an Istisna contract, a contractor is willing to manufacture an asset for 
the client at a pre-determined amount, within a specified time. The Istisna often involves two 




from the bank or financier upon completion. The second contract is between the bank and the 
contractor, and this agreement involves the bank paying the contractor for building the asset. 
Mudaraba: Is an equity Islamic contract in which one party finances the project, in most cases, 
the bank and the other party (mudarib) provides the expertise in executing the project. Profits are 
shared based on agreements as specified in the contract whilst losses are borne by the financier 
except in cases where the mudarib has been deemed to be negligent. The mudaraba is based on 
profit and loss sharing, a key characteristic of Islamic finance principles. Islamic principles 
encourage investor to be partners in a business rather than function as a passive lender. The 
profit- and loss-sharing system is in contrast with the conventional system where the borrower 
pays the bank interests as well as the principal amount borrowed regardless of the success or 
failure of the venture. 
Musharaka: Is an equity Islamic contract in which the bank and a business partner contribute to 
finance a project in the form of a partnership. Ownership is based on the share contributed 
towards financing. In a musharaka contract, the profit or losses is distributed to the financing 
partner and the business partner according to a pre-determined ratio. 
Qard Hassan: An interest-free loan also referred to a benevolent loan. The borrower pays back 
the same amount which was initially borrowed from the financier without any interest payments. 
Islamic principles encourage the loan to be written-off if the borrower is having difficulties in 












1 AEP Investment Management, Saudi-Arabia 
2 Ameen Talib & Associates, Singapore 
3 Arab Banking Corporation, Bahrain 
4 Arcapita Bank, Bahrain 
5 CapitaLand Amanah, Singapore 
6 CapitaLand GCC Holdings, GCC  
7 CB Richard Ellis, Bahrain 
8  Coast Investment and Development Company, Bahrain 
9 Elaf Bank, Bahrain  
10  Emaar Properties, United Arab Emirates 
11 Emirates Tarian Capital Ltd, United Arab Emirates 
12 Eskan Bank, Bahrain 
13 Jones LangLasalle, MENA, United Arab Emirates 
14 Keppel Al Numu Development, Saudi Arabia 
15 Ratings Intelligence, Kuwait 
16 REEM Investments, United Arab Emirates 
17 Sakana Housing Solutions, Bahrain 




















1 Aayan Real Estate Co. 31 Investor Holding Group Co. 
2 Abyaar Real Estate Development Co. 32 Jabal Omar Development Co. 
3 Ajial Real Estate Entertainment Co. 33 Jeezan Holding Co 
4 Ajwan Gulf Real Estate Co. 34 Kuwait Business Town Real Estate Co. 
5 Al-Arabiya Real Estate Co 35 Kuwait Real Estate Co. 
6 Al Enmaa Real Estate Co. 36 Al Mabanee Holding Co. 
7 Al Safat Global Holding Co. 37 Manazel Holding Co. 
8 Dar-Alarkan Real Estate Development Co. 38 Al- Massaleh Real Estate Co. 
9 Aldar  39 Mena Real Estate Co. 
10 Al-Dar Properties Co.  40 Munshaat Real Estate Projects Co. 
11 Al-Mazaya Holding Co. 41 National Real Estate Co. 
12 AlMudon International Real Estate Co. 42 Pearl Development Co. 
13 Alqaria (Kuwait Real Estate Holding Co.) 43 Qatar Real Estate Investment Co. 
14 Al-Tamdeen Real Estate Development Co. 44 Safat Global Holding Co. 
15 Altijaria (The Commercial Real Estate Co) 45 Salhiah Real Estate Co. 
16 Aqar Real Estate Investments Co. 46 Sanam Real Estate Co. 
17 Arkan Al Kuwait Real Estate Co.  47 Saudi Real Estate Co.  
18 Arriyadh Development Co.  48 Seef Real Estate Co. 
19 Barwa Real Estate Co. 49 Sorouh Real Estate Co. 
20 Coast Investment and Development Co.  50 Taiba Holding Co.  
21 Deyaar Development Co. 51 Tameer Real Estate Investments Co. 
22 Dubai Development Co. 52 Al-Themar International Holding Co. 
23 Emaar Development Co. 53 Tijara Real Estate Investment Co. 
24 EMAAR AB 54 Union Properties Co. 
25 Ezdan Real Estate Co. 55 Union Real Estate Co. 
26 First Dubai Development Co. 56 United Real Estate Co. 
27 Grand Real Estate Projects   
28 Injazzat Real Estate Development Co   
29 Inovest Co.   























1 BOSTON  37  CEDAR SHOPPING CENTERS INC 
2 S L GREEN REALTY CORP  38  URSTADT BIDDLE PROPERTIES INC 
3 ALEXANDRIA REAL EST EQUITIES INC  39  KITE REALTY GROUP TRUST 
4 MACK CALI REALTY CORP  40  ROBERTS REALTY INVESTORS INC 
5 HIGHWOODS PROPERTIES INC  41  SIMON PROPERTY GROUP INC 
6 CORPORATE OFFICE PROPERTIES TR  42  MACERICH CO 
7 BIOMED REALTY TRUST INC  43  TAUBMAN CENTERS INC 
8 DOUGLAS EMMETT INC  44  C B L & ASSOCIATES PPTYS INC 
9 KILROY REALTY CORP  45  PENNSYLVANIA REAL ESTATE INVT TR 
10 BRANDYWINE REALTY TRUST  46  GLIMCHER REALTY TRUST 
11 FRANKLIN STREET PROPERTIES CORP  47  REALTY INCOME CORP 
12 PARKWAY PROPERTIES INC  48  NATIONAL RETAIL PROPERTIES INC 
13 PROLOGIS TRUST  49  AGREE REALTY CORP 
14 A M B PROPERTY CORP  50  Getty 
15 D C T INDUSTRIAL TRUST INC  51  EQUITY RESIDENTIAL PROPERTIES TR 
16 EASTGROUP PROPERTIES INC  52  AVALONBAY COMMUNITIES INC 
17 FIRST POTOMAC REALTY TRUST  53  UNITED DOMINION REALTY TR INC 
18 FIRST INDUSTRIAL REALTY TR INC  54  ESSEX PROPERTY TRUST INC 
19 LIBERTY PROPERTY TRUST  55  CAMDEN PROPERTY TRUST 
20 DUKE REALTY INVESTMENTS INC  56  B R E PROPERTIES INC 
21 P S BUSINESS PARKS INC CA  57  APARTMENT INVESTMENT & MGMT CO 
22 CAPITAL LEASE FUNDING INC  58  HOME PROPERTIES N Y INC 
23 MISSION WEST PPTYS INC MD  59  MID AMERICA APT COMMUNITIES INC 
24 GLADSTONE COMMERCIAL CORP  60  AMERICAN CAMPUS COMMUNITIES INC 
25 KIMCO REALTY CORP  61  POST PROPERTIES INC 
26 FEDERAL REALTY INVESTMENT TRUST  62  COLONIAL PROPERTIES TRUST 
27 REGENCY REALTY CORP  63  ASSOCIATED ESTATES REALTY CORP 
28 DEVELOPERS DIVERSIFIED RLTY CORP  64  EDUCATION REALTY TRUST INC 
29 WEINGARTEN REALTY INVESTORS  65  EQUITY LIFESTYLE PROPERTIES INC 
30 TANGER FACTORY OUTLET CENTERS IN  66  SUN COMMUNITIES INC 
31 ALEXANDERS INC  67  UNITED MOBILE HOMES INC 
32 EQUITY ONE INC  68  VORNADO REALTY TRUST 
33 SAUL CENTERS INC  69  WASHINGTON REAL ESTATE INVS TR 
34 ACADIA REALTY TRUST  70  LEXINGTON CORPORATE PROP INC I 
35 INLAND REAL ESTATE CORP  71  COUSINS PROPERTIES INC 
36 RAMCO GERSHENSON PROPERTIES TR  72  INVESTORS REAL ESTATE TRUST 
 
73 WINTHROP REALTY TRUST 103 PITTSBURGH & WEST VIRGINIA RR 
74 ONE LIBERTY PROPERTIES INC  104 ISTAR FINANCIAL INC 
75 PRESIDENTIAL REALTY CORP   105 NORTHSTAR REALTY FINANCE CORP
76 HOSPITALITY PROPERTIES TRUST  106 P M C COMMERCIAL TRUST 




78 DIAMONDROCK HOSPITALITY CO  108 ANWORTH MORTGAGE ASSET CORP
79 HERSHA HOSPITALITY TRUST    109 CAPSTEAD MORTGAGE CORP 
80 FELCOR LODGING TRUST INC    110 DYNEX CAPITAL INC 
81 ASHFORD HOSPITALITY TRUST INC    111 RESOURCE CAPITAL CORP 
82 M H I HOSPITALITY CORP    112 NEWCASTLE INVESTMENT CORP 
83 PUBLIC STORAGE   113 RAIT INVESTMENT TRUST 
84 EXTRA SPACE STORAGE INC    114 ARBOR REALTY TRUST INC 
85 SOVRAN SELF STORAGE INC    115 CAPITAL TRUST
86 U STORE IT TRUST   116 AMERICAN REALTY INVESTORS INC 
87 HEALTH CARE PPTY INVS INC    117 EASTERN LIGHT CAPITAL INC 
88 VENTAS INC    118 AMERICAN SPECTRUM REALTY INC 
89 HEALTH CARE REIT INC    119 GRAMERCY CAPITAL CORP 
90 NATIONWIDE HEALTH PROPERTIES INC   120 ARES CAPITAL CORP 
91 SENIOR HOUSING PROPERTIES TR    121 MAGUIRE PROPERTIES INC 
92 OMEGA HEALTHCARE INVESTORS INC   122 INNSUITES HOSPITALITY TRUST 
93 HEALTHCARE REALTY TRUST INC    123 ANNALY MORTGAGE MANAGEMENT INC
94 MEDICAL PROPERTIES TRUST INC    124 Hatteras 
95 NATIONAL HEALTH INVESTORS INC   125 Redwood
96 L T C PROPERTIES INC    
97 UNIVERSAL HEALTH RLTY INCM TR    
98 COGDELL SPENCER INC    
99 DIGITAL REALTY TRUST INC    
100 RAYONIER INC    
101 ENTERTAINMENT PROPERTIES TRUST   
102 POTLATCH CORP   
 
 
 
 
